




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PERSPECTIVES ON WARFIGHTING

Number Two

Volume One - Two

NAVAL EXPEDITIONARY FORCES AND POWER PROJECTION: INTO THE 21st CENTURY

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*Marine Corps University
Perspectives on Warfighting
Number Two
Volume One*

NAVAL EXPEDITIONARY FORCES
AND POWER PROJECTION:
INTO THE 21st CENTURY

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Editorial Policy *Perspectives on Warfighting*

The Marine Corps University's *Perspectives on Warfighting* is a series of occasional papers, edited by The Marine Corps University, funded by the Marine Corps Command and Staff College Foundation, and published by the Marine Corps Association.

Funding and publication is available to scholars whose proposals are accepted based on their scholastic and experiential backgrounds and fulfillment of our editorial policy requirements. We require: (1) a focus on warfighting (2) relevance to the combat mission of the Marine Corps (3) a basis of combat history and (4) high standard of scholarly research and writing.

The Marine Corps University's *Perspectives on Warfighting* will be studies of the art of war. History must be the basis of all study of war because history is the record of success and failure. It is through the study of that record that we may deduce our tactics, operational art, and strategy for the future. Yet, though the basis of the series *Perspectives on Warfighting* is always history, they are not papers about history. They are papers about warfare, through which we may learn and prepare to fight.

Preface

The Marine Corps University continues its series of scholarly papers on warfighting with the publishing of this two-volume set entitled *Perspectives of Warfighting, Number Two*.

These papers are written by distinguished participants of the 1991 Conference on Naval Expeditionary Forces and Power Projection which was conducted at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Tufts University) and co-sponsored by the Marine Corps University and the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis.

Volume One discusses the nature of conflict, emerging threats, and U.S. national security interests; forward deployed strategy and forces; and naval expeditionary forces, power projection, and combat missions. Volume Two continues with papers addressing naval expeditionary forces, power projection, and stability missions, and concludes with the 21st century and naval expeditionary forces: developing issues and constraining factors.

Introduction

The observation that events in the world unfold faster than the ability to forge doctrinal adjustments would certainly seem to hold true in today's strategic environment. The edifice of the Cold War shuddered and then collapsed suddenly after two generations of virtually unremitting crisis and conflict. In its wake, the fixed reference points of U.S. national security policy have shifted dramatically. With no overarching opponent against which to focus strategic doctrine or to justify force structure and weapons procurement plans, U.S. policymakers must fashion a new national security strategy against a backdrop of ambiguous threats and diffuse challenges.

In an effort to contribute to this reshaping of U.S. national security doctrine and force structure, the international security studies program of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University has sponsored over the last three years, an annual colloquium to focus on the future status of each of the major military services. This two-volume publication of *Perspectives on Warfighting* is a product of the most recent conference in this series, which addressed the roles and missions of naval expeditionary forces into the 21st century. The conference was co-sponsored by the Marine Corps University and the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and brought together experts and leading thinkers of the Marine Corps and naval expeditionary forces from the military, academia, the business sector and the press. Selected conference papers have been edited and published herein because of the valuable insight and contribution they make to the debate on future force structure and strategic priorities.

While limited space does not permit a detailed recounting of all conclusions reached at this conference, a brief capsule of the underlined and recurring theme of the papers warrants emphasis: the Marine Corps, which has always taken pride in its structuring as a "Force-in-Readiness," fills a valuable gap in the military continu-

um between home-based U.S. reaction forces and permanently deployed forward troops. With its flexible task organization and its integrated combined arms structure, a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) can provide a quick response to most regional contingencies. While the MAGTF can be deployed by air, sea, or a combination thereof, the critical value of this force is its close association with the U. S. Navy and its strong amphibious credentials.

The starting point of any U.S. strategic analysis must recognize that this country, regardless of the configuration of power and threats confronting it will remain a nation bounded by oceans, with considerable maritime interests, both economic and military. As an extension of the naval arm, the Marine Corps provides critical amphibious capability which can rapidly augment the U.S. presence in a region for the purposes of deterrence, compellence, defense, or simply "showing the flag." This amphibious capacity has provided, in the words of the late British historian B. H. Liddell-Hart, "the greatest strategic asset that a sea-based power possesses ... the U.S. Marine Corps is the best kind of fire extinguisher, because of its flexibility, reliability, logistic simplicity, and relative economy."

With the mission that it fulfills, the Marine Corps will accompany an important place in the array of military forces fielded by the United States well into the future. This two-volume publication provides a variety of perspectives on how the Marines can continue to discharge its vital duties in an era of limited resources and projected military cutbacks.

In organizing the conference and this publication, we gratefully acknowledge the support of General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., Commandant, USMC; General Alfred M. Gray, former Commandant, USMC; General Joseph P. Hoar, USMC, Commander of Central Command, who agreed to provide indispensable financial support for this undertaking; Brigadier General Peter Pace, USMC, currently serving as the President, Marine Corps University; and the Marine Corps Command and Staff College Foundation who agreed to publish the conference papers.

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Section I

The Nature of Conflict, Emerging Threats, and U.S. National Security Interests

With the decline of longstanding foes and the burgeoning of new international concerns, the U.S. faces a major challenge in redefining its national security strategy. The issue is manyfold, calling for a firm understanding of changed strategic realities, a definition of American interests and potential threats to them, and a crafting of U.S. policy and force structure to fulfill the strategic needs of the country. The first section of papers in this volume examines the parameters of this new and evolving international environment.

Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. frames the issue of continuity and change in international politics by first drawing comparisons between the present era and the post-World War II years. Both periods followed on the heels of a major U.S. victory and were punctuated with calls for massive reductions in military forces. Now as then the U.S. approach to security has continued to be more responsive than proactive in that American policymakers must engage in national security planning “without a clear grasp of the threats against which strategies and forces will be developed and deployed.”

Yet to explain fully the change in the nature of warfare, the author extends his analysis to the early years of this century. Based on this, he asserts that the end of the Cold War era will not necessarily lead to dramatic change in the types of conflict leading to war, but may witness a radical change in the way such wars are fought by the U.S. and its coalition partners. Pfaltzgraff believes

such wars are likely to be fought with high-tech conventional capabilities in which space and information technologies play a vitally important role. American technological advantage, while not immediately at risk, will slowly erode as developing countries acquire more sophisticated technologies and weaponry.

Aside from states, security challenges will continue to involve non-state actors in two major categories: terrorist and insurgency groups and well-armed and financed groups that are essentially states-within-a-state (drug cartels). The potential for U.S. forces to be directly involved in these forms of low-intensity conflict is relatively high in the author's estimation.

Moving beyond threats, Pfaltzgraff turns his attention to ways in which regional security can be enhanced through what is termed "peacetime engagement" actions. For military forces, the author asserts that peacetime engagement holds several principal implications. First, greater emphasis will be placed on strengthening air and sealift capabilities to achieve greater strategic and tactical mobility. Second, traditional military roles will be supplemented by the use of military forces for missions that are not necessarily military in nature. In this era, it is imperative to win acceptance of the need for both preventive measures and increasingly rapid response in the face of technologically advanced enemy forces.

In his article, Dr. Greenwood argues that seeking a redefinition of the spectrum of conflict in the changed global circumstances of today constitutes the wrong search. The purpose of seeking such a definition in the past was to provide a conceptual basis for strategic doctrine, force structure design, and weapons selection. The author argues that, while these important aspects of national security policy still need a grounding in strategic realities, to seek this reality solely in an outline of the spectrum of conflict is misguided.

Greenwood asserts that potential U.S. involvement in a spectrum of conflict must compete on a more or less equal footing with peacetime considerations which have little to do with conflict in determining the nature of strategic doctrine and the structure of U.S. military forces. The author divides the peacetime functions of

military forces into two categories: power projection and assistance projection. Power projection involves military presence, exercises, and reinforcement potential for purposes of force balancing, deterrence or compellence, reassurance of allies, and protection of U.S. interests.

Aside from these more traditional functions, the author points out that military forces have been and are likely to be increasingly called upon to provide humanitarian support through assistance projection. In other respects, the traditional spectrum of conflict still applies. Greenwood believes that within this familiar spectrum, low intensity conflict will remain the most common form of struggle in the world. Greenwood points out that the collective use of force under the aegis of the United Nations or other international bodies is a possibility for the U.S. in the future.

General Van Riper begins his paper with an admonition to avoid hasty analyses of an event as complex as Operation Desert Storm. His theme is that war is probabilistic, not deterministic, and therefore, in this new era of multiple, diffused, and vague threats, it is necessary to advance U.S. warfighting capabilities to contend with a broad spectrum of ambiguous and dynamic challenges. Further, since this is a period of considerable political, economic, and technological change, a review of the basic concepts of war should be undertaken to identify what new perspectives about force and its use are worthy of continued development.

Van Riper believes that both Desert Shield and Desert Storm were planned and executed by military and civilian leaders who were well-grounded in Clausewitzian theory. The author holds that the Gulf War confirmed the relevance of Clausewitz to modern warfare in that states fought for political objectives that could not be fully achieved with other means and derived the authority to execute this effort from the "remarkable trinity" of political leaders, military commanders, and general population.

With this understanding of war, Van Riper states that Desert Storm can be viewed as both exception and rule in the years ahead. In the sense that military strategy was integrated with policy objec-

tives in U.S. and Allied planning for the Gulf War, then this operation should serve as the norm for the future. But achieving as clear a connection between policy and strategy will become more difficult in the post-Cold War world. In the place of an overarching threat, a host of uncertain and more diffuse challenges will arise. To meet these demands, the demonstrated versatility of Navy and Marine forces in providing forward presence and crisis response will call for their enhancement in the years ahead.

Chapter I

Continuity and Change in Future Conflict and War

Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

With the passing of the Cold War, we confront the inevitable need to rethink strategies, force structures, commitments, and the allocation of resources for national security. Such a requirement necessarily follows the end of a period in which, as over the past two generations, agreed threats and interests, defined and prioritized, formed the conceptual basis for a broadly based consensus on which a sustained defense policy was constructed. As we contemplate the future, it is instructive to recall that, in the years following World War II, we faced a situation that bears considerable similarity to the present period. A major victory having been won, the view was widespread that military forces could be sharply reduced. That we had little understanding of the nature or scope of future conflict and war from the vantage point of 1945 was more than implicit in the rearmament effort that the United States found it necessary to mount after the outbreak of the Korean conflict in 1950 and the onset of the Cold War. Only in response to the emerging security environment of the post-World War II period and the threats posed to vital interests was the United States able and willing to commit major resources to defense. As it had in earlier eras, the United States embraced a reactive approach to defense planning. Whether in point of fact we know any more about the world of the next generation than we did about the requirements of security in the Cold War period from the perspective of 1945 and the years immediately after remains to be seen. In all likelihood, our approach to security will continue to be more responsive than proactive.

Now as then we confront the need to engage in effective national

security planning without a clear grasp of the threats against which strategies and forces will be developed and deployed. Today we face, as in the years after World War II, the reality that lead times for the development, production and deployment of weapons systems extend over a protracted time frame. Decisions to downsize forces taken today will shape the structures that we will have available for contingencies later in this decade and in the early 21st century. What cannot be known are the actual conflicts resulting in armed combat that will require American expeditionary and other power projection capabilities. Will we find it necessary, once again, to go into combat, as in the Korean conflict, with a force structure unable without major and rapid increases to perform its assigned missions? Most to the point, will we have the time to make whatever adjustments may prove to be necessary in order to deploy such capabilities in conflicts where they are needed in support of vital interests?

To a great extent, the answers to such questions depend not only on the degree to which we can anticipate future conflicts and wars but also the extent to which an understanding of such contingencies actually results in a force planning process leading to the acquisition of necessary capabilities. If the experience of the years after World War II does not offer grounds for excessive optimism about our capacity for such analysis and resulting action, the question is whether in the 1990s and beyond we will do better than in earlier times.

It is tempting, in a discussion of continuity and change in future conflict and war, to carry our comparison of the present with the early years following World War II one step further. At that time the assumption was widespread that nuclear weapons had altered fundamentally the way in which future wars would be fought or, more precisely, the extent to which the deterrence of armed combat would take precedence over actual military operations. It was widely assumed, as reflected in our rapid military demobilization, that the United States would not again confront a military threat comparable to World War II. Yet the Korean conflict, limited in scope as it was, far more resembled the combat operations of World War II than some hypothesized future situation in which

the awesome power of atomic weapons would furnish the basis for deterrence or for actually fighting such a war. In retrospect, to have prepared force structures in the years just after World War II for contingencies like Korea or the buildup of conventional forces in NATO-Europe that followed in the early 1950s would have been a prudent move. To have advocated such a force structure in 1945, however, would have garnered its proponent little respect and much ridicule. Such was the gap between our perception and the emerging reality of the global security environment, whose basic contours and policy implications became evident only with the passage of time.

To examine change in the nature of warfare it is essential to extend our analysis to the earlier years of this century. While the battlefield similarities between World War II and the Korean conflict were numerous, the reverse was clearly the case as a result of the revolution in strategy and technologies that so sharply differentiated the conduct of combat operations between the two World Wars. The development of air power, both as a strategic and close air support system, the immense mobility conferred by innovations in mechanized armored forces, and related changes in other types of capabilities, including communications, profoundly altered the way in which military forces won or lost wars, so vividly demonstrated in the differences between German and French operations at the time of the fall of France in 1940. Similarly, innovations in naval platforms, notably dramatic advances in carrier-based air power, as well as the submarine, transformed the conduct of warfare at sea. The failure to incorporate the results of the military-technological revolution of this era, as well as the strategic concepts developed between the two World Wars, into their force structures contributed in no small measure to France's defeat by the *Wehrmacht*. By the same token, Saddam Hussein's apparent reliance on strategies and tactics most descriptive of 1914 sealed the defeat of his armies.

Whether or not Operation Desert Shield/Storm represents the prototype for future warfare, it marks the advent of changed technologies and operational concepts comparable in significance to the transformation that took place between the two World Wars.

Advances in information technologies, together with the increasing range, accuracy, and lethality of conventional munitions taken together, have quickened and compressed the tempo of modern warfare. Strategic and other operations that once took days, weeks, or months to complete can now be accomplished in hours and minutes. Among the implications of Desert Storm is the ability conferred by the most advanced technologies to destroy strategic targets early in a conflict without resort to nuclear weapons. Previously, as in World War II, such conventional operations usually required a much longer period and relied on less than accurate capabilities and relatively slow delivery systems. In this respect, Operation Desert Shield/Storm was as different from the Korean conflict as World War II was from World War I.

Thus there exist in the 20th century sharply delineated eras of discontinuity in the conduct of warfare. The first is the period between the two World Wars, and the second is the revolutionary changes in the nature of war symbolized by Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Consider for a moment the battlefield environment in which Allied expeditionary forces fought at the time of World War I, contrasted to operations a generation later following Operation Overlord, the landing of Allied forces on the Normandy beaches in 1944, leading to the defeat of Nazi Germany less than a year later. Therefore, in any discussion of continuity and change in conflict and warfare in the late 20th century, it is essential to assess the impact of technological innovation on the nature of warfare, superimposed as it inevitably will be on the world political map of the future.

In the years after World War II, what changed principally as a result of nuclear weapons, so it seems in retrospect, was the nature of superpower conflict rather than at the level of conventional warfare. It is conceivable that, in the absence of nuclear weapons, the confrontations that marked the Cold War would have escalated to conventional armed conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Instead, those conflicts that actually resulted in wars in which one or both of the superpowers had vital interests took place either between a superpower and a non-nuclear power, or between non-nuclear powers themselves supported directly or indirectly by

one or the other superpower. The advent of nuclear weapons, whatever their inhibiting effects in superpower relations, had little effect, not clearly understood in the years immediately following World War II, on the actual conduct of wars. As we see so vividly in retrospect, nuclear weapons did little to discourage armed conflict at levels of intensity beneath the nuclear threshold except, as in NATO or elsewhere, where there was a clearly understood escalatory ladder from the conventional to the nuclear that served to deter at both levels. Otherwise, we witnessed wars that bore great similarity and displayed considerable continuity, fought with then existing state-of-the-art weapons and with less sophisticated systems as well.

Prominent in the list of such conflicts was the Korean War, in which large conventional forces clashed on a battlefield that extended over the entire Korean peninsula with numerous similarities to the military operations of World War II. In contrast, in Vietnam, we faced armed combat at varying levels of intensity from skirmishes engaging small units, hit-and-run tactics, and large-scale military operations depending on strategic opportunities and tactical circumstances. Common to both Korea and Vietnam was the presence of major capabilities for conventional warfare. In addition, the Vietnam War was a conflict in which strategies for revolutionary warfare were utilized to great effect against South Vietnam and the United States. Our technological advantages were negated by strategy and tactics employed by the opponent. Although the antecedents for the revolutionary or insurgency warfare of the last two generations are deeply rooted in the history of warfare, the widespread utilization of such strategies and tactics, described by such strategist-practitioners as Mao Tse-Tung, Che Guevara, and General Giap, were amplified, perfected, and practiced with unprecedented effect in the decades following World War II. The ability of the United States and other powers challenged by such wars to find appropriate responses proved for the most part to be less than satisfactory.

An assessment of continuity and change in future conflict and war necessarily depends on the extent to which the emerging security environment, as well as the actual capabilities in the form of

strategies, technologies and force structures, will differ appreciably from the recent past, together with the interests deemed sufficiently vital to call for the commitment of military power. Clearly, we are in the midst of a major redrawing of the global political map in an era of military technological revolution that will have profoundly important implications for how we project or maintain military power as part of a forward presence. This altered security landscape is marked by numerous armed conflicts fought thus far, as in the case of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, with weapons more reminiscent of World War II than of the technologically advanced systems of Desert Storm and beyond.

The prospect for conflicts resulting in wars as the territorial boundaries of emerging political units are disputed and redrawn is likely to increase dramatically in the years ahead. The potential for such confrontations abounds from Europe to the Middle East and South Asia to other parts of the Asian-Pacific area. We face a world characterized by increasing political fragmentation, itself a potent manifestation of conflict often leading to war. However pervasive it may become in the years ahead, such conflict represents a logical outgrowth or an integral part of the breakup of existing political units. It is a phenomenon that has recurred not only in this century but in previous eras as well. What distinguishes the contemporary security setting is the existence for the first time of a global international system containing more than 160 state actors and likely to grow substantially in numbers in the years ahead. For the most part, the conventional and unconventional wars of the late 20th century had their origins in the breakup of existing states and empires. The further fragmentation of political units would be unusual if it did not spawn additional conflicts leading to armed combat.

The disintegration of political units as a catalyst for conflict and war coincides with the prospect for armed confrontation between existing or emerging states. Here again, the experience of the past two generations provides ample basis for a discussion of continuity in conflict and war. Like the Second World War, the October 1973 War included battles between large armored formations in the Sinai and elsewhere on Egyptian territory. Such engagements,

for Israel, were underwritten by a massive U.S. military resupply effort mounted after the outbreak of armed conflict. By the same token Operation Desert Storm, fought with technologies developed for the most part for use on a NATO-European battlefield, was dependent on highly mobile, yet firepower intensive, forces that could be deployed in substantial numbers in support of vital interests.

Among the major differences between Desert Storm and previous conflicts was the fact that, for the first time in history, space systems were both integral to the conduct of the war and crucial to its outcome. For the first time space systems were the principal means for intra- as well as inter-theater communications. Although such technologies were never tested against a Soviet-Warsaw Pact military force, they furnish at least in conceptual terms an insight into the dramatically transformed nature of warfare as it would have been fought in NATO-Warsaw Pact military engagements. Once again, it is useful to contrast a hypothetical war in Europe between highly equipped NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in possession of the state-of-the-art high-tech weaponry of the late 20th century with the sharply differing wars fought in Europe between 1914-1918 and 1940-1945.

The contemporary global political map contains numerous examples of conflict and war (1) within existing states in the process of disintegration; and (2) between states or combinations thereof. Barring a fundamental transformation at the international level, such situations are likely not only to persist but even to intensify as the number of political units increases, especially in the former Soviet Union, with important implications, for example, for the political map of Europe and the Middle East. For example, does the unfolding chaos in Yugoslavia furnish in microcosm a portent of things to come in the former Soviet Union and perhaps in the Middle East or South Asia? Thus, the likely prospect is for continuity in conflict both at the intra- and interstate level with a principal change lying in the frequency or numbers of such conflicts and how those wars are fought, depending on the rapidity with which technologies such as those employed in the recent Gulf War are more widely diffused.

Whatever may be the elements of continuity, the future inevitably bears major differences from the past. The end of the Cold War era marks a change of dramatic proportions, not so much in the types of conflict actually leading to war, as in the ways in which such wars may be fought by the United States and its coalition partners as vital interests are affected. Such conflicts extend across a spectrum that encompasses not only conventional operations between large-scale armed forces, but also includes unconventional warfare between smaller groups at lower intensity levels based on political, socio-economic, religious, or resource issues. It is widely acknowledged that, as the prospect for global war has diminished, the likelihood of regional conflict has increased. Such wars, as we saw in Desert Storm, are likely increasingly to be fought with high-tech conventional capabilities in which, for example, space and information technologies play a vitally important role. Regional powers will not soon acquire the panoply of systems available to the United States in Desert Storm. Nevertheless, such states are likely to gain possession of some such capabilities, including more accurate missiles and their associated warheads. Although for at least the remainder of this decade, the United States is likely to retain an impressive technological lead as manifested in the technologies utilized in Desert Shield/Storm, nevertheless other powers will be in the process of developing, or otherwise acquiring, such technologies as advanced command, control and communications; advanced guidance and stealth systems, and space-based components of integrated military systems so dramatically demonstrated in the recent Gulf War. Such technology diffusion will occur at an uneven pace in regions, notably the Middle East, in which the interest of the United States lies in the preservation, or restoration, of power balances or configurations and the development of desirable international structures that serve to prevent domination by would-be hegemonic powers, as in the case of Iraq. They may also develop strategies designed to counter and circumvent existing U.S. advantages. Thus, at the regional level we face a situation in which there will be larger numbers of possessors of weapons capable of high-intensity warfare.

Under such circumstances, the challenge to U.S. national security policy will be to devise strategies and expeditionary force structures

sufficiently flexible, mobile, and firepower intensive, capable of projection either as deterrents or for actually engaging enemy forces in combat. The security environment in which such forces will find it necessary to operate will have as its defining characteristics increasing numbers of powers in possession of new-generation technologies, including nuclear and chemical, as well as other types of conventional warheads, together with their associated delivery systems. Technologies presently the exclusive preserve of advanced powers such as the United States will eventually become more widely available.

Among the problems that will arise in the emerging security environment will be the protection of power projection forces, both en route and at their staging areas, which will be magnified by the availability of a spectrum of capabilities encompassing missiles of increasing lethality, range, and accuracy, and extending, as in the 1983 Beirut Marine Barracks attack, to terrorist groups, themselves in possession of increasingly sophisticated weapons previously confined to state actors. Thus we will need to think increasingly of the technological and other requirements not only for power projection, but also power protection forces, as well as the implications of new technologies for the organization of such forces.

At the same time that technology is altering how wars are fought, we are in the midst of a rapid increase in the numbers and types of political actors including states as well as non-state entities. Especially in the case of conflicts within states, non-state actors have been prominent participants, if not catalytic factors, posing challenges to the authority of established governments. The unfolding process of disintegration of certain states, together with the rise of self-assertiveness on the part of previously quiescent groups in many parts of the world, offers numerous portents of future conflicts based on combat between state and non-state actors. Such entities may include at least two categories of non-state actors. A first category includes insurgent groups seeking to seize state power from an incumbent government in a coup or revolutionary movement, which will remain a prominent feature of the global political landscape. A second category of non-state actor, a well-armed and financed group that is effectively a state-within-a-state typified by

the drug barons, will probably gain greater prominence as a national security threat within and beyond their respective regions. Armed confrontations resulting from such situations will be waged with weapons of varying levels of sophistication, depending on their availability to one or more of the parties engaged in conflict. Conceivably, longer established groups will have access to systems of greater sophistication than newly founded non-state actors, although heavily funded entities of this kind, such as drug cartels, will be able to narrow and even to reverse the advantage to established authorities.

Although advanced technologies will become more widely available, they will be proliferated on an uneven basis, thus heightening the potential for regional instability, including situations in which expansionist powers gain a strategic and technological edge over status-quo states. Whether central governments in possession of the most advanced military capabilities, including nuclear and chemical warheads and delivery systems, will forego the use, *in extremis*, of such capabilities against revisionist groups within their respective frontiers remains to be seen. What is certain, however, is the fact that the conflict map already contains, in the case of the former Soviet Union, a possessor of the most advanced military systems whose leadership confronts the ominous specter of disintegration and civil war. Such a condition, depending on the pace and extent of future weapons proliferation in the context of political trends outlined above, will probably become a characteristic feature of other countries and regions as well with potentially important consequences for the security of the United States and its allies.

The dynamics of weapons proliferation and conflict are such that present possessors of the means for the conduct of low-intensity conflict will increasingly gain access to higher-intensity capabilities. By the same token, newly forming groups are most likely to enter the conflict arena as the possessors of low-intensity capabilities. Conceivably, as in the past in the form of state-sponsored terrorism, the possessors of higher-intensity capabilities will find advantage in resort to low-intensity operations of various kinds as part of a strategy designed to achieve their political objec-

tives. Such a prospect, as well as the presence of increasing numbers of non-state actors prepared to use force at various levels in support of their goals, will continue to make low-intensity conflict a crucially important feature of the global security landscape. What is certain is that political instability leading to low-intensity conflict, defined as political-military confrontation short of convention war, will persist in abundant measure.

Among the issues contributing both to low-intensity conflict and simultaneously providing the means to acquire more sophisticated weaponry is international drug trafficking. Drug-inspired violence is likely to continue to increase in the years ahead with important international and domestic implications. If demand for illicit drugs maintains its present growth patterns in the United States and elsewhere, the financial resources available to international drug cartels will confer on such organizations a greater ability to acquire a variety of advanced technologies. Such capabilities, including technologies for countering drug enforcement efforts, will give unprecedented power to private armies in drug-producing countries, together with other forms of protection, the net effect of which will be to create potential low-intensity conflict challenges both to the armed forces of countries attempting to counter such operations within their borders as well as to the United States.

The role of the U.S. military has already been defined to include the possible use of forces in countries that are drug producers and at points of transit from the source to the United States. Although emphasis is placed on such activities as assistance for nation-building, operational support for indigenous forces, and efforts in association with host nation forces to halt exports, it is not difficult to envisage a variety of scenarios for low-intensity conflict in drug-producing states in which U.S. forces might become directly engaged as emphasis on counternarcotics operations grows in importance as a national security priority. In the transit phase as well, the role military forces both in monitoring and interdicting drugs is likely to gain greater saliency in the years ahead, with the prospect for low-intensity conflict engaging U.S. forces in the maritime environment as well as on land, for example in the Andean states

which form the point of origin for most of the cocaine that enters the United States.

Even a cursory survey of the emerging security environment reveals a broad spectrum of conflict in a world of greater numbers and types of actors. Within and between states the potential for conflicts leading to wars across a spectrum from low-to-high-intensity will increase dramatically. What will differ, as we assess the nature of continuity and change, will be the dramatic increase in the numbers of actors having greater access to weapons of mass destruction in conflict-prone regions including Europe (former Soviet Union) as well as the Middle East (Syria, Iran) and Northeast Asia (North Korea), to mention the most obvious and immediate. The implications of this increased proliferation have yet to be understood, although the prospects for instability will be enhanced to the extent that "rogue" states are in the vanguard of the acquisition of such capabilities. It is conceivable that such possessors of high-intensity capabilities will find it possible to expand their use of low-intensity strategies and operations under the assumption that their possession of forces at the higher end of the spectrum deters appropriate responses on the part of an aggrieved power. For example, what effect would Libya's acquisition of a nuclear capability and delivery system have on the willingness of the United States or another power to engage in a retaliatory raid, as in 1986, in response to terrorist acts traced to Qadhaffi? What types of responses, under such circumstances, would the United States need to contemplate in its power project capability against terrorist acts perpetrated by a state possessing the means for high-intensity military action against the United States and its allies? Such questions will need to be addressed as we contemplate a changing security setting characterized by a greater diversity of actors and capabilities for conflict operations at higher and lower levels of intensity.

In an era of change, any discussion of the conflict environment leads inevitably to a consideration of the nature of U.S. interests on whose behalf forces will be developed and deployed. It is widely (and correctly) assumed that American engagement will be highly selective. Yet the meaning of selective in operational terms remains vague. To be sure, the concept "peacetime engagement" is

based on the explicit assumption that the United States will define as carefully and fully as possible those contingencies in which military forces will be deployed. Peaceful engagement means that military power forms but one important component of a broader strategy designed to achieve national security goals in a more diverse or multipolar world. By the meaning of peacetime engagement, military forces form instruments of last resort for actual operations, although their deterrent value presumably will be taken fully into account in defining projected requirements. Whether peacetime engagement providing for the highly selective use of military forces is synonymous with the less frequent utilization of such power remains to be seen. The experience of the 1989-1991 time frame, coinciding with the end of the Cold War, does not offer cause for great optimism, with the examples of Just Cause and Operation Desert Shield/Storm in mind. The logical inference to be drawn from an assessment of a changing conflict map in which the numbers of actors and conflicts leading to war are likely to increase, perhaps even dramatically, is that we will face the possibility of increased, rather than diminished, selective use of military forces even on behalf of carefully defined interests.

Whether the United States would actually be more frequently called upon to employ power projection forces in situations extending from low to higher levels of intensity depends on the definition of interests underlying American strategy. The term "peacetime engagement" has gained substantial currency without a broadly accepted definition. Among its assumptions is the perceived need to focus less on immediate threats and instead to place greater emphasis on preventing the gradual erosion of security in a more disorderly world of widening power diffusion. Regional conflict, as in the recent example of Desert Storm, and transregional issues, as in the case of drug trafficking, frames the types of security issues for which the United States must plan military capabilities and other instruments of strategy. Explicit in the concept "peacetime engagement" is the pursuit of opportunities to defuse, resolve, or prevent crises and to promote regional stability. The approach emphasizes support for representative governments and market economies. Available political, economic, and military resources are to be utilized in coordinated fashion to underwrite

peacetime engagement. It is suggested that the United States will find it necessary to maintain a capacity for force projection and crisis response that will include a forward presence but at greatly reduced levels from the Cold War era. Peacetime engagement is said to require enhanced proficiency with respect to other capabilities, including those necessary for early warning, the capacity to build *ad hoc* coalitions, and the ability to heighten the impact of military actions. Explicit in this focus of peacetime engagement is the idea that military power would be employed only within the broader context of a political-military strategy designed to follow military success with a longer-term political strategy based on national interests and goals.

For military forces, peacetime engagement holds several principal implications. With respect to power projection needs, emphasis is placed on the strengthening of air and sealift capabilities to achieve greater strategic and tactical mobility. Over-the-horizon fire support is to be improved. Presumably, the strategies and technologies that provided the means for rapid and decisive military victory in Operation Desert Shield/Storm will be further refined for the broad range of contingencies implicit in "peacetime engagement." The ability of U.S. forces to operate either as part of a broader coalition or within a peacekeeping operation is to be improved. Traditional military roles, it is recognized, are to be supplemented by the allocation of military forces to missions that are not necessarily military in nature, but for which such forces have special capabilities. They may include well-defined and carefully delineated nation-building or humanitarian assistance, which are expected to increase in importance to the extent that the conflict environment continues to be dominated by regional contingencies and unconventional threats. Thus the role of U.S. armed forces in the emerging security setting based on the concept of peacetime engagement encompasses the training of, and operations with, coalition forces; participation in military actions across a broad spectrum; and a host of other activities designed to support diplomacy in all of its phases.

Whether a security concept based on peacetime engagement will command essential public support cannot fully be known at this

time. To what extent can it be made sufficiently explicit in its various ramifications so as to establish a series of defense acquisition priorities and to shape future defense budgets? Congressional and public support for defense has been more intuitive and reactive than conceptual or cerebral. In present circumstances, as it was in the Cold War era, the development of sustained consensus will depend on the extent to which vital national interests and goals can be identified as the basis for developing an adequate force structure within the overall context of the peacetime engagement concept. To what extent, for example, can it be demonstrated that, in an era in which the Cold War has been replaced by an era requiring peacetime engagement, there is a resulting requirement for substantial military forces?

Historically, peace and military power have not been viewed in the United States as coincident properties. Threats that are ambiguous, as suggested in the peacetime engagement strategy will be a characteristic feature of the security environment, have not called forth a major commitment of resources to defense. Nevertheless, with recent examples such as Operation Just Cause and Desert Shield/Storm in mind, perhaps a force structure adequate to the needs of the 1990s and beyond can be sustained. Peacetime engagement should be viewed as a concept containing periods of armed conflict, thus requiring the preservation of adequate military power both for purposes of deterrence and in the likely event of deterrence failure, especially at the lower levels of the conflict-intensity spectrum. However, again, it is useful to recall that containment, as the conceptual basis for Cold War strategy, was publicly enunciated in 1947. Yet it took the unfolding events leading to the Korean War three years later to furnish the impetus toward Cold War rearmament. Will comparable future contingencies be the necessary prerequisite to the development of the required force structure for the years leading into the next century based on a concept such as peacetime engagement or whatever U.S. strategy comes to be called in the years just ahead?

It follows that, having identified those conflict issues requiring the utilization of military power across the board spectrum defined above, the United States will face the need to deploy requisite

forces. Here we face a host of issues with respect to the types of forces to be constructed and projected. For example, it has already been noted, the revolution in military technologies, in this case a derivative of the advent of missiles and their associated warheads, as well as space and ground-based command, control and communications, will eventually confer the advantages of unprecedented accuracy as well as global range on increasing numbers of actors in such areas as information technologies and conventional munitions lethality. Operation Desert Storm revealed the extent to which technological advances have altered the meaning of strategic warfare as well as the greatly reduced time required to achieve the destruction of identified targets without resort to nuclear systems. Operation Desert Storm also provided evidence of the need for the rapid deployment of overwhelming ground capabilities as a part of the coalition operation to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait. It is likely that conventional systems, as a result of major advances in accuracy and range, will continue to confer on their possessors the means greatly to shorten the time required to achieve strategic victory. Thus we face the need to address important questions related to the types of power projection forces extending across a spectrum from low- to high-intensity operations and deterrence assets. At the lower end of the spectrum, what types of expeditionary forces will it be necessary to develop and deploy or to pre-position preemptively in conflict environments for purposes of deterring enemy operations? How would such forces be related to the other components of power projection (and power protection) in order to assure escalation control or dominance for the United States and its coalition partners? For example, the ability of the United States, by itself or more likely in association with coalition partners, to intervene with forces interposed between friendly and enemy forces, or to protect the territory of allies or friendly states as in the case of Saudi Arabia in the recent Gulf War, would depend vitally on expeditionary units and other components of the overall structure within an agreed strategic concept.

Thus the unfolding security environment holds numerous important implications for the United States both in designing and actually deploying expeditionary forces in the years ahead. If U.S. interests continue to be defined in global terms, even in an era of

highly selective intervention in varying conflict intensity settings, we will face sharp differences in terrain and climate, as well as differing levels of capacity on the part of host nations for necessary logistical and other support. The need for increasingly rapid response will be heightened by the presence of enemy forces themselves in possession of technologies that confer unprecedented speed, range, accuracy, and lethality as a result of the wider availability of ballistic and cruise missiles and other technologies. If technology confers unprecedented speed, information, accuracy, lethality and range, what types of expeditionary forces should be developed to take account of such advances? If such forces themselves will be targetable by an enemy in possession of advanced technologies, what countermeasures, active or passive, must be taken to ensure the ability of expeditionary forces to conduct effective combat or to act as deterrents? If the forward-based logistical infrastructure becomes increasingly vulnerable, what changes need to be reflected in the types of expeditionary forces that we deploy? In the same time frame leading into the next century, the United States will face continuing reductions not only in its own force structures, but also in overseas facilities and forward deployments as well as other local infrastructures required for logistical support.

This assessment of the nature of continuity and change in conflict and war points up the urgent need, in a dynamic security environment, to fashion a total structure that includes expeditionary forces that are necessarily leaner in numbers but far more lethal in firepower, capable of self-contained operations at the low-intensity end of the spectrum and of combined operations at the national and coalition levels in higher intensity conflicts such as Operation Desert Shield/Storm. However such forces are ultimately configured, it will be essential to base their configuration on two essential assumptions: the persistence of a broad range of conflicts in an increasingly multipolar security environment with additional numbers and categories of actors as well as an understanding of the implications of an ongoing revolution in military technologies and strategies whose ultimate implications may be as profoundly important for the conduct of warfare on the threshold of the Third Millennium as were the changes between the two World Wars.



Redefining the Spectrum of Conflict: Peace, Crisis, Conflict, War

Dr. Ted Greenwood

The assigned subject for this paper, as its title indicates, is the redefinition of the Spectrum of Conflict. The paper will indeed discuss the spectrum of conflict and especially the extent to which it has changed as a result of recent world events. However, the paper begins by arguing that seeking a redefinition of the spectrum of conflict is, in important respects, the wrong search.

The purpose of seeking a definition of the spectrum of conflict in the past was to provide a basis for strategy development, for force structure design, and for weapons choices. We need such a basis now no less than in the past. But to seek it solely or even primarily in a definition of the spectrum of conflict is to look in the wrong place. This has not become true just recently; it has always been true to some degree, as is clear from the second half of the title that the conference organizers gave to this paper: "Peace, Crisis, Conflict, War." "Peace" does not really belong within a spectrum of conflict. Peace is the absence of conflict, unless by conflict one includes political as well as armed conflict. Crisis may or may not involve armed conflict.

To include these conditions on a so-called spectrum of conflict was to acknowledge two things. First, the so-called "spectrum of conflict" was always an imperfect metaphor. Second, strategy development, force structure design and weapons choices have depended more on the nature of anticipated conflict than on the requirements for peace or crisis. The imperfection of the metaphor was well known, of course, but most analysts and students of mili-

tary affairs were quite willing to treat peace and crisis as special cases on the low end of the spectrum of conflict. The intellectual impurity was not bothersome because everyone understood that what really mattered was the rest of the spectrum. The basis for strategy, force structure design and weapons choices was different kinds of armed conflict and these -- quite appropriately -- drew the most attention.

Today, the recognition that the United States could be involved in different kinds of armed conflict is still highly relevant to strategy development, force structure design, and weapons choices, but now the requirements of conflict must compete on a more or less equal footing with the requirements for what has been called peacetime engagement. The better question today, therefore is the more fundamental one: "What should be the basis for our strategy, our force structure, and our weapons choices?" The answer is a combination of the need to prepare for warfare at various levels of conflict and very important peacetime engagement functions of military forces.

PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT

Because most readers will be quite familiar with the various levels of conflict and because the idea that peacetime engagement should in the future really be central for our strategy, force structure design and weapons choices might be unfamiliar, this paper will dwell at some length on the peacetime considerations. The peacetime functions of military forces are quite numerous but, as shown in Table 1, can be divided into two categories. The first is power projection which, in the absence of conflict, includes military presence, exercises, and reinforcement potential. The specific peacetime functions that can be achieved by power projection are force balancing, deterrence and compellence of adversaries or potential adversaries, reassurance of allies and friends, ensuring that U.S. interests are taken into account, and crisis avoidance and crisis management. The second category of peacetime functions of





TABLE 1
PEACETIME FUNCTIONS OF MILITARY FORCES

- A. POWER PROJECTION** (presence, exercises, and reinforcement potential)
1. force balancing
 2. deterrence and compellence of adversaries or potential adversaries
 3. reassurance of allies and friends
 4. ensuring that U.S. interests are taken into account
 5. crisis avoidance and crisis management
- B. ASSISTANCE PROJECTION**
1. disaster relief
 2. care and protection of refugees
 3. non-combatant evacuation
 4. support of other nations; training, transport, construction
 5. peacekeeping

military forces might be called assistance projection.¹ The specific functions that would be included in this category include disaster relief, care and protection of refugees, non-combatant evacuation, support of other nations through training, transport, or construction, and peacekeeping. Each of these functions will be addressed briefly in turn.

There are two reasons why force balances are important.² First, the presence of an excessive force imbalance would harbor the



¹This term is borrowed from LtGen Henry Stackpole (USMC) who used it in a somewhat narrower sense than it is used here. See his paper in Volume II.

²For a more complete discussion of the significance of force balances in Europe and of the utility of employing the concept of force balancing as a basis for NATO force planning, see Ted Greenwood and Stuart Johnson, "NATO Force Planning without the Soviet Threat," *Parameters* (Spring, 1991), on which this and the following paragraph are based.

seed of instability by providing the temptation, if not the motivation, for stronger states to employ their forces to intimidate or coerce others or even to initiate hostilities. Over the long term, force imbalances provide an unstable basis for a lasting peace. Even a state with a benign intent one day could have hostile intent another and the ability to act out that hostility might well increase the likelihood of the transformation. Second, the balance of forces between states has always been an important determinant of the psychological context for interstate relations in peacetime, influencing not only perceptions of security but also the conduct of day-to-day diplomacy over issues to which military forces are not immediately central. This will remain true in Europe and elsewhere for the foreseeable future.

For these reasons, it is important that the United States and its allies maintain an adequate peacetime force balance with respect to their adversaries and potential adversaries. By "maintaining an adequate force balance" is not meant necessarily matching another state's forces man for man or weapon for weapon. Rather, the requirement is to avoid excessive imbalances of forces. There is no more reason in the future than there has been in the past for the United States or the United States plus its allies necessarily to match the military forces of a potential adversary. There is also not just one way to maintain an adequate force balance: it can be achieved through routine military presence, through exercises, through reinforcement potential, and through a combination of these. In both Europe and the Western Pacific peacetime force balancing, not reliance on unrealistic threat scenarios, should now become the basis for NATO and U.S. strategy, force structure design, and weapons choices. The primary answer to the very important question "how can NATO do force planning in the absence of the Soviet threat?" is, "by ensuring an adequate balance of forces in Europe vis-a-vis the primary successor state to the Soviet Union, and vis-a-vis other potential adversaries, especially Turkey's southeastern neighbors.

Maintaining a military capability for deterrence and the potential for compellence has been an important determinant of U.S. strategy, force structure and weapons choices where threats actual-

ly exist and will remain so in such circumstances. As with maintaining an adequate force balance, deterrence and compellence can be achieved through presence, exercises and reinforcement potential as well as, occasionally, through punitive action.

Where real threats still exist, the United States needs, as in the past, to reassure its friends and allies that it will help defend them if need be. Reassurance must also be provided that the United States remains interested in particular areas and will continue to play a political and military role there. This is especially true for east Asia where Koreans and Japanese have both reasons to question whether the United States will remain engaged in their region and a strong preference that it do so. Reassurance can be achieved through political as well as military instruments. However, routine military presence and the conduct of military exercises are especially useful.

Ensuring that the individual interests of the United States, in trade, finance, and other areas, are taken into account by other states in the day-to-day conduct of their international relations has always been and remains one of the primary reasons for maintaining U.S. forces in Europe and Japan. Again, both the routine deployment of U.S. military forces and the conduct of exercises in a region and with the forces of another state can contribute to this objective.

The routine presence of military forces and the sending of reinforcement in times of crisis can be useful for crisis avoidance and for crisis management, including conflict avoidance, when crises occur. Because of their mobility, independence, and intrinsic military capabilities, naval forces, especially carrier battle groups and Marine Expeditionary Units, have been and will remain particularly useful for this function. The use and sometimes provision to others of military intelligence can also be important instruments of crisis avoidance and crisis management.

Military forces have been and are likely to be increasingly called upon to provide humanitarian assistance. These include disaster relief, the care and protection of refugees, and non-combatant

evacuation. U.S. forces performed all of these functions in 1991. In January, while awaiting the commencement of the offensive against Iraq, a Marine Corps unit was diverted from the Persian Gulf to rescue U.S. and other nationals from the deteriorating situation in Somalia. U.S. Marines and Army Special Operations forces, with allied assistance, helped supply food, shelter and medical supplies and offered protection to Kurdish refugees fleeing from Iraqi retribution following the collapse of their insurrection against Saddam Hussein. In May, en route home, following the defeat of Iraq, a Marine Expeditionary Unit helped Bangladesh cope with a devastating typhoon.

U.S. forces have also been widely employed to provide support to the military forces of other nations. Military training is provided to many friendly countries. Transport services have been provided to the military forces of France, such as during its intervention in Chad in the mid-1980s, and to others. Construction services have been supplied to Saudi Arabia, Israel and others. There is no reason to think that U.S. forces will not be used for similar missions in the future.

U.S. forces might also be employed for peacekeeping missions in the Middle East, as they have been since 1983 as part of the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai, or elsewhere. Peacekeeping would normally be performed jointly with the forces of other nations.

Of particular relevance to assistance projection missions are mobility forces, especially airlift assets, Marine Expeditionary Units, and special operations forces. The latter are specially trained in the language and culture of the countries whose people or military forces they are likely to assist.

This is a long list of peacetime missions for which military forces in general and U.S. military forces in particular are likely to be employed in the future. Recognizing the importance of such missions has significant implications. First, with the decline or disappearance of actual military threats, U.S. force deployments overseas and the military exercises conducted in places like Europe

and the Western Pacific must be viewed primarily as fulfilling peacetime missions and be sized and structured accordingly. Second, the sizing of some elements of the U.S. Navy -- particularly the number of carrier battle groups and amphibious groups -- will be driven more by peacetime requirements for presence and operating tempo considerations than by wartime requirements. Third, special operations forces should be sized and structured commensurate to their importance for many of these peacetime missions as well as for possible wartime missions. Fourth, the Defense Department needs to do a better job than it has done up to now in discussing these peacetime missions of military forces and persuading the Congress and the American people that they are important and worth paying for. The focus for the past 40 years on deterring and being able to fight a war with the Soviet Union has eclipsed all the other important peacetime functions of military forces, even though they have always been with us.

SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

Despite the new emphasis on peacetime engagement, the spectrum of conflict remains highly relevant to the question, what should be the basis for our strategy, force structure design, and weapons choices. It is therefore useful to identify ways in which this spectrum of conflict has changed as a result of recent world events and ways in which it has stayed the same despite these events.

The spectrum of conflict can be said to have changed in several significant respects. Most important, the possibility of large-scale nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union or a successor state has all but disappeared. We have not yet reached the point where the likelihood of nuclear war with Russia or Ukraine is no greater than with the United Kingdom or France. However, the likelihood of such a war, always small, has significantly declined. While previously large-scale nuclear war represented an entire category of warfare at the high end of the spectrum of conflict, now it merits little more than a footnote.

The possibility of a global conventional war has also all but dis-

appeared. The only realistic possibility for a conventional war on a global scale since World War II has been one involving the Soviet Union and its client states on one side and the United States and its allies on the other. Although theoretically still possible, with the new Commonwealth of Independent States or conceivably just Russia replacing the Warsaw Pact as the adversary, this scenario is no longer plausible and can be removed from the spectrum of conflict that needs to be taken into account.

In contrast, regional conflicts remain quite possible. However, these are likely to be about and, equally important, to be recognized to be about regional or bilateral issues, not to be elements of or surrogates for global competition between superpowers. This is partly a change in reality, but more a change in perception. The United States has been often misled in the past by considering regional conflicts to be primarily about global competition between East and West when they in fact were mostly about regional, bilateral or domestic issues. The United States is less likely to be misled in this way in the future.

Regional conflicts that do arise are more likely than in the past to be fought by regional actors, without direct involvement by global powers. The primary successor government to the Soviet Union is unlikely to try to exploit remote regional conflicts for its own purposes for the foreseeable future and the United States is likely to be drawn into regional conflicts because it will not be misled into seeing them in an East-West context. Whether the intensity and destructiveness of regional conflicts will decline as a result remains to be seen and will depend importantly on whether the major powers will refrain from selling arms in peacetime and from resupplying them in the heat of battle. Much attention is now being given to this question ³ and some modest progress has been



³See, for example, Report to the Secretary General, **General and Complete Disarmament: International Arms Transfer; Study on ways and means of promoting transparency in international transfers of conventional arms** (New York: United Nations, 9 September 1991) A/46/301 and U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, **Global Arms Trade**, OTA-ISC-460 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1991).

made by the agreement of the Big Five ⁴, for example. How much restraint will actually be exercised, however, very much remains to be seen.

Whether regional conflicts will see the use of chemical or nuclear weapons is also by no means assured, despite the renewed attention to the question, and considerable anxiety that exists in some quarters. The answer depends, in the view of this observer, not so much on international regimes to control the diffusion of nuclear, chemical, biological and missile technologies, but on whether individual countries see it as being in their interest to acquire and, if possessing, to use such weapons. In the long run, resolving regional conflicts, or achieving mutual deterrence at the regional level, or, in some cases, removing certain governments or ruling elites from power will probably be more important in limiting proliferation and preventing the use of mass casualty weapons than will technological denial by potential supplier countries.

In other respects, the traditional spectrum of conflict still applies. For example, low intensity conflict ⁵ will remain the most common in the world. Included would be revolutions, civil wars, ethnic conflict, terrorism, and drug-related violence. Only the latter is relatively new. The incidence of low intensity conflict is not likely to decline over the next few years and might even increase as countries and regions sort themselves out in the new post-Cold War environment.

Similarly, low intensity conflict will remain more likely than high intensity to engage U.S. forces. If recent patterns hold, the United States will involve itself in low intensity conflicts primarily in places and ways that limit the likelihood of becoming entangled



⁴See the Guidelines for Conventional Arms Transfer, agreed to by the five permanent members of the Security Council, on 18 October 1991 and the Communique from their London meeting of 17-18 October 1991.

⁵This phrase is employed here, as is usual, from the perspective of the United States. One must recognize, however, that a conflict that seems to be low intensity from the U.S. perspective might well be high intensity from the perspective of the participating governments or groups. Moreover, individual soldiers rarely regard a conflict in which they are participating as being low intensity.

in local politics. This implies the use of military strikes from afar, especially by air, and the conduct of ground operations only where U.S. forces can make a major difference quickly and then be withdrawn. Whether such self-imposed restraint results from wisdom or timidity is a matter of disagreement and it might not be permanent.

Regional conflicts in which the United States might participate can range in length and intensity from short and small to what Desert Storm might have been, but was not. As already mentioned, short and small seems the most likely. The fact that the United States fought Desert Storm and was prepared to do so even if it had resulted in a much longer and more costly war does not alter the reality that this was a special case and that such wars are unlikely. However, that experience was an excellent reminder that such wars are possible.

A special problem arises if an adversary possesses or is believed to possess mass casualty weapons. Desert Storm was a conflict that the United States and its allies were prepared to fight despite the possible use of chemical weapons by the other side. If an adversary possesses nuclear weapons, which are much more lethal, the response might be different. At the very least, wars against such states would likely be restricted to limited objectives in the hope that the use of nuclear weapons might be deterred.

Two other types of conflict in which the United States and its allies might become involved are worth flagging. Recent events suggest that the world might be entering an era in which the collective use of force might be regarded not only as legitimate but also as desirable to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states when, as in the case of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, this is done under the aegis of the United Nations or a regional organization. To assert that this is a likely transformation of international politics would be to claim too much. The response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait might well turn out to have been a special case in this respect as well. But such a transformation is possible if the long-proclaimed but heretofore little implemented principle of collective security has now actually taken hold in the world.

Even less likely, but not totally out of the question, is the possibility that an internationally sanctioned use of force might be regarded as legitimate and desirable to defend democratic principles and human rights when a government's behavior within its own borders is an affront to universally held human values. This would imply that the balance between the principle of defending human life and human rights, which have often been in conflict in the past, has shifted towards the latter. Whether today, for example, the world would sit back and just watch an Idi Amin or a Pol Pot slaughter his own people is not clear. The U.S. interventions into Grenada and Panama could be viewed somewhat in these terms, although the latter was a purely unilateral action. So could the African collective intervention in Liberia. This is not an issue of collective security in the traditional sense of the security of sovereign states, but rather a commitment to a collective defense of human rights. If either of these principles does turn out to be a new element of international relations, then U.S. forces, together with forces of other countries, will certainly be involved, although not necessarily every time.

CONCLUSIONS

This discussion suggests several conclusions about the spectrum of conflict and its utility as a tool of planning U.S. strategy, force structure and weapons. These are recapitulated below.

1. The search for a basis for U.S. strategy, force structure and weapons choices can no longer be focused on defining the spectrum of conflict, but must now focus on a combination of very important peacetime functions of military forces and the need to prepare for warfare at various levels of conflicts.
2. These peacetime functions, including peacetime force balancing -- by which is meant avoiding excessive force imbalances -- and various types of assistance projection, will play a much larger role in the design of our strategy, the sizing and structuring of our forces, and the choice of our weapons than they have in the past.

3. Defining the spectrum of conflict will remain important and this spectrum will have some different characteristics in the future:
 - the possibility of a large-scale nuclear war and of global conventional war has all but disappeared;
 - regional conflicts remain quite possible, but are likely to be about -- and to be recognized to be about -- regional issues, not to be elements of or surrogates for global competition between superpowers; and
 - regional conflicts are more likely to be fought by regional actors, without direct involvement by global powers.
4. Low intensity conflict will remain more likely than high intensity.
5. Regional conflicts remain possible and could vary greatly in length and intensity. Large-scale regional conflicts involving the United States are unlikely, but possible.
6. In the future, the collective use of force to defend national sovereignty or territorial integrity of states against aggressors or to defend democratic principles and human rights against a government whose domestic behavior is an affront to universally held human values might be considered not only legitimate but also desirable.

Chapter III

DESERT STORM: Exception or Rule in the Years Ahead?

BGen Paul Van Riper, USMC

*"It is difficult indeed to postulate the future of military matters. For military establishments and strategists alike demonstrate a marvelous propensity for summing up at the close of each armed confrontation and forthwith setting about getting ready to fight over again, better, the conflict from which they just emerged."*¹

General Donn A. Starry

I. INTRODUCTION

After every war there is a rush to determine the lessons learned. Desert Storm is no exception. In fact, instant critiques offering "lessons learned" appeared in the media during the first days of the air campaign. In the following weeks, professional journals were filled with stories of what went right or wrong.² During the war and for several months after hostilities ended, of the military services sent teams to analyze and report on all aspects of the conflict. In July 1991, the Pentagon provided Congress an interim report on the war. By late fall, additional studies of Desert Storm were available from several think tanks.

The more technical studies and analyses identify specific weapons, equipment, and procedures which failed to meet expectations. Most of these shortcomings have clear causes and effects, and




¹ From the foreword to Richard E. Simpkin's *Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-first Century Warfare*, Brassey's Defense Publishers, London, p. vii.

² For a critical review of early journalism see Anthony H. Cordesman's "Rushing to Judgment on the Gulf War," *Armed Forces Journal International*, June 1991, p. 66-72.

thus, definitive solutions. Yet, other critiques and reports, particularly those done outside of government, attempt to forecast the future for issues which are by nature uncertain. Examples include explicit projections describing how technology will affect future conflicts, specific predictions on the likelihood of low versus mid-intensity wars, and new hypotheses about the very nature of conflict. Hasty analyses of such complex phenomena are unlikely to be useful. Furthermore, even quality studies done at a time remote from the event may not produce definitive answers to such involved subjects. Researchers and analysts, as well as historians, are reminded of Michael Howard's admonition that "... history whatever its value in educating the judgment, teaches no 'lessons' ..." ³

With these thoughts in mind, my goal is to avoid the race to conclusions about Operation Desert Storm. Rather, I intend to focus on some elements of that conflict which might serve the purpose of "educating our judgment" about war in the years ahead. My theme is that war is probabilistic, not deterministic, therefore, I maintain that in this new era of multiple, diffused, and vague threats, we must advance our warfighting capabilities to contend with a broad spectrum of ambiguous and dynamic challenges.

Some have taken the view that this most recent war validates what in essence is an improved World War II force structure. They argue that all we need to do is to continue to make incremental improvements. Others assert that Desert Storm is the last of the World War II-style wars. They argue that our rapid destruction of conventional forces has made them irrelevant, and that we are about to enter a new era of warfare. I believe these views are neither correct nor incorrect. Our own Civil War, while it maintained the appearance of 18th and 19th century Napoleonic warfare, foreshadowed with its Gatling guns, railroads, and telegraphs, the shape and intensity of World War I. Indeed, Operation Desert Storm contains within it the seeds of the nature of future conflict, the actual scope and appearance of which may bear little resemblance to what transpired in the Gulf.



³ Howard, Michael, *The Lessons of History*, York University Press, New Haven, 1991, p. 11.

We are in a period of considerable political, economic, and technological change. Thus, I believe we need to review our basic concepts about war if we are to successfully understand what has happened and what may happen. We must avoid selectively using events of the Gulf War, as well as those surrounding it, to reinforce existing paradigms. On the contrary, we need to carefully examine our fundamental precepts of war, and identify what new perspectives about force and its use are worthy of further development. Specifically, we must consider how we think about war, how we plan to conduct it, and how we deploy and employ forces.

To this end, my paper is organized into three sections. The first examines the way we study war and the theories developed to help us understand it. The second assesses the effectiveness of the processes used to develop national military strategy and campaign plans. The third outlines the role that naval expeditionary forces have within the context of both our national military strategy and the changes occurring throughout the world.

II. STUDYING AND UNDERSTANDING WAR

Fundamental to learning is the requirement for a theory about the subject. Theories enable us to approach learning in either a philosophical or analytical manner and to order the knowledge we gain.⁴

*The theory and nature of war are inexorably joined. Theory provides the basis upon which the nature of war can be determined. Theory is education and deliberation that forms a common understanding and a norm against which one can compare the situation at hand. Without a theory of war, there is no point of departure to begin understanding how and why wars are fought.*⁵



⁴ Simpson, M. M. III, "The Essential Clausewitz," *Naval War College Review*, March-April 1982, p. 54.

⁵ *Theory and Nature of War, Course Outline for Academic Year 1991-92*, Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia, p. 7.


For most of the 215 years of our Nation's existence, American military officers devoted little time to gaining an intellectual understanding of war. As a result, the theory and nature of war received inadequate attention.

Until the mid-1800s, military learning focused on the practical aspects of tactics. In the Civil War years and those immediately following, the writings of Baron Antoine Henri Jomini had the most influence on Army leadership. Although Jomini is frequently referred to as a theorist of war, it was his mechanical and geometrical explanations of strategy and tactics that were most frequently studied.

Near the turn of this century, Alfred Thayer Mahan's ideas on naval power were widely examined. His basic hypothesis was that sea power is vital to a nation's growth, prosperity and security. He was a distinguished historian; however, he is primarily remembered as a proponent (some would say propagandist) for employing sea power for nationalistic goals.

Jomini's and Mahan's respective views on land and naval warfare were fairly widespread, but not universal. Moreover, they did not produce theories providing for a comprehensive understanding of war.

Although few military leaders recognize his name today, it was Emory Upton's views that influenced most officers from before World War I until after the Korean War. Colonel Harry Summers notes that an Army doctrinal manual of 1936 reflecting Upton's thoughts contained the statement, "Strategy begins where politics end. All that soldiers ask is that once the policy is settled, strategy and command shall be regarded as being in a sphere apart from politics." ⁶ Summers goes on to observe that:



⁶ Summers, Colonel Harry G., U.S. Army (Ret.), "Clausewitz and Strategy Today," *Naval War College Review*, March-April 1983, p. 41.

This was more than just a statement of doctrine, it represented the mindset of the Army's senior leadership. This was illustrated in the testimony of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur before the Senate in 1951. "The general definition which for many decades has been accepted," MacArthur said, "was that . . . when all political means failed, we then go to force." 7

Our failure in Korea and the complexities brought to warfare by the advent of nuclear weapons ". . . marked the end of these neo-Uptonian theories." 8 As military leaders struggled to understand this changed world, civilian academics and operational analysts stepped in to fill the intellectual void. Generals and admirals focused on weapons and tactics. For many officers, strategic thinking came to equate to the study of nuclear warfare. However, as Bernard Brodie notes, after two decades of activity, few significant contributions were made by these "civilian strategists" beyond the introduction of systems analysis into the Department of Defense. 9

Only the shock of losing Vietnam and the recriminations in the aftermath brought American military officers to a serious study of the theory and nature of war. Two events in the mid-1970s spurred their efforts. The first was the radical revamping of the Naval War College's curriculum initiated by Admiral Stansfield Turner in 1973. The second was the publication in 1976 of a greatly improved translation of Carl von Clausewitz' *On War*. 10 The revised Naval War College program required its students to study war seriously, and Michael Howard's and Peter Paret's version of Clausewitz' masterpiece gave them something worthwhile to study. The intellectual revival begun at Newport eventually spread to the other



7 Ibid., p. 41.

8 Summers, Colonel Harry G., U.S. Army (Ret.), "Clausewitz: Eastern and Western Approaches to War," *Air University Review*, March-April 1986, p. 63.

9 Brodie, Bernard, *War and Politics*, Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., New York, pp. 473 and 474.


10 Von Clausewitz, Carl, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1976.

American war colleges and command and staff schools.¹¹

Clausewitz' theories were absorbed by a significant number of military officers in the 10 years prior to Desert Storm. These war college graduates exposed much of the senior civilian leadership in the Department of Defense to the Clausewitzian approach to understanding war. This is evidenced by the incorporation of Clausewitzian concepts in the President's National Security Strategy, its resultant National Military Strategy, and war plans developed during the late 1980s. It was clear, if war became necessary, it was to be the continuation of policy *with* other means.¹² In addition, Clausewitzian influence is found in doctrinal manuals written after 1982. They contain notions put forth by the German philosopher on centers of gravity, uncertainty, friction, and the fog of war.¹³

It is not overstating the case to say that both Desert Shield and Desert Storm were planned and executed by military and civilian leaders who were well-grounded in Clausewitzian theory. As a result, they discharged their duties in a much different manner than their Vietnam-era counterparts.

After the victory in the Gulf War, members of the military reform movement attempted to garner credit for the change in military thinking.¹⁴ Although many of the ideas put forth by the military reformers found a wide audience in the armed forces in the



¹¹ As a student in the Naval Command and Staff Course in 1977-78, when *On War* was initially introduced, I, like most others, was excited by the new and profound knowledge to which we were exposed for the first time. We were provided the means to think about war in an entirely different manner, one which made eminent sense. Ironically, I was also a student at the Army War College in 1981-82 when the Howard and Paret rendering of *On War* was first introduced there with the same effect.

¹² An interesting discussion of *with* other means *vice by* other means is contained in James E. King's "On Clausewitz: Master Theorist of War," *Naval War College Review*, Fall 1977, p. 30. King argues that *by* suggests *replacement* while *with* connotes an *additional* component.

¹³ See in particular U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5, *Operations* dated 5 May 1986, and U.S. Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, *Warfighting*, dated 6 March 1989.

¹⁴ Carey, Peter, "The Fight to Change How America Fights," *U.S. News & World Report*, May 6, 1991, pp. 30-31.

1980s, especially in the Army and Marine Corps, the climate for this acceptance was created by the self-generated intellectual revival begun within the professional military schools.

Many of the officers associated with the renaissance of military thinking were startled in the spring of 1991 by the ideas presented by Martin van Creveld in *The Transformation of War: The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict Since Clausewitz*. Van Creveld opens his new book declaring, "The present volume has a purpose; namely to address some of the most fundamental problems presented by war in all ages . . ." ¹⁵ He follows shortly with the provocative statement that, "The present volume also has a message -- namely, that contemporary 'strategic' thought about every one of these problems is fundamentally flawed; and in addition, is rooted in a 'Clausewitzian' world picture that is either obsolete or wrong." ¹⁶ Van Creveld continues, "This work aims at providing a new, non-Clausewitzian framework for thinking about war, while at the same time trying to look into the future." ¹⁷

At the heart of van Creveld's argument is the assertion that wars are often fought for other than political goals and not necessarily by the "remarkable trinity" of the people, the army, and the government. He reasons that the expense and complexity of large modern forces will cause them to disappear, thus, states will become less able to protect their citizens against unconventional assailants. The role of defending society in this new world of low-intensity conflicts will be taken over by organizations other than nation-states.

Neither the academic nor military communities have been reluctant to challenge the radical ideas contained in *The Transformation of War*. One reviewer notes that ". . . a reader cannot help but



¹⁵ Van Creveld, Martin, *The Transformation of War: The Most Radical Reinterpretation of Armed Conflict Since Clausewitz*, The Free Press, New York, 1991, p. ix.


¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

think of the Gulf War and judge the author's words and conclusions against it." ¹⁸ Other reviewers make similar comments. Perhaps van Creveld should have heeded Clausewitz' advice on "critical analysis," in part, his warning that "serious trouble arises only when known facts are forcibly stretched to explain effects; for this confers on these facts a spurious importance." ¹⁹ This criticism is not meant to say, however, that van Creveld's ideas on future conflicts, notably, those of low-intensity do not have relevance. Warfare, particularly warfare on land, may be into a "fourth generation." ²⁰ A working group from the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy warned in June 1988:

By the first decade of the next century, we must anticipate a world in which groups hostile to the United States—governments and non-governmental political or criminal organizations—will have access to both weapons of devastating power and reliable means to deliver them. The United States and its traditional allies of the Northern Hemisphere could possibly be attacked, and must certainly expect to be threatened, by diverse nations and groups who, compared with the current set of such foes, will be both more numerous and more dangerous. ²¹

Interpreting trends and predicting the level, scale, and intensity of impending conflicts as van Creveld and the Commission at-



¹⁸ Werrell, Kenneth P., *The Journal of Military History*, October 1991, p. 531.

¹⁹ Clausewitz, p. 157.

²⁰ Lind, William S., et al., "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation," *Marine Corps Gazette*, October 1989, pp. 22-26. This article was published simultaneously in the October 1989 issue of *Military Affairs*. The first generation of modern is that of line and column prevalent until the 1870s when advances in weapons forced extended-order tactics employing fire and movement, the second generation. A third generation using nonlinear tactics and relying on infiltration and deep attacks evolved from German innovations in the latter stages of World War I. A fourth generation is postulated to be one of no fronts, with terrorists attempting to collapse opponents from within. Such terrorists might be sponsored by or be members of organizations other than those of a traditional nation-state structure. A detailed discussion of the first three generations of war is contained in John A. English's *On Infantry*, Praeger, New York, 1981.

²¹ *Supporting U.S. Strategy for Third World Conflict*, A Report by Regional Conflict Working Group to the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., June 30, 1988, pp. 12 and 13.

tempt to do, is not the same as fashioning a theory that encompasses all aspects of war. At this point, therefore, the question becomes, does van Creveld's theory on the nature of future wars have utility? My conclusion is that his thesis fails the test for it does not have ". . . a set of general and interrelated statements about [war] that (1) are internally consistent, (2) permit us to explain or predict specific events, and (3) are thereby open to empirical testing." ²²

Desert Storm can be understood and explained from Clausewitz' viewpoint as a war fought by states (the Coalition Forces) for political objectives that could not be fully achieved *with* other means. It was "an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will." Moreover, the peoples, armies, and governments of the several nations comprising the Coalition were linked and can be analyzed in Clausewitz' framework of violence, chance and probability, the foundation for his "remarkable trinity." ²³ Finally, battles and engagements were fought to achieve campaign objectives that were designed to accomplish the strategic goals.

Van Creveld, by contrast, views Desert Storm as an aberration, unique in and of itself as regards the future. ²⁴ Every war is unique as is each day in history. A theory of war must be capable of explaining all events if it is to have wide applicability and therefore usefulness. Van Creveld's does not, for his ". . . basic postulate is that, already today, the most powerful modern armed forces are



²² Nelson, Keith and Spencer, Olin, *Why War? Ideology, Theory, and History*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1979, p. 3.


²³ For an explanation of the "remarkable trinity" see pages 201 through 207 of Peter Paret's chapter on Clausewitz in *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1986.

²⁴ In a personal interview on August 14, 1991, I asked Doctor van Creveld how he would explain the apparent discrepancy between the theory he advances in his book and recent events, Desert Storm being the most important. He responded, "We are nearing the end of a 350-year period in which states go to war. War is now between third and fourth rate countries. Desert Storm was an aberration, a last gasp in this period of transition."

largely irrelevant to modern war -- indeed that their relevance stands in inverse proportion to their modernity.”²⁵ Desert Storm belies this hypothesis.

For the future we would do well to note Bernard Brodie's description of Clausewitz' *On War* as “. . . not simply the greatest but the only truly great book on war.”²⁶ Accordingly, it must remain central to the study of war, especially in America's professional military schools. Likewise, those high level officials responsible for developing policy and strategy as well as those military officers charged with preparing contingency plans or writing doctrine must be well versed in the thoughts contained in *On War*. The writings of Sun Tzu, Jomini, Mahan, Douhet, Liddell-Hart, Luttwak, and van Creveld, to name a few, are of considerable importance, and military and civilian leaders must be exposed to all. But only Clausewitz' thoughts, as difficult as they are to interpret, give us a comprehensive understanding of war.

What of the nature of future wars? Clausewitzian theory tells us that their very essence will be a clash between human wills. The dynamic action such clashes produce will ensure ample uncertainty, friction, and disorder. Violence is the means used to compel the enemy to meet our demands, thus danger will be inherent. Both moral and physical forces will be employed. Of these, moral forces will be the most powerful though they cannot be quantified. The intensity of the conflicts may range from low to high depending on such factors as “. . . policy objectives, military means available, national will, and density of fighting forces or combat power on the battlefield.”²⁷ With this understanding of war we can say with assurance that Desert Storm can be viewed as both exception *and* rule in the years ahead.



²⁵ Van Creveld, p. 32.

²⁶ Clausewitz, p. 53.

²⁷ U.S. Marine Corps Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) -1, *Warfighting*, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 6 March 1989, p. 21.

III. PLANNING FOR WAR

The proposed cover letter for a September 1991 draft of the *National Military Strategy for the 1990s* notes that, "The strategy builds upon the President's 'Aspen speech' on defense, his National Security Strategy, and his recognition of the emergence of a new world order." Such an explicit connection between policy and military strategy would have been hard to identify prior to 1988, when President Reagan signed the first document titled, National Security Strategy. Until then, determining specific policy guidance was a difficult task for those charged with developing military strategy. Among the few sources they could turn to were the *Secretary of Defense's Annual Report to Congress* and the "Defense Guidance."²⁸ There was no focused process for developing a military strategy which reflected national goals and objectives.

This deficiency was recognized early on by those civilian and military officials who were influenced by the Clausewitzian understanding of war. They began to highlight the necessity of tying ends (policy) to means (strategy). Moreover, they advocated identifying national interests and goals, and assessing which instruments of national power (diplomatic, political, economic, and military) could best be employed to achieve them. This policy level activity is frequently referred to as "grand strategy."

When the military is selected as an appropriate option in support of the national security strategy, a force structure must be created and plans for its deployment and employment developed. The processes encompassing these measurers constitute global planning and the result is "military strategy." The specific detailed planning for deployment and employment of forces in a geographical area is considered regional planning and the product is "operational" or "theater strategy." The latter process is defined ". . . as the art and science of planning, orchestrating, and directing military cam-



²⁸ "Defense Guidance" was a key document in the Department of Defense's Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) prior to 1988.

paigns within a theater of operations to achieve national security objectives.”²⁹


In retrospect the benefits of this logical method of thinking about and preparing for conflict are obvious when we consider the Gulf War. A clear thread runs from President Bush’s *National Security Strategy* of March 1990, where he states under “Our Interests and Objectives in the 1990s” that:

*The United States seeks, whenever possible in concert with its allies, to: -- deter any aggression that could threaten its security and, should deterrence fail, repel or defeat military attack and end conflict on terms favorable to the United States and its interests and allies*³⁰

to the U. S. national policy objectives he announced on 5 August 1990:

- Immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait;
- Restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government;
- Security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf; and
- Safety and protection of the lives of American citizens abroad.³¹

Based on these policy objectives and the Secretary of Defense’s guidance, the following military objectives were framed for operation Desert Shield; “. . . to establish a defensive capability in theater to deter Saddam Hussein from continued aggression, to



²⁹ Drew, Colonel Dennis M. (U.S. Air Force) and Donald M. Snow, *Making Strategy; An Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems*, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, August 1988, p. 19.

³⁰ *National Security Strategy of the United States*, The White House, March 1990, p. 2.


³¹ *Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict; an Interim Report to Congress*, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., July 1991, p. 1-1.

build and integrate Coalition forces, to enforce sanctions, to defend Saudi Arabia, and to defeat further Iraqi advances, if required.”³² Military objectives for Operation Desert Storm were:

- Neutralization of the Iraqi national command authority's ability to direct military operations;
- Ejection of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and destruction of Iraq's offensive threat to the region, including the Republican Guard in the Kuwait Theater of Operations;
- Destruction of known nuclear, biological, and chemical weapon production and delivery capabilities, to include Iraq's known ballistic missile program; and
- Assistance in the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait.³³

This distinct articulation of military objectives for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm enabled field commanders to make their intent clear, focus planning efforts, and assign specific missions to combat units. The importance of this process cannot be overstated. Among five general lessons from the Gulf War, Secretary of Defense Cheney listed the first as “Decisive Presidential leadership [which] set clear goals, gave others confidence in America's sense of purpose, and rallied the domestic and international support necessary to reach those goals.”³⁴

The ability of the National Command Authority and military leaders to present well defined, consistent political and military objectives speaks well for the future. Prior to or at the outset of future crises the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chair-



³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid., pp. 1-1 and 1-2.

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 1-4.

man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff must act as deliberately to assess the situation, make decisions, and provide direction as they did for the crisis in the Gulf. In this regard, Desert Storm must become the *rule* in the years ahead.


Achieving as clear a connection between “ends” and “means” in the future will prove more difficult. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the demise of the Warsaw Pact have greatly lessened the potential threats. In addition, the threats that remain are more diffused. As a result there is less specificity in the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff’s draft National Military Strategy and requirements are not as focused. This indicates, as one critic of the draft document observes:

Whereas military capability in the past could be justified in terms of the solution it provided to measurable enemy threats operating in credible scenarios, it now must be based on the functional utility of forces for handling types of situations in unspecified settings. ³⁵

Under changes brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, upon issuance of the *National Military Strategy for the 1990s*, the Secretary of Defense will provide guidance to link the national military strategy to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. This guidance, coupled with the military objectives and strategic concepts contained in the National Military Strategy, will be used by the commanders-in-chief (CINCs) of the unified commands to develop campaign plans or “theater strategies.” After further analysis, they will determine the capabilities and forces required to implement their strategies.

The process as described above is relatively clearcut. However, the introduction of service developed maritime, air-land, and aerospace “strategies” somewhat muddies the water.

The Maritime Strategy was born of the maritime strategy de-




³⁵ Batcheller, Colonel Gordon D., U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), “Where to Now?” *Marine Corps Gazette*, November 1991, p. 43.

bates carried on from 1979 to 1985 as part of the renaissance of military thought during the period.³⁶ It was first published in 1982. Skeptics viewed the Maritime Strategy as a pragmatic document to justify a 600-ship Navy. Rather, the basic concepts were formulated by Vice Admiral Forest P. Sherman in 1946 and 1947.³⁷ In many ways, it was designed to move away from the operational analysis approach to warfighting and the post-Vietnam defensive mentality prominent in the late 1970s.³⁸ Although criticized as a Navy-only strategy, it was presented from the outset as a component of national military strategy. Updated in 1986, the Maritime Strategy is currently undergoing a thorough review. An "Amphibious Warfare Strategy" was developed in 1986, however, it received scant attention compared to the Maritime Strategy.

Until recently, the closest thing the U.S. Army had to a "strategy" was its doctrine of air-land battle. The Army never suggested, however, that air-land battle be raised above the level of doctrine. This is not the case with the evolving follow-up concept, AirLand Operations. AirLand Operations is being billed as one of the twin pillars of national military strategy, the other pillar being Maritime Strategy.³⁹ The U.S. Air Force is touting a major reorganization of its peacetime and operational structures as change ". . . guided by the strategic planning framework of Global Reach -- Global Power."⁴⁰

Those responsible for the strategic planning process generally view service developed "strategies" as nothing more than contribu-



³⁶ Swartz, Captain Peter M., U.S. Navy, "Contemporary U.S. Naval Strategy: A Bibliography," *The Maritime Strategy*, U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland, January 1986, pp. 41 and 42.

³⁷ Palmer, Michael A., *Origins of the Maritime Strategy American Naval Strategy in the First Postwar Decade*, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C., 1988, pp. xv-xix.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. xvi and xvii.

³⁹ *AirLand Operations: A Concept for the Evolution of AirLand Battle for the Strategic Army of the 1990s and Beyond*, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 1 August 1991, pp. 3 and 4.

⁴⁰ *Air Force Restructure*, U.S. Air Force White Paper dated September 1991, p. 1.

tions to force development and outlines of warfighting doctrine. Theater CINCs may take them into account, but they are not held accountable for any portion of them as they are for the national military strategy.

We return from this excursion of examining service-oriented "strategies" to consider how theater commanders translate strategic policy into operational direction for their subordinates. Though there is no standard method for developing campaign or operational-level plans, there is general agreement that the process should coordinate ground, air, and naval forces to secure a synergistic effect. It should also allow the commander to render his vision and intent into phased actions from before the opening engagement, through each battle until the desired conclusion is reached. These actions may encompass weeks or even months. In addition, a campaign plan must address command relationships and sustainment issues and provide the foundation for all other planning.⁴¹

The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) undertook development of an offensive campaign plan early on during Operation Desert Shield. Though this effort was initially done as a prudent step to ensure an adequate contingency plan was on hand, it soon expanded into a major activity involving all of CENTCOM's component commanders. One unusual aspect of planning was the tasking of Third U.S. Army, the Army component command, with the development of the plan for ground operations since CINC CENTCOM retained the function of land component commander. Albeit misnomers, subordinate component plans were titled air, ground, and naval "campaigns." The plan, which was redesignated Operations Order (OPORD) 91-001 on 17 January 1991, worked. Thus, it is hard to be too critical of the process which led to its de-

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⁴¹ Mendel, Colonel William W., U.S. Army and Lieutenant Colonel Floyd T. Banks, Jr., U.S. Army, *Campaign Planning*, Final Report, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 4 January 1988. This report resulted from a study conducted in 1986 and 1987 when the paucity of doctrine on operational-level planning was recognized. The U.S. Marine Corps published a Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 1-1 *Campaigning* in January 1991.

velopment. The knowledge gained by those involved will be incorporated into efforts by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and service staffs to create joint and combined doctrine for campaign planning.

The procedures used to create the plan employed to successfully prosecute Operation Desert Storm were fundamentally sound, but somewhat convoluted. With proper refinement they should become the *rule* in the years ahead.

IV. DEPLOYING AND EMPLOYING NAVAL FORCES

In his 1977 preface to *Navies and Foreign Policy*, Ken Booth observed, "The study of naval policy has been the Cinderella of strategic studies. It has been badly neglected."⁴² His book and Edward Luttwak's *The Political Uses of Sea Power* did much to create a wider understanding of how naval forces can be used to support national interests. There is still not as much general interest in things naval as in nuclear, air-land, and aerospace. As a consequence a considerable portion of the thinking about the strategic and operational uses of naval power has been done "in house" by the Naval War College's Strategic Studies Group and the Navy's Center for Naval Analyses.

The reduced interest in naval subjects and activities was reflected in the lack of press attention to the U.S. Navy's activities prior to and during Desert Storm. Though two U.S. Navy carriers, the *Eisenhower* and *Independence*, were in Southwest Asia before U.S. air or ground forces, it was the latter which received most of the publicity. When the air war commenced, what interest there was in the Navy's enforcement of United Nations' sanctions quickly faded. During the ground war, few media representatives wanted to go aboard ships and miss the more easily recorded and reported ground actions.


Yet, in the period from August 1990 to June 1991 the Navy demonstrated in Southwest Asia and around the globe those capa-



⁴² Booth, Ken, *Navies and Foreign Policy*, Croom Helm Ltd., London, 1977, p. 10.

bilities which make it such a vital strategic and operational tool. At the same time as 7th Fleet units were intercepting some 30 ships a day in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aqaba and Persian Gulf, rehearsing amphibious assaults in Oman and Saudi Arabia, and providing air cover for deploying forces, other Navy and Marine units were evacuating more than 2,400 American and foreign citizens from strife-torn Liberia.⁴³ Just days before the Desert Storm air war began, Marine helicopters with embarked combat troops flew from 7th Fleet ships, refueling twice in mid-air, to Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia where 260 American and other nationals were rescued from a dangerous rebellion. In addition, naval forces provided significant support to United Nations' efforts to assist Kurdish refugees in Turkey and northern Iraq. They aided the evacuation of 17,600 American military personnel and their dependents from the hazards of the volcanic eruption in the Philippines and provided critical humanitarian aid to the people of flood ravaged Bangladesh. During Desert Storm itself, Navy and Marine aircraft flew missions throughout the theater, Navy ships launched cruise missiles, and the Marine Corps ground units fought their way through the toughest Iraqi defenses. The ability to respond to a wide range of contingencies amply demonstrated the utility of American naval expeditionary forces.

At this point we need to consider how naval expeditionary forces can best support the U.S. national security objectives in the years ahead. There will be challenges, but they will differ considerably from those we have focused upon since World War II. The lessening Soviet threat in Europe will allow us to significantly alter how we structure and deploy our forces. This is recognized in the "four fundamental demands" identified in the President's most recent statement of national security strategy; deterrence, presence, crisis response, and reconstitution.⁴⁴ The requirements of forward presence and crisis response will most influence the role Navy and Marine Corps forces play in the remainder of the 20th Century.



⁴³ "The Sea Services' Role in Desert Shield/Storm," White Paper, The Navy League of the United States, Arlington, Virginia, 1991.

⁴⁴ *National Security Strategy of the United States*, The White House, August 1991, pp. 25-30.

The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations discerned the need more than a year ago to examine how naval forces could be deployed more effectively in the mid-1990s and asked the Center for Naval Analyses' Strategic Policy Analysis Group to research the issue. The Group approached this task by asking three questions:

- What is the nature of peacetime presence and why are naval forces suited for this role?
- What purposes can be served by naval presence forces in supporting U.S. national security objectives?
- How can naval forces be deployed and operated to best accomplish their presence missions? ⁴⁵

The analysis concluded that deployed naval forces have the advantages of: (1) being able to move from point to point (mobility), (2) with the inherent ability to execute a variety of missions (flexibility), (3) without requiring support or permission from other nations (availability), (4) while raising or lowering the threat presented as required (controllability), and (5) offering real and perceived combat power (capability). ⁴⁶

The analysis also observed that forward deployed naval forces can be used for a number of purposes including reassuring friendly governments of U.S. support, deterring adversaries from threatening or taking hostile actions against U.S. interests, signaling U.S. concern about such things as freedom of the sea, and positioning themselves to respond to developing crises. ⁴⁷ Naval forces can be



⁴⁵ Kahan, Jerome H. and Jeffrey I. Sands, *Alternative Naval Deployment Concepts: Demand for Deployed Naval Forces 1991-1999*, CNA Research Memorandum 91-92, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia, August 1991, pp. 2, 2-1 and 2-2.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3 and 2-4. The five assets are very similar to seven discussed by Ken Booth on pages 34-36 of *Navies and Foreign Policy*.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 2-4 and 2-5.

stationed in areas on a continuous or intermittent basis depending on the effects desired. Similarly, they can adjust their "visibility" to accomplish the mission assigned. Finally, naval forces are able to conduct any number of activities such as port calls and exercises to meet objectives. ⁴⁸

Employing the Delphi method, the Strategic Policy Analysis Group examined U.S. interests, threats or challenges to these interests. The role of the military, in particular naval forces, in supporting these interests in the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf, Western Pacific and Caribbean was then examined. To support U.S. interests ten "geostrategic 'centers of gravity' for peacetime deployments" were identified. Subsequent analysis determined the types of naval forces which might be needed in each of the ten deployment zones and the amount of time those forces would need to be present on an annual basis.

This effort by the Center for Naval Analyses represents one of the several similar studies being undertaken by the Navy. The Marine Corps is also examining ways to meet the demands of presence and crisis response more effectively. The initial draft of the new *Marine Corps Capabilities Plan* states, "Strengthening our naval expeditionary capabilities to support joint commanders is our number one planning objective." In addition to enhancing the capabilities of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) command element through restructuring and doctrinal changes, the Corps is developing concepts to allow for a more flexible deployment of its forces. The building blocks of these "packages" of forces are crisis action modules which will allow for various combinations of strategic deployment.

As the Navy and Marine Corps merge ongoing efforts to improve strategic mobility and operational capabilities, naval expeditionary forces will become even more versatile and effective instruments for the warfighting CINCs. Their utility in the past, particularly during Desert Shield and Desert Storm indicates employ-



⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 2-7 - 2-12.

ment of such forces to support the demands of forward presence and crisis response will be the rule in the years ahead.


V. CONCLUSION

A remarkable transition occurred within the American Armed Forces between the closing days of the Vietnam War and the opening shots of Operation Desert Storm. A military force of exceptional competence and prowess rose from the ashes of a national defeat. The foundation for this resurrection was an intellectual awakening in the officer corps. The results were revolutionized security policy, strategy, and doctrine.

Studying and understanding the nature of war made clear the connection of national policy goals and military strategy. This led to the development of a national policy process which focused plans and facilitated the effective application of force. The manner in which the United States went to war in Southwest Asia will serve as a classic example of sound decision making in the years ahead. Our task is to strengthen the process. We must keep the study of war as the center piece of our professional military education.

The value of naval expeditionary forces was also made evident by the events of the past 18 months. They provided the warfighting commanders a powerful, flexible and adaptable means of bringing combat power to bear where and when it was needed. The more ambiguous and fractured global environment we have inherited will certainly require such forces in the future.

Operation Desert Storm is the exception *and* the rule for the years ahead.



Section II

Forward Deployed Strategy and Forces

In the previous section, the emerging outline of a much-altered strategic environment was examined by our contributors. In this section, our authors begin to forge the link between U.S. strategic doctrine and the role of forward deployed forces in executing that doctrine. General Alfred Gray asserts in his article that future military contingencies can be expected to have a regional focus. The U.S. must remain engaged in the world to counter ambitious regional powers, resurgent nationalists, ethnic and religious rivalries, drug cartels and terrorist organizations which present very real threats to the enduring interests of this country.

Gray believes that the Navy and Marine Corps have the proper mix of forces at present to deter a resurgent or emerging global threat, and to respond to prevent the most distant stirring of regional instability. Naval expeditionary forces, while focused on the mid-to-low end of the range of conflict, have the capability to operate across the entire spectrum. The maritime superiority conferred by aircraft carriers, naval gunfire, support ships, Maritime Prepositioning Ships, and Marine ground forces highlights the fundamental truth that the U.S. remains a maritime nation and must retain and demonstrate the ability to secure the seas that connect this country to its vital interests.

The forward presence of naval forces in proximity to potential crisis areas remains a key element of U.S. security. While forward-based forces provide optimal leverage in a regional crisis, the vulnerability and expense of these forces mean that the Navy and Marine Corps will remain the primary means of maintaining regional in-

fluence. This reliance on forward naval presence does not diminish the importance of other service capabilities but underscores the importance of force sequencing across the full spectrum of combat operations to exploit the particular strengths of individual services.

Given the proposed cutbacks in future U.S. military outlays, Gray argues that the deployment of naval forces must change in several respects: smaller naval forces must be more closely tailored to specific missions and naval forces can no longer be "tethered" to a specific region. To adapt to changing circumstances, the Marine Corps has developed an array of improved deployment packages and special task groups which allow Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) to fulfill their forward presence mission.

Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor argues in his paper that containment alliances have lost their salience and significance. Regional arrangements will continue to be useful, but must be assessed on a careful basis according to evolving national security priorities. The U.S. must ensure unilateral freedom of action while selectively benefitting from alliances and security arrangements, including those under United Nations auspices. American interests abroad encompass political, economic and moral objectives, with each interest calling for a different form and level of military involvement. Only the Middle East is militarily critical because of American dependence on Persian Gulf oil.


General Trainor asserts that with the dissolution of the Soviet empire and the inevitable reduction and retrenchment of the American military establishment, the U.S. must restructure its forces to be responsive to new national requirements. For naval forces this shift will call for a downgrading of defense of the sea lanes as their first priority. In its stead, the capacity to project forces regionally will increase in importance. Given anticipated manpower constraints and the value of high technology, naval expeditionary forces should exploit American superiority in technology to effectively and efficiently perform their assigned missions with fewer resources.

Jacquelyn Davis begins her paper with the observation that a

significant shift in the foundation of U.S. national security policy was underway even before Desert Shield/Storm. The reduced risk of war in Europe, contributed to a rethinking of U.S. global strategy, including the importance of the extended deterrence concept and the role of forward-based forces. Organized around the Base Force concept, this emerging, new U.S. military strategy seeks to protect enduring American interests, including commercial economic interests, without reliance on the large-scale forward deployment of U.S. forces and possibly without recourse to formalized alliance structures of the Cold War years. In the future, U.S.-alliance relationships will likely be of a qualitatively different nature than they were in the past, characterized by a greater fluidity of command relationships and different types of forward presence.

As in the immediate past, the twin tasks of preserving stability in regional theaters of importance to the U.S. and the capacity to forestall the rise of destabilizing regional hegemonies remain central to U.S. national security objectives. Yet, in the post-Cold War era, it will be more difficult to sustain support for forward deployment of U.S. forces, especially as the U.S. lacks a readily perceived adversary.

In this context, Dr. Davis concludes that it is likely that both U.S. Navy and Marine Corps forces will play an even more important role in future strategic planning. Fundamental to the policy of peacetime engagement are force-sizing and deployment plans, which will increasingly be shaped by contingency planning for unstable areas. In common with the past, this imposes upon the U.S., a requirement for force structure modernization that allows for a flexible mix of capabilities, greater self-sufficiency, and force interoperability.



Naval Expeditionary Forces and Strategic Planning; Enhancing Options Available to the National Command Authority

Gen Alfred Gray, USMC (Ret.)

The dramatic changes in the geostrategic environment during the past two years -- the destruction of the Berlin Wall, the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact as a military alliance, the ongoing removal of Soviet troops and arms from Eastern Europe, and the conflict in Southwest Asia -- have brought about a corresponding change to the Nation's security requirements.

In this new era, the United States must rethink its military force requirements, and how these forces may be best used to match ends to means. During the coming decade, the Navy and Marine Corps will be called upon to conduct a wide variety of operations from peacetime presence, through crisis response, to conflict resolution. Many of these operations, such as strategic deterrence and protection of American lives overseas, have been performed by naval forces for years. However, the emergence of a multi-polar world, with its increasing potential for regional instability and conflict, will have a significant impact on future military planning and force structure. The Navy and Marine Corps have been looking to the future in order to develop a strategy which can meet the demands of a changing international environment.

In large part, the global peace enjoyed by most of the world's developed nations since 1945 has, in fact, been guaranteed by U.S.

military power. The perseverance and sacrifice of the United States and its allies have realized the goals which they so steadfastly pursued throughout the Cold War -- freedom and national self-determination for the peoples of the world and a commitment to maintaining world stability. Our rapid response to the Iraqi aggression in Kuwait shows that the United States will continue to uphold these fundamental beliefs. Nevertheless, the recent necessity for U.S. military operations in Panama, Liberia, Somalia, and the Persian Gulf have clearly shown that the end of the Cold War has not made the world any less dangerous.

As President Bush stated in a recent address at Aspen, Colorado,

"What we require now is a defense policy that adapts to the significant changes we are witnessing -- without neglecting the enduring realities that will continue to shape our security strategy. A policy of peacetime engagement every bit as constant and committed to the defense of our interests and ideals in today's world as in the time of conflict and Cold War."

Economic and political competition will continue to foster conditions that can create regional instabilities and ignite crises. Accordingly, our National Military Strategy will continue to recognize global commitments, although future military contingencies can be expected to have a regional focus. Because of the growing interdependence of the world's nations, the United States must remain globally committed to maintaining political and military stability in selective areas of the world.

With the receding threat of global war, the United States must now concentrate its planning effort at the center of the spectrum where conflict has historically occurred and United States Navy and Marine forces have historically responded. In a new era the United States must enhance its capabilities for resolving multiple, unrelated crises. Instabilities occurring in the littoral regions of the world have required frequent response in the past, and can be expected to continue in the future.

ENDURING CAPABILITIES AND EMERGING THREATS

Today the threat from the Soviet Union has changed dramatically. Beset by a wide range of fundamental economic and political problems, the Soviets are in the process of withdrawing their forces from the central European nations they have occupied since 1945, and the Soviet Union is experiencing its own internal disorder. As a consequence, it is now very unlikely that the Soviet Union could wage a conventional attack on the United States or its allies without an extensive period of forewarning.

Nevertheless, for now and the foreseeable future, the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal makes it the only nation capable of threatening our national existence. Prudence requires that the United States maintain forces of sufficient capability and numbers to deter any renewed threat to our Nation or our allies.

There are, however, other forces today that threaten the stability of our interests and those of our allies. A growing number of countries and organizations are acquiring the means of waging intense, violent conflicts with weapons of great lethality and destructiveness. Ambitious regional powers, resurgent nationalists, ethnic and religious rivalries, drug cartels and terrorist organizations present very real threats to the enduring interests of the United States, our friends and allies.

At the same time, it is unlikely that the United States will enjoy the same level of cooperation or political unity among allies that was achieved in the recent past. Without the unifying effect of a common threat, current friends and allies will be less motivated to subordinate their national interests to a common purpose. This development will make it more difficult for the United States to maintain overseas bases and overflight rights, or to exert political and economic influence abroad.

Today the Navy and Marine Corps have the right forces and forces to deter a resurgent or emerging global threat, and to respond immediately to even the most distant threat to regional stability. Current United States naval forces represent the culmina-

tion of decades of planning and investment, with the flexibility inherent in these existing naval forces, the United States is uniquely prepared to adapt to a dynamic security environment. Fully capable of operating throughout the entire spectrum of conflict. Naval expeditionary forces have focused on the mid-to-low end of this spectrum and offer multiple strategic planning options.

Today, our existing naval forces are capable of fulfilling a significant portion of our current and future defense requirements. These forces are unique in their capability to deter or respond to the types of threats and likely conflicts of the future security environment. Their mobility, readiness, and self-contained sustainability allows them to be where needed around the globe uninhibited by a reliance on overseas bases or access rights. Their ability to conduct operations across the spectrum of violence ranging from nation building to offensive power projection operations provided our Nation with the military credibility and capability needed to discourage potential adversaries, and should deterrence fail, to respond to acts of aggression against our citizens and interests. In an era of uncertainty and change, our aircraft carriers, naval gunfire support ships, Maritime Prepositioning Ships, and Marines of our balanced fleet can provide the warriors, the floating air bases, infantry base camps, tank and artillery parks, ammunition dumps, maintenance facilities, hospitals, and command, control, communications and intelligence facilities needed for such strategic flexibility. These mobile sea bases, and the forces they house, project, and sustain, can provide our Nation with a competitive advantage of unmatched utility.

The United States remains fundamentally a maritime nation, and must retain and demonstrate the ability to secure the seas that connect this country to its allies, commercial partners, energy supplies, and resources. As President Bush has observed, "No amount of political change will alter the geographic fact that we are separated from many of our most important allies and interests by thousands of miles of water." Maritime superiority gives the Nation the ability to preserve the vital links to our allies and economic partners, to maintain a visible presence throughout the world, and to project military power inland whenever and wherever necessary.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The President's National Security Strategy contains the following essential components: Deterrence, Forward Presence, Coalition with Allies, and Force Projection. In his 2 August 1990 address, the President identified the further requirement that the Nation retain the capacity to rebuild its forces should world events dictate.

Deterrence, both nuclear and conventional, costs less than any level of conflict and will remain the cornerstone of United States defense policy. Nuclear deterrence will be required as long as any country possesses the capability to strike the United States or endanger United States forces abroad with nuclear weapons. If deterrence should fail, strategic forces must be able to respond at the point of conflict.

The forward presence of capable naval forces in close proximity to potential areas of world crisis remains a key element of United States security. In addition to contributing to deterrence, forward deployed naval forces strengthen our ties with allies and serve as a visible sign of United States commitment. These forces provide the nation with the capability to respond effectively to crises independent of overseas bases and access agreements. Routine forward deployments, logistic self-sufficiency, and ambiguity of intent make naval forces largely immune to the political constraints that could inhibit the employment of land based forces during times of crises.

In the past, our fundamental security ties and activities have centered on countries with whom we have had formal alliances. Such alliances remain a strategic goal for the Nation. In the future, however, the character of our alliances may be substantially different. The coalition which the United States is leading in the Persian Gulf is perhaps more typical of future alliance structures.

Simply maintaining the capability to keep the sea-lines of communication open to our allies and for resource movement is insufficient to fully protect America's vital interests. The maintenance of stability also requires that we be able to influence events on

land. In some cases, this can be done through a combination of forward deployed or forward based forces followed by the sequential introduction of combat forces transported from the continental United States. For much of the globe, however, the Navy and Marine Corps will remain the primary means of maintaining regional influence. Since most of the world's population lives within 50 miles of the sea, our naval power projection capabilities are particularly useful in deterring aggression or applying force at the appropriate place and time.

Existing naval forces provide a significant portion of the capability needed for deterrence and crisis response in the present geostrategic environment. In the event that a global threat to national security should arise, those same forces would provide the foundation for the reconstitution of a globally-capable fleet sufficient to deter or defeat any enemy threatening United States maritime supremacy. Such a fleet takes a long time to build, even if many decommissioned vessels are available for reactivation. In addition, reactivated ships would be qualitatively inferior to the active fleet ships which would have responded initially to a global threat. Those constructed in response to a national mobilization, or built to replace ships lost during the initial stages of combat, would take significantly longer to complete than any other element of the reconstituted military force. Nevertheless, given the anticipated warning time, existing United States naval forces are adequate to provide the foundation for the reconstitution of a larger naval force in the event of a national emergency.

POWER PROJECTION

The shift in focus of United States security efforts from the defense of NATO toward the more likely involvement in regional crises, highlights the continued importance of naval power projection forces for crisis response. The core of this force is the strike capability of aircraft carrier battle groups, amphibious task forces, and Marine Air-Ground Task Forces. These forces provide an important forward presence in peacetime and an early surge capability to enable the introduction of follow-on forces.

SEA CONTROL

During the Cold War, keeping the sea-lines of communication open against a formidable Soviet submarine and air threat was of primary importance. Today the potential for global open-ocean attack has been reduced because regional adversaries are not as likely to acquire or concentrate sufficient naval forces for open-ocean operations. However, the need to ensure local control of the seas in the immediate operating area of our Naval Expeditionary Forces remains as vital as ever.

Ensuring local sea control remains the essential prerequisite for successful power projection operations. In a regional crisis, these operations can be more complex and demanding than similar operations in the open ocean.

ENHANCING FORCE MULTIPLIERS

United States naval forces must continue to exploit and develop force multipliers which have preserved our combat superiority over numerically superior forces. The application of advanced technologies as represented by the Aegis AAW system, TOMAHAWK cruise missile, medium assault helicopter lift replacement, advanced amphibious assault vehicles, and air-cushioned landing craft (LCAC) will enhance arrogant usefulness in multiple scenarios. Likewise, interoperability of C3I2 systems and the capability to exploit space-based resources enhances future joint and combined operations.

JOINT OPERATIONS

Each of the military services has unique capabilities which are the result of decades of organizational focus and institutional ethos. The sequencing of forces across the full spectrum of combat operations capitalizes on the inherent strengths of each service. The linkage between services has been formalized by involving component commanders in the planning, exercise, and contingency phases of operations and in the development of joint doctrine.

The concept of joint force sequencing integrates complementary capabilities when forces must be introduced over several phases of a campaign. Naval forces are integral to this force sequencing concept. When employed in presence and stability operations, forward-deployed naval forces play a crucial role in any effort to deter a crisis or stabilize a volatile situation. These forces are inherently mobile and provide a range of options, particularly when employed in combination with selected Army and Air Force units.

In the event that no forward-deployed forces are on station when a crisis develops, forces must be shifted from other theaters or transported from CONUS by sealift or airlift. Deployed Navy and Marine forces provide a capability for prompt power projection, in concert with USAF tactical air and Army special forces if available in theater.

Some responses will require the insertion of forces capable of forcible entry. In such cases, naval forces are able to launch both strikes and assaults in order to seize entry points to enable the introduction of follow-on forces. After securing access, land-based tactical air units and Army airborne forces can be introduced.

In cases where unopposed access can be achieved, amphibious and air-based combat power can be concentrated rapidly to either terminate the conflict, or to set the stage for decisive action by additional joint follow-on forces.

The power projection forces of the Navy and Marine Corps can pave the way for the introduction of heavy forces. For example, as the responsibility for expanding an operation is transferred from naval forces to Army combat forces and Air Force tactical air wings, the CINC has the option of reforming the Navy and Marine Corps forces into a regional reserve for use elsewhere within the same campaign, or holding them for other contingencies.

This is the theory behind the joint force sequencing concept. The most recent international crisis, Operation Desert Shield, unfolded much as depicted here.

DESERT SHIELD

From the onset of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, naval forces in the Persian Gulf region have been a major instrument for bringing pressure to bear on Iraq. The role of implementing U.N. economic sanctions has rested almost exclusively on naval forces. When the decision was made to move a large deterrent force into the region, aircraft carrier battlegroups steamed quickly into position from deployment hubs in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. Forward-deployed naval forces, supplemented by Army airborne units, which had arrived by air to defend vital port and airhead facilities, formed the covering force for follow-on air and ground forces. Simultaneously, Marine units flew from Hawaii and California to link up with their equipment aboard Maritime Prepositioning Ships which had moved into the Persian Gulf.

In this crisis, the forward deployment of CVBGs, and the rapid mobility of Maritime Prepositioning Ships gave the National Command Authorities a strong and unequivocal response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

THE SHAPE AND FUTURE EMPLOYMENT OF NAVAL FORCES

One factor which promises to have a significant effect on the shape of the future Navy and Marine Corps is the predictable reduction in the size of United States military forces. In a world defense requirements are not driven by the need to respond to a monolithic global threat, the nation's defenses can be sized more closely to actual commitments and foreseeable instabilities in the world. While those commitments may not appear much different now than they have been for the last 45 years, the economic realities and priorities of the new world never-the-less require that the nation's naval forces decline in size.

For the United States to continue to support its allies, protect its citizens and interests, and maintain its access to overseas markets, the naval forces must seek new ways of operating their forces. A new emphasis on flexibility and versatility will be required.

One of the more significant results of the diminished Soviet threat is that naval forces cannot focus their efforts on operating in areas of traditional United States and Soviet confrontation, such as the Mediterranean, the Far East and the Indian Ocean. Naval expeditionary forces must operate globally in areas of U.S. interest.

The level of presence required in a given region may vary depending on considerations such as economic interests, regional instability, and the strength of local allies. Concurrent with this new flexibility in operational requirements will come reductions in naval force levels. These reductions will dictate that naval commanders carefully consider how they deploy existing assets. The National Command Authorities must carefully weigh each reduction in naval capability to determine its implications upon local perceptions of United States commitment, influence and resolve.

TAILORED EMPLOYMENTS

Reductions in Navy force levels will inevitably require that we change the way we deploy our ships and aircraft. At the same time, reductions in the number of overseas bases will place an increasing responsibility on the Navy and Marine Corps to maintain a forward United States presence. In the future, we will deploy naval forces in several ways. When the situation allows, smaller naval forces will be tailored for a specific mission and deployed outside of historical rotations or patterns. Naval forces will no longer be "tethered" to a specific region, as has been the case in the past. With a smaller number of deployable forces, ships will move between theaters of operations depending upon the emerging requirements. Once in a region, naval forces may be dispersed to maximize their political impact, while maintaining the ability to quickly concentrate into a major force should a crisis arise.

The Marine Corps has developed an array of improved deployment and force closure packages known as Deterrence Force Modules (DFMs) and Crisis Action Modules (CAMs). DFMs and CAMs allows the CINC to organize Marine Air-Ground Task Forces according to the capability he specifically requires, using the entire Fleet Marine Force structure as a reservoir combined in-

tegrated arms of capability. The CINC can tailor the compositing of the desired MAGTF to his specific needs, employing any desired combination of the three deployment methods used by Marines (Air Contingency Forces, Amphibious Forces, and Maritime Prepositioning Forces). This building-block approach provides the best utilization of mobility assets and available time. DFMs and CAMs provide the CINC with a flexible force option for use in both deliberate planning and crisis response to real-world events.

Whatever the nature of our changing security environment, national decision makers will continue to rely heavily on naval forces. Because of their proximity, endurance, and inherent defensive and offensive capabilities, naval forces will continue to be called early in a crisis.

THE KEY COMPONENTS OF NAVAL FORCES

Technology is changing the face of naval warfare, and the Navy and Marine Corps are at the leading edge of this movement. Developments in precision guidance, satellite navigation, cruise missile, advanced radars, stealth technologies, and worldwide communications have been incorporated into the naval force structure and tactics. Since ships and aircraft often have lifetimes expanding 30 years, adapting the best of these new technologies to proven concepts and platforms holds the most promise for meeting the challenges of an uncertain future.

THE CARRIER BATTLEGROUP AND MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE

The most flexible elements of a balanced fleet, and the primary choice for projecting United States power and influence, are the carrier battlegroup and amphibious task forces. These powerful units are composed of an aircraft carrier, amphibious ships, Marine Air-Ground Task Forces, several surface combatants, and one or more nuclear attack submarines. They are supported by combat logistic ships, land-based maritime patrol aircraft, and sophisticated spaced-based surveillance and communications systems. They can be ready on short notice to conduct full combat operations any-

where in the world. The composition of these forces can be tailored to the requirements of each contingency.

The Fleet's force projection capability and flexibility expanded by Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) are organized to respond to a specific mission, and have capabilities ranging from providing mobile training teams to conducting amphibious assaults from over the horizon. Each MAGTF has a command element, a ground combat element, an air combat element, and a combat service support element, each of which is tailored to the specific mission.

Using the flexibility inherent within the Marine Corps' force structure of three active (and one reserve) divisions, three active (and one reserve) air wings, and three active (and one reserve) force service support group -- organized into Marine Expeditionary Forces -- MAGTFs of whatever size can be readily assimilated into larger, more capable MAGTFs. This process of "compositing" permits MAGTFs to deploy by various means and to rapidly organize according to the capabilities required for the specific theater of operations. As MAGTFs are composited, they acquire the capabilities of the units they incorporate.

The source for all Marine Corps task organizations is the Marine Expeditionary Force. The MEF not only deploys smaller MAGTFs, but is the operational task force for all contingency plans. The three active Marine Corps Expeditionary Forces provide global coverage for regional planning, and are the primary organizations for all Marine combat operations and peacetime preparedness.

FLEXIBLE EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES

Forward presence is the key to stability operations. In peacetime, special task groups can be employed to promote stability and demonstrate continued resolve to protect vital United States and allied interests. Special task groups combine individual units, usually on a level below that of a carrier battlegroup or amphibious ready group. They permit rapid response to situations ranging from disaster relief to crisis intervention, and conserve resources by match-

ing force requirements to the anticipated threat. When it serves national policy, such task groups can be withdrawn unilaterally without the heavy political costs associated with the movement of land-based forces.

While active forces are responsible for immediate peacetime presence and crisis response, reserve forces, the "Total Force," provide backup for crises as well as a pool of trained individuals and units available in the event of a major conflict. Achieving a proper balance in the active/reserve mix will play an important part in maintaining overall force readiness. In the future, greater responsibilities will be shifted to the selected reserves, particularly in the areas of anti-submarine warfare, anti-drug operations, and mine countermeasures.

MAINTAINING HEDGES AGAINST FUTURE UNCERTAINTIES

Given the uncertainties of the future, it is imperative that the United States provide hedges against unforeseeable turns in the geopolitical climate, or changes in our potential adversaries' correlation of forces. Maintaining maritime superiority remains essential to preserving American access and influence abroad. This requirement is a fundamental principle for a maritime nation like the United States.

The United States has always relied on its technological edge to offset the need to match potential adversaries' strengths in numbers. Protecting the country's technological edge in vital defense industries means continued investment in research and development, and ongoing enhancement of our industrial competitiveness.

As President Bush has noted, the Nation's capacity to rebuild its forces is a strategic asset which cannot be allowed to decline in an era when active forces are at the minimum level needed to ensure peace and stability. Inseparably linked to America's technological edge is the preservation of its strategic industrial base, centered around critical capabilities such as aerospace design and submarine construction, and continued access to strategic materials and energy sources.

Finally, the most difficult challenge will be in sustaining the operational experience gained during the last 10 years. While certain material stocks can go into reserve, the same is not true of perishable warfighting skills, or of highly-trained personnel whose abilities are the foundation of United States combat capability.

CONCLUSION

Geography makes the United States a maritime nation with interests inextricably linked to the sea. The foundation of national policy and its concomitant military strategy is maritime in nature.

Emerging regional powers, the economic interdependence of the world market, and the growing dependence on scarce resources requires a focus upon traditional maritime nature of our nation. Our National foreign policy is no longer "containment" but "stability," i.e., pursuing a policy which results in a stable and secure world, free of major threats of U.S. interest. In consonance with a new policy, National military strategy can no longer be viewed as two distinct but complementary strategies but rather a single integrated strategy -- a strategy based upon the maritime nature of the United States and the future global focus of military efforts. An integrated maritime strategy is such a strategy.

A maritime nation with global interests and responsibilities must have an expeditionary capability. Expeditionary forces are combined-arms forces tailored to accomplish a specific objective. They are uniquely trained, equipped, organized, and experienced in rapid deployment. Expeditionary forces have the capability for forcible entry. These forces must be able to function in an austere environment and possess a degree of self-sustainment.

Our naval expeditionary forces are capable of fulfilling a significant portion of our current and future defense requirements. They provide the National Command Authority and the unified commanders with multiple options and they provide our Nation with a competitive advantage of unmatched utility.

Chapter II

Regional Security and Forward Deployed Forces

LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.)

THE CHANGING SCENE

During the years of the Cold War the United States maintained alliances and regional security arrangements on two levels. The principal one dealt with the Soviet Union. It had at its core the containment strategy, which worked so successfully to limit the spread of Moscow-dominated communism until that flawed system collapsed of its inherent contradictions. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Central Treaty Organization and Southeast Treaty Organization, the bilateral treaties with such nations as Japan and South Korea and special understandings with South Africa are examples of this level of American commitment.

The second level of commitment was regionally oriented and, while it contributed to containment, its primary goal was to maintain the status quo and the balance of power in volatile regions of the world. Formal and informal security arrangements with the Shah of Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia in the Middle East represent the most complex of these regional instruments. The Organization of American States, the Inter-American Defense Board, bilateral agreements with Mexico and Canada and special relationships with individual Latin nations were the most straightforward of alliances in this category.

At both levels the traditionally isolationist United States took on weighty commitments to better protect its own national interests and commonly shared interests with those with whom it had close cultural, moral, political or economic ties. The system of alliances and understandings woven in the post-war world were the

product of hard-headed analysis about what was good for the United States. Some, such as NATO, stood the test of time. Some like CENTO and SEATO did not. When a failure occurred, the United States sought alternate arrangements to pursue its goals. Support for ASEAN is an example of how the United States adjusted to the failure of SEATO and its own defeat in Vietnam.

With the demise of the Soviet Union and its empire, the need for the first level of alliances diminished, at least as an instrument of containment and mutual defense. But the downfall of the Soviets also destroyed the neat and predictable bipolar world that existed for almost half a century. It has been replaced by an uncertain and unpredictable world, which is unipolar in the sense that the United States is dominant in raw military power; multipolar in that there now exists super-economic and political powers around the globe - Japan on the Pacific rim for one, United Germany and the European Economic Community for another. On the horizon, China promises to be an additional member of the club.

While the ashes of the Soviet Union will also give birth to another major power center, perhaps historic Russia, that is not likely to take place for years.

The complicated tapestry of the redistribution and redefinition of world power is further complicated by the reemergence of regional disputes. They were previously held in check by the heavy hand of centralist communism and the bipolar confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. These range from the ethnic disputes which are tearing apart Yugoslavia and some of the Soviet republics to inter-border disputes such as occasioned the Persian Gulf War.

The world today has characteristics of the pre-World War I period and of the inter-war years. The big difference is that today, the United States is the major player on the international scene and not an isolated bystander as it was earlier in the century.

As it adjusts to the dynamics of the new world, the United States' goals actually remain substantially unchanged. Simply stated they

are to protect and advance the well-being of its people. If this could be done by retreating into isolation it would do so. But only those with the narrowest of vision would endorse such a policy. This is true, not only in the economic sense, but in all areas of human affairs including the ecology. In addition, the United States has a special burden as the symbol of democracy. It must continue to foster the growth of democracy around the world, not only as a moral imperative, but from enlightened self-interest. History shows that wars do not take place between democratic nations. The United States simply cannot withdraw into isolationism with the excuse that domestic issues come first. The world has grown far too independent for that.

An argument is made that the United States can serve the interests of its people best by taking advantage of its unipolar power using that power unilaterally to create conditions favorable to itself. This too is a bromide that is doomed to have the opposite effect. It leads to arrogance of power, which will neither be tolerated by the American people, nor by the international community, which would be certain to unify against the imposition of a self-centered form of Pax Americana.

If the United States is to enhance the well-being of its people it must play a constructive role on the world scene by cooperating with current and potential friends and by deterring or preventing those who threaten that goal. Such a policy has worked well for us in the latter half of this century and promises to do so in the next. But the form this policy takes is bound to be different.

For 40 years military might, alliances and forward deployed of forces have been the centerpieces of American security strategy. This has been at a cost to the quality of life at home. It was a price worth paying when the threat to the country was mortal. But there is no gainsaying that the price of freedom also contributed to those ills that currently plague American society; a huge deficit, a weak economy, poor health care, crime and a flawed educational system. The American people are not going to support the security centerpiece of military muscle, alliances and forward deployment in the future as they willingly did in the past.

The public's focus in the future will be on building economic and social strength. Military strength and its commitments abroad will be downgraded. This trend can be seen already in myriad ways. The budget battles over defense spending on Capitol Hill and the challenges to the longevity of NATO are just the tip of the iceberg. The American people, proud as they are of their servicemen, retain their traditional suspicion of a large military establishment. They no longer perceive a need for it, at least in its current form, and will be quick to reduce it in the wake of the demise of the Soviet Union and the spectacular victory of American arms in the Persian Gulf. The conviction that uncontested victors can sheath their swords has been a hallmark of America. National indifference to the loss of overseas bases, such as Clark Field and the Subic naval base in the Philippines is also a manifestation of public willingness to retrench militarily.

THE NEED FOR REASSESSMENT

In light of the sea change that has taken place in the world over the past three years, regional arrangements so valuable in the past must be reassessed for their value. The United States must ensure unilateral freedom of action while selectively benefiting from alliances and security arrangements, including those under United Nations auspices. American interests abroad are political, economic and moral. Each interest requires a different level of military involvement and form.

On the political level this means American military might will be called upon to buttress friendly regimes, even if some of those regimes are not democratic in the accepted sense of the term. Not to do so can threaten regional stability and the balance of power. Support for Saudi Arabia is a case in point.

On the economic level, the United States must make use of its military to ensure free and unfettered access to world markets and defend economic activities essential to its quality of life. Access to oil is the classic example in this regime.

Morally the United States, as the sole superpower, must use its

strength to lead other free nations to oppose aggression and advance the principle of peaceful resolution of disputes and the protection of human rights. American use of force in the defense of Kuwait in the Gulf War and the subsequent multi-national intervention in Iraqi Kurdistan symbolize American moral responsibility.

Notwithstanding the principles embodied in the pursuit of these three categories of national interest, the United States cannot unilaterally police the world. Neither can it, nor would it use its military arm in every instance to deal with events that are inimical to its political, economic or moral interests. For one thing military forces remains the steel fist within the velvet glove of diplomacy and not the naked arbiter of disputes. For a second, a shrunken American military establishment will demand fewer commitments.

It is essential, therefore, that the United States use force judiciously and, insofar as possible, in conjunction with others who share the same interests we do.

In the face of an uncertain future, the world must be viewed through the lens of broad American interests if the military establishment is to be responsive. What are the critical regional areas? Why are they critical? Where do they stand in a hierarchy of priorities? In which of the three categories are they critical, political, economic or moral? With those questions answered, we must assess whether international regional cooperative arrangements are possible with other nations while reserving the right of unilateral action. Finally, in the context of how maritime forces can contribute best to safeguarding and advancing those interests, how should sharply reduced naval forces be structured to ensure maximum capability and utility?

THE CRITICAL AREAS

In conducting a *tour de horizon* of American regional interests, Europe obviously stands out as important and our interests there are an amalgam of political, economic and moral factors. But while Europe has been traditionally first in priority from a military standpoint during the Cold War, that importance has diminished

with the passing of the Soviet threat. Increasingly Europeans are, and will, look to their own security. This is apparent in the Franco-German initiative to establish a European standing military force under the aegis of the Western European Union. While the United States should continue to foster the longevity of NATO, its long-term prospects are uncertain. It is in the interest of the United States to keep a foothold in Europe as part of an alliance to exercise an influence over European decision making. NATO also provides an in-being multi-national military infrastructure and process that can be used as a model for other multi-national coalitions elsewhere. But from a military standpoint the role of the United States on the continent is bound to diminish. Naval forces traditionally played a support role at sea in the alliance, but their utility is transferable to other oceans of the world.

In the Far East, both northeast and southeast, our interests are primarily political and economic. The military focus in the region is primarily on North Korea. It is the only clear and present threat to our interests. Not only does it pose a continuing threat to South Korea, but most importantly, it is potentially a nuclear threat to Northeast Asia.

Beyond North Korea, there is no active threat. But we cannot overlook the potential capabilities of Japan and China. The smaller nations of the region have historical reasons to fear them. If Japan ever rearmed, all of Asia would look to the United States as a counter-force. Despite economic differences with Japan, which are apt to grow, maintaining close formal ties and commitments to Japan including the current defense commitment are in America's best interest. The commitments allow us some political and economic leverage and provide some assurance against a rebirth of Japanese militancy. If the United States turned its military back on the far Pacific an uneasy vacuum would develop; one that would not be filled to our liking.

Continued American military presence in the region is essential to stability and while that stability is bought at cost to the United States and at little cost to the nations of the region, it is a sound investment given our political and economic interests in the Far

East. Given that, naval forces provide the most economical and politically acceptable form of continued American presence in the region. They are non-intrusive, yet visible, flexible and mobile. Furthermore the two giants of the region, Japan and China are far more comfortable with a naval military-to-military relationship with the United States than they are with ground or air forces.

American interests in our own hemisphere have always taken a low priority. Our relations with Canada are taken for granted by both countries and both are formally allied within the framework of the NATO alliance. Mexico has always been distinguished from the rest of Latin America because it is contiguous to the United States. But the relationship is primarily economic and other than problem areas, such as immigration and the narcotics traffic, there has been little reason in recent years to elevate Mexico on the scale of national security interests. Past fears of the spread of communism in Mexico were groundless and are now non-existent.

Central America was only important to the United States when the Panama Canal was valuable, but the Canal has lost its military and commercial significance. As for the remainder of the region, it never was critical to our well-being although successive administrations insisted on elevating its importance because of the perceived dangers of communism in the hemisphere. At the present and for the foreseeable future, there is only a moral imperative for the United States to help the Central American republics along the path of democratic reform.

The same may be said of the remainder of Latin America. Both North and South America have long established ground rules for their inter-relationship that have proven satisfactory. These include formal relations under the Rio treaty. The status quo best serves the interest of both north and south during this time of transition. None of our political, economic and moral interests in Latin America have been modified significantly by the changes resulting from the end of the Cold War and attendant events. Even the problem of cocaine trafficking in the Andean region is amenable to cooperative initiatives within the framework of existing relationships.

Militarily the main function of the United States is to provide training, support and a model for Latin armed forces. As the army is the dominant service throughout Latin America, it follows that the U.S. Army should remain the principle vehicle for our military-to-military relations south of the border.

In the Caribbean, only Fidel Castro's Cuba remains a problem for the United States, but it is more an irritant than a problem. Cuba is isolated and in economic ruins. Castro has lost his standing as a third-world leader and his brand of communism no longer serves as a model for other developing nations. The country is in decay and while still militarily strong, Cuba poses no active threat to the region.

South Asia is of interest to the United States on a political level because it contains the world's largest democracy, India. But it is a volatile nation with a nuclear capability. Its antagonists are China and Pakistan, one with nuclear weapons, the other suspected to have them and fully capable of fielding them if they do not. The triangle of conflict centers on territorial disputes with the Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan being the most dangerous. Both sides have postured for war frequently in recent years. With the Afghanistan war on the back burner, Pakistan is now in a better position to harden its position *vis a vis* India. It is not in the interest of the United States to become militarily involved in an India-Pak dispute, but any conflict between the two is bound to have international repercussions of an unpredictable nature. This is particularly true if nuclear weapons are used or threaten to be used.

The region lowest in the hierarchy of American interests is Africa south of the Sahara. As a non-colonial nation we have no significant political, economic or moral ties with southern Africa. What interests we did have in the recent past were tied to the Cold War. Thus, we established close ties with South Africa as guardian of the Cape sea lanes. Also our support for President Se-se Se-ko Mobutu of Zaire and Jonas Savimbi in Angola were associated with our competition with the Soviets and Cubans in that part of Africa. That is a thing of the past. Africa is in the process of struggling with its own identity. It is no longer even a minor player in

First and Second world politics. Other than a tepid interest in fostering democratic institutions, equal rights, humanitarianism and increased trade, southern Africa is in no way critical to American interests. The level of these interests do not warrant guarantees with military implications.

Notwithstanding the presence of an amphibious task force off Liberia for six months, the United States wisely limited itself to protecting its nationals and left it to a coalition of African nations to intervene in the fratricidal conflict.

This leaves the Maghreb and the Middle East from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean as an area of United States interest. Despite the wide variation in any subregion of the Middle East, the entire region must be considered as one because of its religious, cultural and political interrelationships.

If there is one area of the world where the United States has critical interests in all categories, it is the Middle East. It has moral commitments to Israel and the Gulf states. It has enormous economic interest in the region and from these flow major political interests.

There is no doubt that the Middle East is the most dangerous region of the world. The balance-of-power struggle brought on with the downfall of the Shah of Iran has not yet been resolved. Indeed it has been exacerbated by the Gulf War. An unchastened Saddam Hussein remains in power in Iraq, still seeking a nuclear capability. While the Persian Gulf War exploded the myth of Arab solidarity, there are those, particularly Saddam Hussein who still seek it. Iran seeks to join the nuclear club as the major player in the region. Islamic fundamentalism also poses potential problems from the Arab Maghreb to Persian Iran and even the Islamic populated Soviet republics.

Syria seeks leadership of the Arab world and remains dangerous under the canny leadership of Hafiz al Assad who still views Israel as a mortal enemy. The Arab world, despite the recently concluded Mid-East conference still views Israel as a cancer. Add to this the Golan Heights, Palestinian issues and Israel's siege mentality and

the mixture is as volatile as ever. The quixotic Mu'ammar al Qaddafi of Libya remains not only anti-Israeli, but anti-United States and an active troublemaker along the Mediterranean littoral. On top of all this is the west's growing dependence upon Mid-Eastern oil.

Given these factors, the future American military posture must provide for the distinct possibility of armed intervention in the region.

THE MECHANISMS

If it is true that the United States is unwilling, and indeed unable, to be the policeman of the world, it nonetheless cannot abrogate its international responsibilities as the sole superpower and leader of the free world. At the very least it has to be the sheriff who puts together and leads the posse against international malefactors. But it must do this in a way that the nation is not tied into security arrangements that will automatically draw us into conflict we wish to ignore.

There is little the United States can do, or need to do, about multilateral and bilateral alliances and understandings that already exist - NATO, being the prime example. But these existing arrangements can be reviewed and tempered by developments flowing from the end of the Cold War. For example, the United States' commitment to Israel's survival is absolute. But Israel no longer has the strategic importance it once had in the context of the East-West confrontation. This reduction in Israel's importance to the United States increases the United States' importance to Israel and provides additional leverage when dealing with the Israelis on Mid-East issues.

The demise of the Soviet threat also changes our security relationship with Japan. This must be taken into account in assessing our policy towards Japanese defense needs.

As the new world order emerges, the United States should maintain maximum freedom of action while fostering those coalitions,

which will be useful in dealing with those regional crises that bear on our important interests.

The United Nations provides the ideal overall coalition vehicle. The Administration made skillful use of it during the Persian Gulf War. As a permanent member of the Security Council, the United States is able to exercise significant influence over UN members. This change is becoming increasingly more apparent as the anti-western post-colonial leadership of the Third World matures and moves in a more democratic direction. The United States accrued considerable prestige for its political acumen and military leadership in the struggle against Iraq and it is now in a position to capitalize on that prestige.

But prestige is a perishable commodity. To capitalize on it, it behooves the Administration to explore the opportunities of a more formal UN intervention force. This can be done by breathing life into the Security Council's moribund Military Staff Committee. The same may be said of Article 42, of the UN Charter, which makes provisions for a peace enforcement force of the sort authorized solely by resolution in the Gulf War. (As distinct from peacekeeping forces.)

But as long as a permanent member of the Council such as China, has veto power, the UN is not sufficient to ensure collective action where it is needed against an outlaw state. Again this means that the United States must selectively develop regional security coalition outside the UN to deal with possible military threats to its important interests.

For the foreseeable future Northeast Asia and the Middle East are the two most dangerous regions of the world relative to American interests. It follows that we should lay the groundwork for coalition cooperation in both those regions. In Asia this means cobbling understandings aimed at deterring or dealing with a nuclear armed North Vietnam. Perforce this includes Japan, China and the Russian Republic.

In the Middle East, the United States has an opportunity to

strengthen a coalition of Gulf states and those nations dependent upon its oil. This includes Germany and Japan.

With regard to Israel, it is unlikely that the United States can structure a coalition to guarantee Israel's existence, but it can foster international understanding towards unilateral American action in the unlikely event Israel is seriously threatened.

In the absence of serious threats to American interests elsewhere in the world, and a concomitant reduction in the armed forces the United States must be cautious in undertaking additional specific or implied regional obligations.

The implications of the geopolitical changes in the world for naval forces are significant. With the end of the ideological and power struggle with the Soviet Union, the military focus has become regional rather than global. The United States no longer has to be prepared to checkmate communism around the globe. The shrinking size of the military attests to Congressional and public realization of that fact. Ironically enough, for the first time in decades the capabilities of the military may actually match requirements. They will be geared to deal with fewer, yet critical, areas of the world.

Smaller active military forces require an ordering of regional priorities to ensure that areas of critical interests are covered. For the current and foreseeable future this means the Middle East and northeastern Asia.

Lesser important areas cannot be ignored, but there is no reason to try to cover them with the reduced number of forces that will exist in the coming years. To do so would be self-defeating. It would dilute capabilities to such a degree as to make them ineffective everywhere. However, crises frequently occur in the least expected place and time and take on lives of their own. Therefore, the United States must structure and dispose its forces in such a way that it maintains sufficient capacity to deal with unforeseen crises without unduly degrading its ability to act in regions of primary interest. The infantry analog of "two up, one back" is as applicable to strategy as it is to tactics.

The draw down of air and land forces abroad makes naval forces increasingly more important in a regional context. Naval forces constitute a principal means of projecting sustained power. Further, the high technology threat to them as represented by the Soviet Union does not exist to a comparable degree on the regional level. This increases the relative power of naval forces. But the Navy's traditional pattern of operations and priority of interests must conform to the new realities.

The western Pacific remains critically important from a geopolitical standpoint but also as a theater for war fighting in the event of an ill-considered move on the part of North Korea.

The far Pacific also constitutes our line of communication to the Indian subcontinent and most importantly to the North Arabian, Red Seas and the Persian Gulf. While there is no threat to these lifelines at present, they would represent a vulnerability for operations in Southwest Asia if they were to be ignored.

The waters of Southwest Asia must remain the domain of the American Navy. Twice in less than five years, naval forces have fought in the region because it was vital to our national interests. The United States must be prepared to intervene decisively in the Persian Gulf, whatever force structure emerges from the current draw down.

The naval companion to the North Arabian Sea is the Mediterranean Sea. It too is critical in safeguarding our national interests in the Maghreb and the Middle East. The African shore of the Mediterranean has seen naval forces in action more than any place else in the world in the years following the Second World War. The argument for United States presence off its troubled shores though different now, is no less strong now than it was when the 6th Fleet was initially established.

NAVAL REORIENTATION

The emerging regional orientation of the U.S. military requires a mental readjustment of the Navy. Navy officers and the Navy's

professional education system must redirect their thinking away from deep blue water and more towards shallow and brown water operations; frequently in concert with local navies.

Carrier battle groups designed to control the high seas and carry the battle to the Soviet homeland in both Europe and Asia soon will be no longer necessary. A major effort at sea control will likewise no longer be warranted. Other than the Soviet Union there never was a power, nor is there likely to be one, capable of challenging the United States in that regime. In addition to showing the flag in presence missions, battle groups form the backbone of naval projection forces in regional conflict. This requires greater Navy attention to integration of battle groups with amphibious task forces.

The same may be said for undersea warfare, both submarine and anti-submarine. Making allowances for a minimally acceptable number of attack and nuclear missile submarines, submarine operations and their counter should be geared to the nature of regional undersea threats. This means shallower water operations and dealing with extremely quiet foreign submarines designed to operate in a coastal environment.

Amphibious and mine countermeasure forces are relatively unaffected by the reorientation occasioned by the collapse of communism. These forces have always been oriented more towards likely Third World contingencies than they were towards global war with the Soviet Union.

Both the Navy and the Marines have traditionally trained and worked with foreign forces. The relative ease with which coalition forces integrated the efforts of many countries in establishing the embargo against Iraq is illustrative of this capability. As coalition warfare is both politically and military desirable in dealing with future regional crises, the naval forces are well positioned to capitalize on existing integrating techniques and processes. Passing exercises with friendly warships have the advantage of enhancing international cooperation at sea without implying any commitments.

ORGANIZING FOR REGIONAL OPERATIONS

Desert Shield and Desert Storm provided important lessons on how smaller Navy and Marine forces can operate more effectively in the future. In the Gulf War the United States offset Iraqi superiority with technology to achieve a quick and relatively cost-free victory. The high technology approach should be pursued, even at the cost to some more conventional capabilities.

The United States defeated the Iraqis by integrating its technical systems. It was a "system of systems," which rendered the Iraqis deaf, dumb and blind, located their critical nodes and delivered accurate and devastating firepower against them. For all their strength, the Iraqis were helpless to prevent their own systematic destruction.

Satellites, reconnaissance aircraft, remotely piloted vehicles, electronic and signal intelligence provided American and coalition forces unparalleled information about the Iraqis, while countermeasures denied him information on the allies. Thanks to data linking, much of our data was distributed to users in real time.

AWACs, E2Cs and JSTARS provided an unprecedented air and ground picture on the theater level, which TARPS, RPVs and FLIR equipped aircraft and helicopters did the same for operational units. These along with PLRS and GPS gave the allies unprecedented "situation awareness." Thermal sights and night vision equipment gave United States forces and its allies mastery of the night.

High technology helped acquire targets and precision guided munitions destroyed the difficult ones. The litany of achievements due to the American technological edge is almost endless. And yet the equipment used for the most part is almost a generation old. Only the Tomahawk with its fire and forget capability represents the on-coming generation of sophisticated systems.

Insofar as possible, the Gulf War should be a model for all regional wars, i.e., let systems do the fighting. This not only makes

sense in achieving the goals of an operation it minimizes casualties, that great inhibitor of American public support for military action in a crisis.

Whether the United States in the defense of its regional interests is faced with a sophisticated enemy, as was the case with the Iraqis or a more primitive opponent, the odds are that the enemy will outnumber our projection forces. He will also have the home field advantage. To offset these advantages intelligence is key to the effective use of forces available to us. It does not make any difference whether the environment be desert, mountain, jungle or urban, operational intelligence is a *sine qua non* for effectiveness.

Following intelligence, both in importance and sequencing, are target acquisition and target preparation systems. Technology should be used to ferret out the enemy and neutralize his ability to defend himself. The target can then be destroyed by a variety of weapons combinations.

It makes no sense to try to match the Third World with infantry. It will always have more of them at a cheaper price. In today's world there is no greater tribute to the rifleman on the ground than to present him a battlefield that he can walk over rather than fight over. Technology can do that for him.

To translate this presumption into a maximum capability at an acceptable cost requires tradeoffs in investment as well as in organization and doctrine. In organizing for combat, the Navy - Marine Corps team must add the Air Force to the roster if it wants to benefit from the synergism that existing and projected technology provides.

The Air Force can provide another dimension to the fleets' sea based force projection capabilities, but only if all three Services think about it, work at it in peacetime and make it happen in war time.


The stories of lack of Navy interoperability with the other Services in the Gulf War are legion. They will be legion in the next regional conflict unless the Navy disabuses itself of its high seas mentality.

A systems architecture must be designed by the three Services (and those expeditionary units of the Army) to integrate their capabilities. It should provide a theater commander an in-being expeditionary "system of system" at the outset of a regional crisis. He should not have to wait almost six months for an imperfect jury-rigged one as he did in the Gulf War.

Given the importance of intelligence and situation awareness, all systems that can be expeditionally configured to support those requirements should be brought into harness. Battle groups and amphibious task forces at sea should be linked, real time, not only to national systems but to systems like AWACS and JSTARS. Operational planning for naval forces should routinely take Air Force capabilities into account and integrate them as a matter of course in battle planning. Planning itself should take an all systems approach rather than a Service peculiar one.

In addition to designing a battle systems architecture, the Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force will have to experiment and train with organizational concepts for best use in a sea based force projection role.

Much has been made of "jointness" in recent years. Unfortunately it has become an end in itself, with concurrent resistance, particularly by the naval services which frequently believe the balanced fleet is all the jointness necessary for most regional crisis. True jointness does not mean four Services involvement, nor does it mean a form of command and control. It means bringing the right forces to bear to a given mission at given time. In that sense the naval services should organize, train and equip its forward deployed to make maximum use of national power, not just naval power, to protect American interest in the critical corners of the world.



Global Strategy and Forward Deployed Forces: Regional Contingency Planning In The Post Cold War Era


Dr. Jacquelyn K. Davis

In the last two years, the global security setting has been fundamentally transformed, giving rise to a "new world order" in which specifically defined threats to U.S. national interests are not readily perceived and public expectations of a "peace dividend" are eroding support for overseas deployments of American troops. With the return to Soviet territory of substantial numbers of Soviet Warsaw Pact forces, Moscow's withdrawal from Afghanistan and troop reductions along the Sino-Soviet border, the threat of attack with minimal warning in Europe -- which had underpinned U.S. global strategy and force posture since the formation of NATO -- has dissipated, providing the basis for revising the nature, and deployment modalities, of our forward presence. Instead of reliance on a large-scale forward deployed force structure, logistical network and troop presence, as was the case in NATO-Europe and on the Korean Peninsula for the past forty years, U.S. forward presence in the post-Cold War era is most likely to be based on greatly reduced troop levels in regions important to U.S. national security. Some project a level as low as 75,000 to 100,000 personnel (approximately the size of a corps) in-theater in Europe in five years' time -- and more restrictive access to bases, infrastructure facilities, and overflight rights both in Europe and elsewhere.

Against this backdrop, President Bush promulgated in August 1990, at the time of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, a new global strategy

governing U.S. force structure and particularly its overseas force deployments. Formulated around the three basic concepts of: force reconstitution (or greater reliance on "round-out" units and the mobilization of active forces to attain full readiness levels); discriminate engagement (or selective intervention in a crisis situation); and coalition-building (or the development of *ad hoc* "alliances" for a specific contingency operation), the Bush proposals sought to define forward presence less in terms of formalized Alliance structures and massive overseas deployments and more in terms of pragmatic planning for specific contingency situations. In other words, in the future the U.S. forward presence is to be based on movement away from the bipolar confrontation of the "Cold War" years and toward a strategic setting in which, "the size of our forces will increasingly be shaped by the needs of regional contingencies and peacetime presence."¹ In his Aspen speech entitled, "Reshaping Our Forces," President Bush went on to say that, "our new strategy must provide the framework to guide our deliberate reductions to no more than the forces we need to guard our enduring interests -- the forces to exercise forward presence in key areas, to respond effectively to crisis, to retain the national capacity to rebuild our forces should this be needed."² As part of what the President termed this new policy of "peaceful engagement," forward presence emerges as central to the ability of the United States to retain "important American interests in Europe and the Pacific, in the Mediterranean and in the Persian Gulf."³

Thus, even before Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the reduced risk of war in Europe has contributed to a rethinking of U.S. military strategy, to include a fundamental reassessment of the nature and importance of extended deterrence and forward based forces. The new U.S. global strategy that is emerging is one centered on the *Base Force* concept organized around four major command groupings (i.e., strategic, Atlantic, Pacific and a Contingency Command based in CONUS).



¹ Remarks by President Bush to the Aspin Institute Symposium, The Aspin Institute, Aspen, Colorado, August 2, 1990, p. 2.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

Three of the four major commands in the new structure will rely on the continued basing in key theaters of U.S. forces or, failing that, forces that could be inserted in a timely fashion into conflict-prone regions or theaters of crisis or conflict. In the case of the CONUS-based Contingency Command, force deployments would rely heavily on "cadre divisions and "surge" forces and would depend on some type of pre-existing "forward presence" to provide a "graduated deterrence response" prior to their arrival in theater. In those areas where forward based forces are not an option, the U.S. dependence on a self-sustaining, flexible entry capability which can be sized to meet specific contingency requirements will be key to the ability of the United States to respond to crises or protect U.S. interests. In both instances this suggests a greater reliance on the combined assets of the Marine Corps and the Navy, particularly in light of their integrated air-ground and maritime capabilities. Together, this "combined arms"-force, with its expeditionary nature, is uniquely configured to protect U.S. interests abroad and therein to provide the basis for a "forward presence."


As force planners contemplate future force structure sizing and U.S. global security interests, the capacity for deterrence of conflict in theaters of vital interest to the United States, together with the capability to project power from CONUS during a specific contingency situation either for the purpose of compellence or for the defense of specific interests, including the requirement to re-establish a stable regional "strategic" balance, will continue to set the parameters by which the Joint Staff and the Services develop their operational concepts and define their force acquisition priorities. As in the immediate past, the twin tasks of preserving stability in regional theaters of importance to the United States and the capacity to forestall the rise of regional hegemonies which could prove to be destabilizing remain key to U.S. national security objectives. However, with the end of the Cold War, it may be more difficult to generate more difficult to sustain that support once an operation involves the actual employment of American forces.

the actual employment of American forces.

While it is arguable, for example, to suggest that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait or the conflict in Yugoslavia would not have occurred if

the Soviet Union had retained its global political and strategic-military reach; it is certainly true that the changes that have taken place in the Union of Soviet States (U.S.S.) have eliminated Moscow as a major actor in several future potential regional scenarios. On the one hand, this makes it easier, in theory, for the United States to intervene if need be in regional theaters, based on a diminished threat of crisis escalation or the prospect of a global war in which a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union was perceived to be a real (if not likely) option. On the other hand, however, the capacity of the United States to intervene in a regional theater, in the absence of a clearly perceived U.S. national interest and without reference to a specific threat, such as the former Soviet Union which could affect directly U.S. interests, may create a situation in which public (and Congressional) support for the deployment of American forces from CONUS to a crisis region may undermine the ability of an American President to signal U.S. interest in crisis or conflict resolution.

At the same time, however, if the United States fails to make explicit, its interests in a certain regional theater, either as a result of the draw-down, its regional force presence or its inability to attract Congressional support for a major overseas deployment (a' la Desert Shield), "adversaries have been more inclined to resort to action, often of an openly military nature."⁴ Thus, as the United States moves to redefine its global role and interests as we approach the new century, key questions relating to extended deterrence and regional stability remain to be resolved, especially if the future basing of American troops overseas is in doubt. Specifically in question is the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence guarantees in certain, key theaters -- such as Northeast Asia -- where potential adversaires or renegade powers may possess nuclear or chemical/biological weapons. The dilemma facing U.S. policymakers arises in part as a consequence of President Bush's September 27, 1991 speech in which he announced the elimination from U.S. force posture of most organic SNF assets. But it also can be attributed to a



⁴ Kevin Lewis, "Reorganizing U.S. Defense Planning to deal with new contingencies," p. 6799 (The RAND Corporation: Santa Monica, California, 1984), pp. 17-18.

lack of advanced, mobile "defensive" ATM and other theater/tactical missile defenses -- an important and an emerging requirement certainly for expeditionary forces, as well as for other power/projection-rapid reaction capabilities. One of the more positive developments in force structure planning is the (relatively) recent participation by the U.S. Navy in the Army and SDIO's respective theater defense programs. Of course for the U.S. Navy, their primary objective is fleet air defense, whereas for the Marines the major concern would necessarily be troop protection, especially for initial assault elements. This suggests the need for both a low-altitude search (radar) capability, as well as for a "look-up" capability to counter aircraft (fixed-wing and rotary wing) platforms. It also is evidence that in the future, expeditionary forces will need to have access to a dedicated ATM/ATBM capability, similar perhaps to the USA CORP SAM in terms of characteristics. In other words, the synergism and interoperability between offensive and defensive systems will assume greater importance in the emerging strategic environment largely due to the proliferation in the Third World of ballistic missile and other weapons technologies. In this sense, any attempts to project power in key regional theaters will rely heavily on the availability of advanced defensive systems, optimally they will be organic to expeditionary and other forward deployed forces.

With the *Base Force* concept, characterized by a significant reduction in U.S. forces deployed overseas -- in part due to a conscious decision on the part of the American government to cut overseas force levels, but also because of the growing sentiment in Allied countries against the continued forward deployment of American (and other foreign) forces on national territory -- it is likewise increasingly apparent that in the future, U.S. theater contingency planning and forward presence will depend to an unprecedented extent on the ability to tailor forces for joint operation based on inputs from the individual Service components. This emerging tendency will impose an even greater premium on the efficacy of "jointness" as well as on interoperability between and among the U.S. Services. At the same time, however, among the "lessons" that have emerged from the Desert Storm operation is the clear operational requirement for coalition planning, both as a

means of effecting political support for a crisis deployment and wartime operations, but also to "fill-in" for force posture deficiencies -- deficiencies that are only likely to increase in coming years as defense spending declines and force structure is reduced.

It is clear that forward presence will underpin future diplomatic and security initiatives just as in the past forward based forces did in the context of U.S.-Alliance planning. But in the security environment of the future, "alliance" frameworks will be qualitatively different than the alliances which emerged in the context of the East-West bipolar confrontation during the Cold War years. Then when there was a clearly perceived enemy (or enemies) there was relatively little difficulty in attracting public support for the forward basing of U.S. troops. But in the context of this uncertain strategic environment and the fast-paced changes that are occurring almost on a daily basis, there is widespread questioning of the need for such tight Alliance frameworks, including the specific commitment of military forces. There is a growing tendency both overseas and in the U.S. to suggest that force structure be sufficiently flexible to handle all contingencies -- from counter drug operations to full-scale warfare -- by using non-dedicated forces. Such thinking reflects great uncertainty about the future direction for even the most established Alliance settings, including NATO. This has led to a budding interest in mission rationalization and greater force structure complementarity, with some nations even willing to eliminate from their structure forces for missions which they no longer can adequately perform -- as in the case of air defense in Belgium. This type of "new thinking" suggests that changed command arrangements are likely to emerge, reflecting less the primacy of military power (relatively speaking) of the United States and more the changing complexity of relationships between the U.S. and its "former" Alliance partners. Conceptually this likely will lead to the development by the United States of a series of internetted bilateral arrangements and looser multilateral frameworks in which the key to future "Alliance" relationships will reside in operational flexibility, especially in terms of crisis deployments, and new formulas for "burden-sharing."

If Desert Shield/Storm revolutionized thinking about coalition building and "Alliance" interoperability, it also established new ground rules about the deployment of intervention forces in a theater where the United States had no formal alliance infrastructure upon which to host and sustain the introduction and deployment of U.S. (and other Allied) forces. Paradoxically, over the next decade U.S. policymakers are likely to be faced with the need to contemplate the possible deployment of U.S. forces to regional theaters where the United States has not, in the past, routinely deployed forces. Whether under U.N. auspices as part of a national-bilateral or a multilateral action (which in any case would depend heavily on U.S. force capabilities, such as airlift and intelligence assets), or as a unilateral U.S. activity (in direct support of a regional ally or friend), the United States will need to have access to mobilizable, rapidly deployable, easily transportable forces which are self-sustainable (in terms of logistics requirements), highly survivable and flexible (in terms of employment options). They must also be capable of performing effectively in diverse environments and amidst adverse climatic conditions. In the future in the Middle East, at least, the United States is attempting to develop and formalize a "coalition" arrangement in which U.S. POMCUS and/or a residual force presence may be permanently based in the region. Clearly, however, this will fall short of establishment of a new Middle East Treaty Organization whose prospects are dimmed by the internecine politics of the region which today are hopelessly tied up with the evolution of the Arab-Israeli peace process. In the context of U.S. global strategy this raises an interesting dilemma: should the U.S. Government place priority on responding to Saudi demands for help with the modernization of its force structure at the risk of alienating its long-time ally, Israel; or, should the United States place a lesser priority on the establishment of a permanent basing infrastructure in the region to satisfy Israeli concerns over U.S. technology transfers to the Arab world. These are difficult questions which will shape the parameters of the American debate over force structure and how the U.S. maintains in the future a "forward presence" in this crucially important region.


If, in coming years, the United States will have diminished ac-

cess to forward-based support and infrastructure facilities and capabilities, how will its crisis response and sustainability requirements be met? This key question must be answered in the context of planning for the 21st century in which neither the two and one half wars concept nor the one and one half planning construct may have relevance to future contingency planning. In the past, the emphasis of planners was on the major war scenario and force posture was optimized according to the possibility of global war involving the participation of the Soviet Union in an adversarial role. Lesser contingencies were assumed to be "half war" case in which planning was predicated upon the utilization of capabilities which were optimized for fighting a major war. In the future, while the threat of a major war involving the former Soviet Union remains a possibility, it must at best be considered a remote likelihood, at least in the near term when the Republics of the former Soviet Union are focused inward and their military forces are being brought back to within the borders of the Union territory. Still, it behooves us to recognize that by itself the Russian Republic supports an extensive military establishment and if its leadership were to adopt an adversarial stance against the West or the other Republics then it would be prudent for both the U.S. and its traditional Western allies to be prepared for that contingency both in terms of diplomatic-political activity and with regard to deterrence and crisis management capabilities. Still it is more likely in coming years that U.S. military planners will be faced with the need to develop versatile forces that can be employed in a range of lesser type contingencies, but ones which, nevertheless, may be characterized as high intensity conflicts based on the nature of the adversary's (or adversaries') forces posture capabilities and the proliferation of advanced weaponry to less developed and Third World nations and non-state actors, including perhaps even terrorist organizations operating within the territory of a specified "host nation."

The foregoing analysis suggests that so-called rapid reaction forces will form an even more important component of future power projection capabilities, with integrated air and sea-based forces having a "forced entry" capability assuming greater importance in the context of the overall force posture planning at the Joint Staff level in the United States. Because of their organic ground combat,

aviation, and support capabilities, including coordinated command and control elements, Marine expeditionary forces, together with the associated capability of Naval Expeditionary Ready Groups, possess a capability that might be best suited to the types of contingencies that will confront U.S. decision makers in the remaining years of this century. As with the Gulf War experience, off-shore U.S. naval assets could be deployed to clear waters for a potential amphibious assault, while utilizing carrier-based aviation and cruise missile assets to target and interdict enemy C³I sites, air defense radars, and other important high value aimpoints to help obtain air superiority over the battlefield before the actual insertion into the theater of ground forces. In those situations like Desert Storm where a long-lead time was provided for mobilization before the outbreak of hostilities, or in the more likely case where a timely reconstitution and mobilization of U.S. forces is required, the relatively self-contained assets of the carrier battle group, including its Marine components, continue to offer the U.S. a reliable interventionist option for many possible future contingencies. And, it may be that in the future all power projection capabilities should be incorporated into the Marine Corps, including the Army's airborne assault divisions. But this makes sense only in the context of a unified special operations, amphibious assault command structure that includes as well, organic airlift assets -- a proposal that both the Army and the Air Force could be expected to oppose.

Without question in the future, the United States, as a maritime nation, will continue to depend on its naval power as an important instrument of diplomacy and perhaps coercion in the context of its new global strategy. Naval forces and associated Marine Corps assets are particularly well-suited to a range of contingencies, including "maritime contingencies, small-to-medium scale contingencies in coastal areas, and, where relevant, as the lead element in large-scale responses."⁵ For a growing number of contingencies this is likely to mean greater reliance on Navy and Marine Corps assets,



⁵ See Donald C.F. Daniel, "Beyond the 600-Ship Navy," *Adelphi Papers* 261, Autumn 1991, p. 36.

since much of Army force structure will be redeployed to CONUS from their present forward-based locations, and "forward presence" is likely to be defined by the capacity of the United States to maintain autonomous units and logistics stocks in close proximity to a potential crisis theater. This may entail the development of new coalition-type relationships with countries such as Singapore, for example, which may be willing to host the deployment of forward-based stocks of ammunition and equipment, if not some type of force presence itself. Or, it could mean greater reliance on USMC/USN prepositioned platforms and logistics ships which in both instances will require new thinking in Congress, OSD and the Department of the Navy about force structure, acquisition priorities and the potential roles of new technologies, from *Tomahawk* cruise missiles to maritime propulsion systems. For the Navy and Congress together it will also require innovative ideas as to how to address "manpower" issues, including long-term deployments, women and the pregnancy issue and ship-to-shore rotation policies, and clarification of "combat-exclusion" decision-making.

In terms of operational effectiveness and in light of the increased uncertainties of the new world into which we are moving greater reliance on U.S. maritime assets makes imminent sense, especially if NATO, in the context of the *Strategy Review* process, moves to change -- as it is likely to do -- its own command structure to emphasize "Flank" operational contingency planning over its previous focus on the Central Front and a ground forces' mission orientation. At a time when the relevance of NATO is in question in many quarters, the framework of the Atlantic Alliance remains an important basis for managing change in the European security setting, while providing a basis for ensuring stability on the Continent in an uncertain time. Yet, there is a clear need to revise the Alliance's planning concepts to reflect the transformation of the "Soviet" threat and the rise to importance of so-called "out-of-area" issues. The newly perceived greater importance of the Alliance's Northern and Southern regions is clearly reflected by the movement away for the planning assumptions of *Flexible Response* and toward a SHAPE concept directed towards counter concentrations planning and rapid reaction forces. Thus, an important new aspect of Marine Corps, Navy and Joint planning will have to be

the coordination between what OSD/Service planners are doing and the whole NATO *Strategy Review* process. This is not to suggest that, as in the past, U.S. Service and Joint planning should be Euro-centric in focus; it is meant to convey the importance of understanding what is going on in the NATO-European theater in terms of the assumptions we are making at a U.S. planning level as well as in the context of coordinating "out-of-area" planning with either a specific ally, such as the United Kingdom or with the Alliance as a whole.

Even as the emphasis on Europe in U.S. national security planning will probably diminish in the years ahead, in concert with the concomitant draw-down of American forces from that Theater, it is important to understand that the Alliance's Northern and Southern regions, particularly the latter which includes as well the Mediterranean littoral and the gateway to the Middle East, will be the site of new and emerging security threats that may have direct implications for U.S. (and Allied) interests in the coming years. Sitting astride two of the world's vital economic and commercial centers of power (i.e., Western Europe and the Persian Gulf), freedom of access across the Mediterranean and through the Suez Canal remains a fundamental U.S. national interest that has not lost its relevance in the post-Cold War era. Just as important is the need to assure the security of U.S. allies in the region, including Italy and Turkey -- two NATO allies -- as well as to have a continued presence in the region (largely via access to NATO installations and by virtue of the forward deployment of elements of the U.S. 6th Fleet) either to react to developments in North Africa or the Persian Gulf region in a timely fashion, or to help promote stability in potentially conflict-prone areas (e.g., Algeria, Morocco, Chad-Libya-Niger, and Egypt).

Since the end of World War II, this so-called "arc of crisis" area has traditionally required intervention from outside powers since regional organizations to promote security cooperation have been largely unsuccessful in balancing the forces in the region. This is unlikely to change in the post-Cold War era given the enduring nature of the Arab-Israeli confrontation and the precipitous growth of Islamic fundamentalism, especially in the wake of Desert Storm.

Beyond this, with a new inward looking "Soviet Union," Moscow's ability to harness the activities of its former client states in the region is fundamentally diminished, removing from the regional balance one of the relatively more stable elements in the equation. These factors, together with the adverse socio-demographic trends which characterize countries in the region, suggest that the United States must remain proactive in the region, promoting attempts not only to convene a "peace conference" as a basis for a possible political settlement, but also to maintain a capability for intervention should it be necessary to employ military forces.

Geo-politically the Mediterranean/Persian Gulf region forms a comprehensive entity whose overall stability affects each of its component parts. It is useful to recall that during Desert Shield the massive U.S. logistical reinforcement effort depended heavily on forward-based forces in Europe and logistical infrastructure available in the Mediterranean region. Without access to U.S. equipment and POMCUS in the NATO area, both the size and speed of the coalition response would have been affected negatively. As it was, the coalition effort had the luxury of a prolonged period of mobilization and reinforcement; in a future crisis in the Persian Gulf region, we may not have five months within which to move forces from CONUS to the theater of operations, underscoring the importance of some type of forward presence in Europe for use in contingencies in the Middle East and North Africa, as well as in Europe.

But the future of American forces based in Europe is far from clear, despite the repeated affirmations of the senior U.S. and NATO leadership as to the continued importance and viability of the NATO framework. In the context of German unification and the changes that have taken place in the European strategic setting, proverbial U.S. questioning about burden-sharing has reemerged on center stage in the U.S. Congress, while the impetus toward "burden-shedding" is gaining momentum throughout the Atlantic Alliance. Among Europeans there is a great debate over security collaboration, with some allies -- the French in particular -- seeking to displace NATO with a new security framework organized under the auspices of the European Community; while others,

notably the British are insistent that NATO retain its premier role, in part as a means of assuring a formal nexus with the United States. At this point in time it is unclear as to the outcome of this debate; but it is more likely the case that if NATO were to be superseded by a European Community organization, or a broader East-West cooperative framework, such as is envisaged in the CSCE process (and notably its Conflict Prevention Center), it is questionable whether the United States government will be able to sustain public and Congressional support for any type of forward presence on the ground in Europe -- once again reaffirming the potential role and importance of sea-based forces and forward-based logistical and repair facilities. Nevertheless, this may be a moot point, since it is also unlikely that the Europeans will continue to support the deployment of foreign forces on their national territories in the absence of a formal Alliance or as part of a multinational forces concept.


This being the case, it may be that in the coming years, the United States will find it prudent to move to develop an interlocking network of national bilateral agreements outside the NATO framework for access to bases and other infrastructure facilities grounded less in European theater contingency planning and oriented more towards Middle East scenarios. Although in this context it would also be wise for U.S. policy-planners to have POMCUS and forces available for possible intervention (perhaps under U.S. auspices, but perhaps as well under the aegis of the CSCE) in the Balkans where historic instabilities and conflict potential could escalate, as they have done already in Yugoslavia, into a major confrontation that could spill over into Turkey, Italy -- or even Greece.

Even as the concept of collective security, as exemplified by NATO, may be changing, it remains important for the United States to have the capacity to operate with "allies" in a coalition framework in order to attract the political consensus that is necessary to support future military interventions. This requirement imposes upon U.S. force planners the need for military forces to train and exercise on a regular basis with major Allied units and probably means as well the sustained deployment of forward-based

stores of equipment and ammunition to facilitate a timely and responsive intervention capability.

From an historical perspective, nearly one third of all crises to which the United States has had to dispatch forces since World War II have occurred in the Mediterranean arc. Since 1980 that proportion has risen to nearly 50 percent.⁶ And, as noted above, this is likely to remain true in coming years because of the "endemic instability in this region." However, there is another arc of crisis, extending from the Indian Ocean to the Asian-Pacific region, in which the United States must also be capable of response with a timely force presence to deter conflict and instability and to restore the "balance" should fighting erupt. The future threats to U.S. interests in this region range from the emergence of India as a regional hegemony to Korean unification and perhaps its proliferation as a nuclear weapons state to Japan's emergence as a major military power in the region. While hypothetical in nature, each of these contingencies is based on the reality of the day and could, if any one such scenario actually came to pass, have potentially profound implications for U.S. economic and security interests.

The importance of forward presence in the Asian-Pacific region almost dwarfs our needs in Europe when one considers the geographical distances that cross the theater and the absence of any overall regional or subregional security architecture involving the participation of the United States. While the United States does maintain a series of mutually reinforcing bilateral relationships with the countries in the Asian-Pacific area, they are most mature in Northeast Asia, where the U.S. maintains explicit security guarantees to Japan and the Republic of Korea. Still, the loss of access to Philippine bases and logistical infrastructure, together with the great distances between such points as Singapore or Guam -- two proposed alternative sites for hosting some of the Subic Bay operations -- places greater importance on access to facilities in Northeast Asia, at a time when popular opinion in both Korea and Ja-



⁶ Bradford Dismukes and Commander Bradd C. Hayes, USN, "The Med Remains Vital," *Proceedings*, October 1991, p. 48.

pan is growing more hostile to the continued presence of U.S. forces on their respective national territories. The potential for conflict in the Asian-Pacific area arises from a series of religious, ethnic and fundamentalist disputes as well as from controversies over resources and sovereignty questions. While it is not in the cards for the United States to assume the role of "world policeman," it is surely in the interest of the United States to maintain a military capability in the region -- or failing that -- in close proximity to the region in keeping with the new national security strategy that was outlined by President Bush at Aspen in August 1990.

Finally, it remains essential for the United States to retain a capability for reconstitution of forces in the face of great uncertainty about the future of the Soviet Republics. The abortive coup in the Soviet Union has resulted in the fragmentation of the Soviet empire that has laid the seeds for future attempts to restore a semblance of central control over the dissident Republics. This coming winter will be a difficult one for the Russian Republics, some of which have already indicated -- such as the Ukraine -- an unwillingness to share foodstuffs with Russia and the other Republics. Internal unrest and even conflict within and between the autonomous Republics could spill-over into the newly emerging democracies of Eastern Europe for example as a result of the exodus of refugees and immigrants seeking asylum and safety from the turbulence of the former Soviet Union. The implications of this uncertainty are great for Western Europe and could impose special requirements on NATO and the United States in terms of conflict containment. In the period just before the abortive coup attempt, the United States and its NATO allies were moving with the Soviet government toward definition of a "cooperative" deterrence regime in which crisis management and conflict escalation control were seen to be important aspects of a more positive East-West relationship, and to provide a basis for cooperation in regions beyond Europe where the United States and the Soviet Union shared interests in conflict control, including in the Middle East with proliferation as a major concern.

Events of the last two and one half years have demonstrated the great uncertainty of the present security setting. Against a rapidly

evolving strategic environment, the importance of having available a range of options, from military intervention to crisis diplomacy, is self-evident. Forward presence, whether defined by the actual basing in forward areas of U.S. forces, or in the global deployment of carrier battle groups or elements thereof, remains an essential feature of U.S. national security policy. Such presence may be defined by new patterns of deployments for maritime assets, and/or by changed geographic locations for ground and air units; but in common with the past, it will -- if U.S. interests are to be sustained -- entail a credible mix of assets, having a wide range of capabilities, which are capable of operating autonomously or until reinforcements can arrive in theater.

Section III

Naval Expeditionary Forces, Power Projection and Combat Missions

In the midst of worldwide centrifugal forces and in the course of a major U.S. national security reassessment, the outlining of service roles assumes paramount importance. The authors in this section address the adaptation and refinement of traditional Marine missions in the context of constrained resources and ambiguous threats. LtGen Walter E. Boomer recounts the longstanding role of Naval Expeditionary Forces (NEFs) as amphibious assault forces, but claims this configuration is too narrow for today's naval capabilities and emerging regional threats. He asserts that NEFs must be equipped for three missions: 1) Crisis response and peace-time engagement. 2) Joint and allied contingency operations. 3) Blue water sea control against residual Russian naval forces.

The author observes that in littoral regions of the world, American global economic and security interests intersect with growing instability and modernized armies. In the likely absence of forward bases in these areas, forward deployed naval forces must provide military presence and crisis response. Rapid reaction, credibility and self-sustainability are the hallmarks of today's forward deployed Marine expeditionary units.

To maintain their relevance for the future, naval forces must develop an integrated NEF Task Force capability which will allow Navy or Marine officers to rapidly assume a Joint Task Force role. This calls for NEF access to all-source digital data and information management systems, NEF staff proficiency at coordinating

naval and joint operations, and NEF capability to support joint and allied ground operations. As part of this effort Crisis Action Modules are a step in the direction of allowing commanders to quickly task-organize a force anywhere in the world.

BGen Charles Wilhelm examines the important role played by Marine Air Ground Task Forces (Special Operations Capable), or MAGTF(SOC)s, in complementing the activities and missions of Special Operations Forces (SOF). Like SOF, MAGTF(SOC)s have utility across the operational continuum and possess a mobility, availability, and flexibility which make them useful in the LIC environment. To obtain the SOC designation, MAGTF(SOC)s are trained in 18 special missions tasks, some of which have long been practiced by Marine forces and others which have required refined staff procedure and new tactics.

Even before Congressional attention was directed at shoring up weaknesses in U.S. capabilities for special operations and low-intensity conflict, the Navy and Marine Corps had initiated the process of SOC qualification and had committed over \$1 million in supplemental equipment purchases for each Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). This early recognition of the need for more rigorous training of MEUs in special operations tasks was an outgrowth of the adaptive culture of amphibious operations specialists, who, according to the author, have a heritage of pioneering whatever is necessary to get the job done.

The versatility of MAGTF(SOC)s has been demonstrated in combat operations during the Gulf War, humanitarian assistance operations in northern Iraq, Bangladesh, and the Philippines, and in non-combatant evacuation operations in Liberia and Somalia. In the future, maritime SOF and sea-based SOC forces must adjust to new roles. Among these missions must be a capacity to destroy an adversary's surface-to-surface nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons capabilities, conduct special reconnaissance missions, serve as a forward presence, and respond to regional crises.

To aid in the pursuit of these objectives, interagency cooperation will be essential in the intelligent use of all military and civilian

agency assets in training and crisis situations. One area where interagency cooperation has already proved fruitful relates to Marine Corps cooperation with the FBI. Under the Training Assistance to the Marine Corps, the FBI has provided Special Agents to each Fleet Marine Force commander to train MAGTF(SOC)s in individual skills, special targets training, and urban environments.

To enhance interagency cooperation, the author recommends that in LIC contingencies, an interagency organization similar to the Vietnam-era CORDS be formed to serve in the host nation while in crisis situations, an interagency rapid response cell be deployed to provide liaison between the country team and other decision-making centers.

In the last article of this section, Theodore Clark and Thomas Harvey trace the threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction as well as NEF adaptations of doctrine to counter these threats. Currently, 15 to 20 developing countries have or are attempting to acquire a ballistic missile capability. With increasing range, accuracy, and more deadly warheads, ballistic missiles play a much greater role in developing nations' overall warfighting strategy while creating greater security problems for American forces abroad. In a parallel effort, many developing countries are pursuing nuclear weapons programs. Israel, Syria, and Iran have recently been locked in a regional arms race and may offer the best index of how quickly and in what form proliferation efforts will manifest themselves in the 1990s.

In light of this global dispersion of advanced weapons technologies, the proven power projection capability of the Marine Corps faces a significant challenge. Doctrinally, the Marine Corps has embraced the concept of maneuver warfare as the optimal means for depriving an opponent of massed targets for high-tech weapons. This approach involves an emphasis on surprise, rapid strikes and flanking maneuvers to destroy the moral and physical balance of an enemy. In terms of operational techniques, the Marines have upgraded their over-the-horizon capability to remain beyond the easy reach of enemy shore and air defenses while per-

mitting rapid deployment of amphibious forces ashore by helicopters and air-cushioned landing craft (LCAC).

The Marine Corps has also been a strong proponent of joint operations and phased deployments which highlight the strengths and offset the vulnerabilities of individual services. One development which will greatly benefit the Marines is the fielding of anti-tactical ballistic missiles (ATBMs) under the direction of the SDIO and the Army.

Conventional Operations as Sea-based Forces

LtGen Walter E. Boomer, USMC

How can naval forces best respond to the national security demands that will be made upon them in the emerging post Cold War period? Throughout America's history naval expeditionary forces (NEF) have played an important and often critical role in the protection of United States and Allied national security interests. The structure and technology of these forces have repeatedly evolved and changed to provide for *adequate* capabilities to defeat anticipated threats. The evolution continues, as defense budgets shrink and views on future threats change. This paper will examine how naval expeditionary forces (NEF) should evolve in order to best contribute to an adequate national defense capability.

WHAT ARE NAVAL EXPEDITIONARY FORCES?

Traditionally, NEFs have been viewed as carrier striking forces and amphibious assault forces which can operate from a sea base for extended periods to successfully project power at a time and place of their choosing against a determined, well-armed hostile force. Anti-submarine warfare against modern nuclear attack submarines have been viewed as the critical enabling priority to project such naval power. These views are too narrow for today's naval capabilities and emerging regional strategy and threats.

Today, against the backdrop of successful Allied and joint military operations against Iraqi forces and as a result of the end of the Cold War and ongoing defense resource reductions, the United States finds itself engaged in another fundamental reevaluation of

its national defense structure. There is a consensus that "adequate" defense capability must be maintained; however, what constitutes adequate defense capability is subject to debate and opinion.

I believe that NEFs will continue to be an essential component of an adequate national defense on three levels:

1) As forward-deployed forces conducting peacetime engagement activities and providing immediate crisis response capability, particularly in the world's littorals.

2) As an integral part of joint and Allied military operations in response to regional contingencies.

3) As a blue water naval force which can defeat any modern naval force, should peace and deterrence fail.

FUTURE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

The United States is dependent upon having unimpeded access to the sea to reach its markets, raw materials for its industries and to fulfill its treaty obligations in defense of democracy. In fact, during 1990, United States imports and exports by sea alone exceeded \$800 billion. Such trade depends upon open sea lines of communication (SLOCs).

Much of the world's raw material reserves lie in the littorals in lesser developed countries or regions. Many of the world's SLOCs pass through these same regions where instability could dramatically affect access to critical raw materials or markets. Deterring and, if necessary, controlling conflict in these critical littoral areas will continue to be of profound interest to the United States.

The United States remains the leader of the free world. We have global interests in support of democratic institutions and global treaty obligations as defense against aggression. Deterring wars and stopping aggression as part of our treaty obligations will remain essential national interests.

THREATS AGAINST U.S. INTERESTS

I envision a world which will be less stable, yet less likely to resort to global war. Industrialized nations will continue the evolutionary improvement of weapons technology but at a reduced rate, as budgets and needs decline. As superpowers move from military confrontation, individual regional leaders or nations will seek local or regional advantage, and if possible, hegemony. World supplies of modern, lethal weapons systems will be more than adequate to meet the demands of ambitious regional leaders. In fact, as NATO and Soviet armed forces are sharply reduced in size there may be a glut of excess weapons on the world arms market. Potential adversaries may be armed with a formidable inventory of modern, highly lethal, and sophisticated weapons systems, including missiles, aircraft and mines.

The growth of military forces in developing nations coupled with the decline of Soviet influence in these areas are major destabilizing factors in various regions of the world. During the period 1960 to 1990, the overall trend in the growth of armed forces for the developed world is relatively unchanged. During that same period the population of the developing world increased by 94 percent, but their regular armed forces have risen by 116 percent totalling close to 28 million.

It is one thing to possess modern weapons and quite another to successfully employ them with full synergistic effect in concert with other military capabilities. Iraq had great quantities of modern weapons; however, Iraqi military doctrine was centralized and rigid. In the future, we cannot assume that adversaries will lack the ability to fully integrate and aggressively employ their forces.

Should the Soviets reverse their course toward peace, they still possess a modern and highly formidable naval force. Like other navies it is being reduced in size; however, this reduction will likely focus on lesser capable ships and sailors. What will remain will be the nucleus of a very capable force. We must retain the ability to defeat this force as long as it remains.

NAVAL EXPEDITIONARY FORCE ROLES

In the world's littorals, America's global economic interests, maritime lines of communications and treaty obligations intersect with growing instability, a rapid expansion of armies equipped with modern weapons and expansionist oriented leaders. In these areas, we maintain few, if any bases, and are unlikely to build any. Forward deployed naval forces provide military presence and immediate crisis response in these areas. This requirement will not diminish in the foreseeable future and will probably increase. For example, prior to the Iraqi attack on Kuwait in August 1990, carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups made periodic visits to the Arabian Sea area from their normal deployments in the Mediterranean and Western Pacific. Continuous naval presence in the Arabian Sea area is now required by the U.S. Central Command.

NEFs must maintain the capability to operate from a sea base in the world's littorals, both as a self-contained naval force and as part of a fully integrated, mutually supportive joint or Allied effort. Should East-West peace fail, we must maintain the ability to defeat any modern navy, as the most credible deterrent to its use. Therefore, the future security environment will demand NEFs be capable of responding on three operational levels. The first level is crisis response and peacetime engagement. The second level is joint and Allied contingency operations. These two levels will be the primary focus of NEF operations. The third level is blue water sea control against residual Soviet naval forces.

CRISIS RESPONSE & PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT

Naval expeditionary forces employed in crisis response and peacetime engagement (first level) are tailored from the capabilities developed to operate as part of joint/combined contingency forces (second level) or wartime forces (level three). These forces must be able to rapidly transition from one level to the next. In a world which will likely see persistent instability along the littorals, we need to maintain forward deployed forces which provide unified commanders with immediately available crisis response

forces. This is a traditional naval expeditionary mission. Carrier battle groups and integrated Navy amphibious ready groups and Marine expeditionary units continue to remain forward-deployed providing the unified commander with a self-contained force which can loiter over the horizon and strike quickly at the time and place of their choosing, and then redeploy just as quickly.

Rapid reaction, credibility and self-sustainability are the hallmarks of today's forward-deployed amphibious ready group/Marine expeditionary unit organizations. These forces are able to launch sea-based operations from over the horizon against coastal or inland locations within six hours of notification. They can operate at night and without electronic emissions. Carrier battle groups and surface action groups have similar rapid response capabilities. Presence as a deterrent, evacuation operations, disaster relief and support for counter-terrorist operations are but a few of the possible missions. The demand for these forces to remain forward deployed has in fact increased post Desert Storm.

For example, in May 1991, a NEF composed of 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade and Amphibious Group 3 was returning home from Desert Storm when directed to augment joint disaster relief forces in Bangladesh commanded by the Commanding General III Marine Expeditionary Force. The flexibility inherent in these forces was demonstrated when they redeployed from combat operations against Iraq to sea-based disaster relief operations in a country where national infrastructure was totally devastated.

Peacetime engagement to counter instability, relieve natural and human disaster, support democracy, and the continuing expansion of counternarcotics missions will demand the unique capabilities found in NEFs. Most of these capabilities are resident in traditional Navy and Marine force structure; however, language skills, specialized equipment, such as riverine craft, and specialized training may be required to assist other Allied nations successfully conduct such operations.

Host nation infrastructure is fragile and often very limited in the world's littorals. NEFs must rapidly tailor response forces to oper-

ate compatibly with this infrastructure. Our forces must not create greater crisis, in an effort to respond.

NEF operations should be the primary focus of future naval operations. Naval forces must expand their ability to respond rapidly to crisis anywhere in the world. Such forces must remain forward deployed in order to respond immediately and yet be able to immediately transition to the role of on-scene joint task force (JTF) to serve as the base upon which to build an integrated military response.

JOINT/COMBINED NAVAL EXPEDITIONARY FORCE OPERATIONS

When forward deployed forces are inadequate to deter or contain a crisis, the widest possible range of credible options must be available and ready to support the unified commander. Our military goal will undoubtedly be to quickly control and favorably resolve a crisis with minimum destruction and loss of life. The speed with which a credible force can reach such a crisis area is critical; *speed* to prevent the expansion of the crisis and *credible force* to make our adversary pause and think.

NEFs have two roles in these conventional contingency operations. First they are the tip of America's military spear; i.e., the first self-sustainable forces to respond with credible capabilities. Second, should the crisis expand, and additional U.S. and Allied forces be deployed, NEFs must be able to transition to the role of the sea-arm of the unified commander's multi-dimensional theater campaign.

As the tip of the spear, NEFs should be able to pave the way for deployment of land-based forces. Deployed NEFs can perform enabling and containment roles early in a crisis and provide unique, critical capabilities for a unified theater campaign should joint/Allied operations be required. They must be able to project military forces into an area where no established bases exist and to operate and sustain themselves for an extended period of time. For-

ward-deployed naval forces, maritime prepositioning ships and air deployable forces can quickly converge on an area and begin sea-based operations. These operations would focus on enabling the strategic deployment and buildup of all forces by:

- 1) Establishing control of the sea and air space required for the strategic deployment of other joint forces.
- 2) Seizing and protecting critical choke points, facilities and expeditionary seaport and air facilities for the reception and marshalling of these forces.
- 3) Providing sea-based sustainment for all early deploying forces until land-based logistics can be established.

If additional forces are deployed for expanded joint or Allied operations, the NEF must also be able to expand and transition to the role of naval component commander or even to separate Navy and Marine service component commanders. The NEF must mature to encompass whatever combination of reserve or active Navy or Marine units are required to serve as fully integrated component(s) of the total theater military force.

Let us examine what capabilities NEF should possess to accomplish these missions.

TIP OF THE SPEAR

Establishing control of the sea and air space

NEFs must have the capability to control the sea and air space required in order to provide a protective umbrella over a joint force deployment area and permit the introduction of forces and build-up of required combat power. This requires the capability to operate against the range of threats that a developing world military force might present, when armed with modern weapons.

The NEF must have the capability to defeat quiet, conventional submarines, missiles, aircraft, small fast missile boats and shallow

water mines. The task force must maintain air and sea superiority, even supremacy over the crisis area. It must be able to conduct uninterrupted operations in shallow water and land raid forces from the sea to seize/control critical choke points or destroy critical enemy facilities.

Seizing and protecting expeditionary bases

Rapid deployment and build-up of joint forces depends upon access to air and port facilities. Air facilities are required for rapid build-up of personnel and land-based air operations. Port facilities are critical for the rapid build-up of equipment, munitions and supplies. Maritime prepositioning shipping can be off-loaded without port facilities; however, off-load speed can be significantly increased by using established ports. For example, in August 1990, two MPS ships offloaded 4,000 C-141 equivalents of equipment in Saudi Arabia in four days. Except for amphibious ships, all other sealift requires port facilities for off-load.

If expeditionary air bases and port facilities in the crisis area are available and offered by Allied nations, they will need to be defended against potential attack and may require extensive, rapid construction/expansion. NEFs can provide security forces and, more importantly, heavy construction capability. For example, Naval Construction Battalions were deployed in August and September 1990 to Southwest Asia and rapidly expanded facilities.

If not available, air and port facilities must be created or seized and defended. NEFs must be prepared to control the employment of joint forces for the seizure of air or port facilities. In addition, the NEF must be prepared to conduct raids to evacuate non-combatants, rescue hostages or to destroy critical enemy facilities.

To accomplish these missions, NEFs must be able to conduct forcible entry landing operations from over the horizon at sea and, if required, simultaneously coordinate and direct airborne, special and other operations. Amphibious assault forces, airborne forces, aircraft carrier strike forces, cruise missile forces, long range bomber forces may all be used. Their operations must be integ-

rated and controlled. The NEF commander and his staff must be prepared to operate as a JTF to direct such operations.

Providing sea-based sustainment

NEFs must have the capability to sustain arriving forces while additional forces are introduced. Once established ashore, air deployed forces will have to rely upon sea-based sustainment until strategic sealift, prepositioned stocks or host nation infrastructure can provide requisite support. Amphibious and maritime prepositioning ships with organic supplies aboard may be called upon to support all early-deployed forces. Such support also requires a robust, organic transportation and distribution capability.

Overarching capabilities

To be effective as the tip of the spear, the NEF must have the command and control capabilities required to direct and coordinate naval, joint and Allied operations throughout the land, sea and air space involved early in the crisis. The NEF may have to serve as the JTF commander and perform the role of joint forces air component commander (JFACC) for all early arriving air forces. This will require near-realtime situation monitoring and intelligence production and dissemination to all operational forces, a thorough understanding of the warfighting doctrine and procedures of all quick response U.S. contingency forces and the ability to rapidly transition from naval to JTF command and control.

Theater Component Forces

A NEF may have to transition from its role as the tip of the crisis response spear to serve as service component force(s) in the unified commander's campaign chest. The naval component(s) must continue to maintain control of the seas and airspace above them, regardless of the threat, and provide a credible amphibious assault capability to complement the land campaign. If necessary, Marine forces must be prepared to participate in the land campaign. The expanded Navy and Marine component commands must be fully integrated into the joint and Allied force structure.

They must credibly threaten an enemy with a military force to which he must respond by defense, attack or decision to ignore. Such enemy responses create gaps and weakness which a theater campaign plan can exploit.

Should residual, modern, blue water naval forces threaten access to the seas, our naval forces must retain sufficient naval capabilities to defeat them. NEFs must be backed up by a naval capability that can defeat modern nuclear attack submarines, hunt and kill ballistic missile submarines, and destroy carrier and surface battle groups. At the same time, a capability must be retained for a Marine Expeditionary Force to forcibly enter hostile territory. These are essential naval warfighting capabilities that provide the force of deterrence which keeps the peace.

FUTURE NAVAL EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

NEFs were a fundamental component of the successful military operations against Iraq, because they were credible, responsive and interoperable. To remain relevant, NEFs will be required to maintain and refine these characteristics. Many of the required capabilities of future NEFs already exist in today's naval forces; however, they must be integrated as naval and joint forces and some expanded capabilities must be developed.

Naval forces must develop an integrated Navy and Marine Corps NEF Task Force capability which will allow forward deployed Navy or Marine officers to rapidly assume a Joint Task Force role. The NEF task force must have the organic command, control and communications architecture required for near-realtime information flow and decisionmaking. This means immediate access to all-source digital data and information management systems that can support joint and Allied forces employed in the early days of a crisis operation. The NEF must have staffs that can immediately transition to joint contingency operations. NEF staffs must practice and be proficient at the direction and coordination of naval and joint operations. A NEF must be able to assume the coordinating role for the reception of forces deploying by

sea and air and for all operations necessary to control the sea and air space for the deployment. All of this requires expanded training for NEF commanders and staffs in joint operations.

Future NEFs must be capable of defeating the expected threat. In the world's littorals, this means shallow water mines and conventional submarines, modern land-based aircraft and missiles, fast missile attack boats and sizable, often heavily armored ground forces defending key facilities and choke points. Fast, synchronized, combined arms forces which can attack from any direction, at night, without electronic emissions or early warning must be a fundamental component of the future NEF.

The future NEF must be able to support joint and Allied ground operations ashore. Sea-based sustainment, close air support, amphibious assault operations and anti-air warfare against aircraft and missiles are all essential components of this support.

Naval forces must retain the capability to build up quickly against larger threats. The Navy must be able to defeat the residual Soviet naval threat. The Navy and Marine Corps must be able to threaten the seaward flank of a modern land army. Marines must also be able to deploy early to operate as part of land forces, if required to support Army land operations.

The full range of required capabilities will not be present in all forward-deployed NEFs, but integrated force structure and training standards for all naval forces will allow commanders to quickly task-organize a force from all those available worldwide. For example, Crisis Action Modules are a step in this direction. They are an evolution in the integration of existing NEFs and are based upon our experiences in Southwest Asia. CAMs provide quick response force packages which rapidly deploy and integrate forward-deployed amphibious forces, air deployed naval forces and one or more maritime preposition ship(s) into a single, self-sustainable unit tailored to meet the specific contingency needs of the unified commander.

By combining the capabilities present in today's Carrier Battle

Groups (CVBGs), Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs), and Surface Action Groups (SAGs), NEFs can achieve some efficiencies. Unifying the command of these various capabilities, routinely deploying them as an integrated force and realistic joint command and control exercises will all be required to increase the flexibility of joint response available to the unified commander.

FUTURE USMC CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS

What does this expanded view portend for the evolution of U.S. Marine Corps capabilities? Marine forces will have to remain fundamentally naval in character and even return some Marine capabilities more fully to their naval roots. All Marine forces must be able to instantly transition to sea-based operations. Marine forces, staffs and commanders must have the ability to operate as part of joint or Allied forces. Marines must improve their already significant ability to operate from a sea or land base, at night, over great distances. As Marine forces grow smaller, the synergistic combat power that is derived from integrated combined arms operations and our warfighting doctrine must remain central to the way we train and fight.

The integrated NEF concept outlined in this paper will demand that all Marine forces be able to operate as an integral part of the naval task force; therefore, we should remain fundamentally naval in character. Weapons systems must be designed for embarkation and operation at sea. This means size and weight constraints and costly corrosion control will remain design requirements. Marine forces will have to adapt to operating from carriers and surface ships, as well as amphibious ships.

Navy forces have to become better at shallow water operations against developing world threats. Marine forces should be able to lend a hand in all aspects of these operations including AAW, ASUW, mine counter-measures, task force defense or even ASW. At times, Marine forces will not be embarked afloat as part of a NEF task force. However, Marines must be able to rapidly deploy by air or sea to join the task force or prepositioned equipment to operate as part of the task force. We must continue to think of operations in expeditionary terms; i.e., get to a crisis fast with every-

thing we need to fight, conduct operations from the sea or construct our own expeditionary bases ashore and be able to leave as fast as we arrived.

Naval expeditionary forces will have to improve their ability to operate as part of integrated joint and Allied forces. Amphibious doctrine recognizes the importance of unity of command and decision-making at the lowest possible command level. Joint contingency operations directed by a unified commander directly or through a JTF commander must still be based upon these principles. All forces must be integrated through robust command, control, communications, computer, intelligence and interoperability (C⁴I²) architectures. We must develop the near-realtime capability to receive all-source data, fuse it into a current multi-dimensional view of the battlefield and transmit this information to decisionmakers in time for them to act upon it. We must be able to connect all elements of rapid response contingency forces so they can operate as an integrated force. Systems must be able to talk to systems and Marines must be able to take near-realtime advantage of this.

But joint integration is more than just (C⁴I²) system. It is fundamentally derived from joint training and operations. Every element of the joint task force (JTF) brings unique capabilities and limitations to the force. Each element of the JTF must know how the other elements fight but retain their individual ability to employ forces using their unique doctrine and force structure developed to match their intended use and warfighting doctrine. Joint does not mean mirror image. For example, Marine forces which are designed to operate under expeditionary conditions derive their combat capability from their combined arms, warfighting doctrine. Since artillery and land-based fire support are limited under these conditions, heavy reliance is placed upon integrated use of close air support (CAS) to provide combat power when and where it is needed. However, U.S. Army forces have much heavier densities of artillery and rockets. Any Army view of CAS support for fast moving mechanized operations is to push the CAS out beyond the direct fire weapons battle. Both of these concepts are correct for the forces and doctrine they are intended to support; however, they

are fundamentally different. Each element of America's rapidly deployable joint contingency forces must know how all of the other elements fight. This will require expanded joint training, particularly among senior commanders and their staffs.

The evacuation of Somalia in January of 1991 may provide an instructive framework for future naval expeditionary forces demands. Between 2 and 6 January 1991, a tailored amphibious force was withdrawn from Desert Shield operations and sailed some 1,300 miles in three days. On hours notice, it deployed Marine and Navy forces at night over 460 miles of ocean, secured the embassy compound and sent a rescue team through rebel-held streets to recover evacuees, then evacuated some 261 persons without loss of life. The task force deployed without notice. It had to operate with joint forces and communicate over great distances. It had to launch evacuation operations from distances which exceed the capabilities of our current assault helicopters. Throughout the operation it had to be prepared to operate in a hostile environment. The unexpected pervades the expeditionary environment. Naval forces anticipated and responded to the unexpected as a matter of course. The naval task force commander and on-scene evacuation force commander deployed into the embassy had to fuse available intelligence, coordinate all operations and make on scene decisions. Such operations will probably have to be repeated in the future.

All the Services have a role in our national defense strategy. The Navy-Marine Corps team has been and should continue to be the Nation's forward-deployed force in readiness, able to respond quickly with credible power projection anywhere on the globe. The changing world situation demands greater cooperation and teamwork within and between Services. Future NEFs, task-organized and employed in imaginative ways, will give the Nation a potent force that will play an essential role in our military strategy and that will complement the unique capabilities of other Services.

Chapter II

Special Operations and Sea-Based Forces

BGen Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC

In a reaction against the militarily ineffective policies of incrementalism associated with the Vietnam War, the present Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has embraced the use of "overwhelming force" to bring conflicts in which U.S. forces are engaged to a swift and favorable conclusion. As evidenced by Operation Desert Storm, large conventional and strategic forces are needed to deter and defeat the significant large-scale threats which remain in the world, even after the implosion of the former Soviet empire. But beneath these macro challenges, there is an amalgamation of more ambiguous threats which comprise the low-intensity conflict (LIC) environment, in which overwhelming force and strategic deterrence are irrelevant. If incrementalism is effective and overwhelming force is inappropriate for LIC challenges, what better alternatives remain?

Micro, not macro, force options are more appropriate when dealing with many threats on the low end of the operational continuum, such as counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and varied scenarios which combine elements of the aforementioned with ongoing or incipient insurgencies. The development of these smaller force options, employed before international security problems have reached crisis proportions, is a logical course of action given the present paring of forces. These contemporary challenges are complex, and solutions will require innovative thought and flexible teamwork. In short, it is an ideal scenario for maritime SOF and SOC forces.

COMPARISON BETWEEN SOF AND SOC

The distinction between Special Operations Forces (SOF) and

Special Operations Capable (SOC) forces is often poorly understood. SOF are assigned to the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) by law, and special operations activities are similarly delineated. Some SOF activities, such as unconventional warfare, require unique training and specialized equipment. Other missions, such as direct action, are frequently performed by conventional forces as well. For this reason, conventional forces can be found executing some special operations activities, e.g., raids. Both are currently involved in riverine environments, developing doctrine and sending Mobile Training Teams to South America as part of the U.S. counternarcotics campaign.

Unlike SOF, which have permanent units, the Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (Special Operations Capable), or MAGTF(SOC)s, are task organized units which are formed and trained for a specific deployment or task. A conventional force which has received intensive training, a MAGTF(SOC) contains a limited amount of special equipment to enhance its Special Operations Capabilities. Like SOF, MAGTF(SOC)s have utility across the operational continuum and their mobility, availability, and flexibility make them especially useful in the LIC environment. The matter has been summed up by General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., USMC, as follows: "We train Marines to have some special operations capabilities. That is different from being a special operations force. We are not, and do not pretend to be, nor should we be, SOF. Because we believe that the forward-deployed forces should have as many capabilities as they can, we train to do some militarily special operations."

SOF and Conventional Forces

Special Operations Forces and conventional forces are not in competition. Their roles have long been complementary, and students of military history are familiar with the important role played by 34 underwater Combat Demolitions Units in WWII. That legacy has passed to Navy SEALs, who have played a key role in every conflict since their inception in 1962, most recently in supporting conventional forces and the operational deception plan for Desert Storm. More will be said later of their contributions and

those of the Marine Expeditionary Units (Specials Operations Capable), or MEU(SOC)s, to maritime interdiction, special reconnaissance, and direct action. Valuable assets to both theater and fleet commanders, both SEALs and MAGTF(SOC)s can be employed independently or in concert with other forces to support the commander's plan.

Analogies can be drawn between the status and utility of MEU(SOC)s and the Air Force Special Operations (Low Level Qualified) aircraft and crews. Although the aircraft and crews are conventional forces assigned to the Military Airlift Command (MAC), they operate in support of SOF. This relationship illustrates, perhaps better than any other, the complementary roles of conventional and special operations forces.

SOF/SOC: FROM NEGLECT TO RENAISSANCE

In the post-Vietnam era, funding for SOF was reduced by 95 percent from its Vietnam high. The SOF force structure largely disappeared and SOF capabilities atrophied. This cyclical "going out of business sale" at the end of each conflict is a reflection of a systemic dysfunction. As Sam Sarkesian (author of *Organizational Strategies in Low Intensity Conflicts*) and others have noted, the American military structure has always resisted SOF. SOF's nature placed it outside the organizational essence of the Services and, unlike the armor, aviation, submarine, and other communities, SOF lacked a constituency among the military hierarchy. In the aftermath of Vietnam, there was an understandable desire on the part of the Services to return their focus to those things which we did well, such as scenarios involving a conventional war in Europe. The result was that SOF did not compete well for funds in the normal budget cycle.

The rise of international terrorism in the 1970s sparked some interest in resurrecting our special operations capabilities, and General Meyer, then Chief of Staff of the Army, authorized the formation of an Army counterterrorist unit. The most significant impetus, however, was the April 1980 failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt. This disaster highlighted the compelling need for special

operations capabilities, despite Service resistance. Most of the momentum for this renaissance, however, originated in the Congress. In contrast, SOF proponents in the Pentagon were few. Consequently, as the SOF budget rose from \$440 million to \$1.1 billion annually between 1981 and 1986, the Services repeatedly reprogrammed this proportionately modest SOF money, e.g., for SOF aircraft, into other accounts. Other problems were also apparent: SOF operations were hindered by their lack of interoperability with their own Services and with the SOF of other Services, SOF personnel had limited career opportunities, and there was no centralized advocate for SOF within the Department of Defense (DoD). All of these manifestations of Service rejection kept the issue on the Congressional agenda. In 1986 and 1987, the 99th Congress acted decisively, directing numerous changes within the DoD to address weaknesses in our ability to conduct special operations and low-intensity conflict.

The Navy - Marine Team Acts

Even before the advent of the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization and the Nunn-Cohen Act, leaders within the naval establishment had realized that the structure and capabilities of forward-deployed naval units needed to be reviewed. With vision from both Navy and Marine leaders and input from Marines and SEALs in the Fleet, 18 missions were identified and the concept of adding a special operations capability for deployed units was developed. Many of these missions, such as amphibious raids and show-of-force operations, had been Navy-Marine staples for centuries. Other missions, which included clandestine rescue operations and in-extremis hostage rescue, required refined staff procedures and introduced new tactics and techniques. The overhaul of our capabilities was both extensive and expensive. Over \$1 million was committed in supplemental equipment purchases for each MEU, not to mention time and training costs.

With this heightened interest in the LIC environment, the USMC *Small Wars Manual* was republished and challenges on the low end of the spectrum received additional emphasis. Thus, the efforts to develop the training, obtain the equipment, and perfect

the techniques which characterize maritime SOC units predate not only the formation of United States Special Operations Command, but the Congressional initiatives as well.

The Congress Acts

By 1986, Congressional patience with Service stonewalling was wearing thin. The Nation's SOF capability was anemic and, for the first time since 1947, Congress directed the formation of a unified command, despite strenuous objections from DoD. The Nunn-Cohen Act (PL-99-661) mandated several significant changes within the Department of Defense with regards to Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. Since the primary focus of this paper is on the former, the following discussion will focus on the three major points which are germane to special operations.

Oversight and Advocacy

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, OASD(SO/LIC), was created to provide both oversight and advocacy for SO/LIC concerns within the civilian arenas of government. The initial DoD response was simply to delay filling the billet.

To assist in overcoming bureaucratic inertia, the law further instructed that the first ASD(SO/LIC) be given direct access to the Secretary of Defense. Even though the concerns of the ASD(SO/LIC) are functional, the present ASD is part of the regionally-organized office of the Under Secretary for Policy. This structure is unlike other functional ASDs, such as the ASD for Public Affairs.

Major Force Program 11

To correct the problem of reprogramming of SOF funds within the Pentagon, Congress directed the establishment of an 11th category in the Defense budget, Major Force Program 11. It further directed that Commander-in-Chief Special Operations Command (CINCSOC) be designated as the "head of agency" with the responsibility to construct his own budget. As the Acquisition Exec-

utive, CINCSOC is now in his second Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) cycle and is responsible for a budget that recently crested at \$3 billion.

Establish Special Operations Command

The law also directed the establishment of the USSOCOM, which was activated in 1987. It further assigned specific forces to USCINCSOC. USSOCOM provides a venue for the concerns of Special Operations Forces and an avenue for their expertise to the Joint Staff and the Commanders of the Unified Combatant Commands.

USSOCOM AND MARITIME FORCE STRUCTURE

USSOCOM

USSOCOM, located at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, was created as the permanent command to prepare and deploy SOF to the theater commands. Specifically, USSOCOM has three Service components, each of which is a major command: the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; the Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM), located at the Naval Amphibious Base, Coronado, California; and the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSCO), located at Hurlburt Field, Florida. The fourth component is the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

The balance of this paper will concern itself only with the Navy SOF and Marine SOC forces.

Maritime SOF - Naval Special Warfare

The Naval Special Warfare Command is responsible for all continental U.S. based Active and Reserve Naval Special Warfare forces. These forces, comprising SEAL Teams, SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams (SDVT) and Special Boat Units (SBU), conduct Naval Special Warfare (NSW) operations in support of both Fleet and

Joint Commanders. The component commands, Naval Special Warfare Group One (NAVSPECWARGRUONE), Coronado, California, and Naval Special Warfare Group Two (NAVSPECWARGRUTWO), Little Creek, Virginia, exercise Operational Control over assigned forces. Accordingly, NAVSPECWARGRUONE forces are geographically oriented to support the Pacific Command (PACOM) and Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) requirements while NAVSPECWARGRUTWO forces are geographically oriented to support the Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) and Special Operations Command Atlantic (SOCLANT) requirements.

Consequently, Naval Special Warfare, as a fundamental naval warfare mission area, must be prepared to conduct sea control and power projection missions. A consistent requirement for NSW is to support Fleet and Joint Commanders in specific roles worldwide. Often the Maritime Special Operations and sea-based SOC forces work jointly to accomplish specific tasking in support of high priority national security missions, e.g., counternarcotics.

Indeed, counternarcotic operations are well suited for Maritime Special Operation and sea-based SOC forces. NSW forces as well as Marines have been and will continue to be involved in counternarcotics -- a high-priority national security mission for our armed forces. Maritime forces composed of SEALs, SBUs, and Marines often work together in the Andean region in support of counternarcotic Deployments For Training (DFT) and Mobile Training Teams (MTT), where we seek to enhance the effectiveness of host-nation law enforcement and military activities against powerful and well entrenched trafficking organizations.

Naturally, in Desert Shield/Storm, SEALs performed numerous maritime missions supporting conventional forces and SOFs. Details of many of the operations still remain classified but in general they include: reconnaissance missions of Kuwaiti beaches for a possible Marine assault, intelligence gathering of Iraqi troop and vehicle movements prior to the battle for Khajfi, deception missions on Kuwaiti beaches during the early phase of Desert Storm, combat search and rescue, and direct action operations to seize en-

emy-held islands and offshore oil platforms.

Maritime SOC - Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (SOC)

Inasmuch as MAGTF(SOC)s are not SOF, they are not assigned to USSOCOM, but USSOCOM assists by setting tasks and standards for MEU(SOC) training. Ties between USSOCOM and the Marines have been further strengthened by the routine assignment of Marines to USSOCOM.

That the MEU(SOC) developed before and distinct from the special operations community is scarcely surprising. Whereas USSOCOM was created in response to resistance from the Army, Navy, and Air Force to special operations, the amphibious elements of the Navy-Marine Corps team had foreseen the requirement for rapidly responsive, flexible instruments of military power. The nature of amphibious operations demands such a culture and we have a heritage of jointly pioneering whatever is necessary to get the job done, e.g., naval gunfire, amphibious vehicles, vertical envelopment, etc.

During 1987-1988, Marines and sailors activated two MAGTFs in 48 hours for service with Operation Earnest Will (Kuwaiti tanker reflagging). After training while en route, these forces on arrival provided security for two mobile sea bases, MTTs to 35 ships, armed aerial reconnaissance and escort for 11 convoys and 10 minesweeper transits through vital sea lanes. During a punitive raid carried out against the Iranian Sasson Gas-Oil platform, these Marines worked with Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams and surface craft in a highly successful mission that was described as a textbook example of Navy-Marine teamwork.

The versatility of the MAGTF(SOC) concept has been repeatedly validated in recent months by events requiring expertise in operations across the continuum of conflict. The success of Operation Desert Storm has been widely acclaimed and the Marines who penetrated the Iraqi defensive line and reoccupied Kuwait have received due praise. Less well known was the extraordinary success of the afloat units in skillfully conducting the raids and feints, which

succeeded in keeping at least seven Iraqi divisions out of play.

In contrast to these combat skills, Marines of the 24th MEU(SOC) made headlines for the manner in which they protected and aided Kurdish refugees in Operation Provide Comfort. Other sailors and Marines participated in humanitarian assistance in Operation Sea Angel (Bangladesh) and Operation Fiery Vigil (Philippines). In meeting the needs of each of these diverse scenarios, the Navy-Marine team has not only acquitted itself with distinction, but done so in a manner that has made thousands of friends and raised the stature of our nation in the eyes of the developing world.

These examples unquestionably demonstrate that the MAGTF(SOC) is a highly competent fighting organization with tremendous versatility for humanitarian assistance. In between these operations, there is also the responsibility to safeguard American lives and conduct non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) when necessary. In Operation Sharp Edge (Liberia), Navy ships with embarked Marines demonstrated the value of organic sustainability, remaining off the coast of Liberia for weeks. Their presence calmed the situation and provided a safe exit for over 2,400 non-combatants. A more dramatic NEO, Operation Eastern Exit (Somalia), required Marine helicopters to rendezvous at night with aerial tankers for two in-flight refuelings while racing to rescue 260 persons from our embassy in Somalia. This operation is an excellent example of the utility of the enhanced capabilities that distinguish a MAGTF(SOC).

The script for the above described operations could hardly have been more convincing or ambitious if it had been crafted by the Department of the Navy. Our success in meeting with such diverse, far-flung challenges with such a rapid tempo of operations is incontestable proof the forward deployed Navy-Marine team is more than ready as the force of choice in a difficult and unpredictable world.

CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT

The Challenge: The Maritime Venue

Maritime forces have been employed in many of the developing nations of the world and it is likely that these regions, particularly the Middle East and Southeast Asia, will become even more important to us in the future. While the world's littoral regions have always been economically important as seaports for the transshipment of raw materials and manufactured goods, demographers indicate that the world's population has shifted to these regions as well.

Likewise, the National Military Security Strategy notes that the end of the bipolar confrontation will lessen the restraints on unrest throughout the world. Nationalism, ethnic tensions, and religious strife have all fueled violence and provided headlines. The result is growing instability in regions of significant political and economic interest to the U.S. The world has changed and so must the strategy that will guide the military into the 90s and beyond. As was stated by Adm Jonathan T. Howe, Commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe, in a recent interview at his headquarters in Naples, "we have studied the future as best we can by looking at history and trends...."

The Answer: Maritime Forces

The diverse capabilities and important contributions of maritime Special Operations Forces and sea-based forces have been amply demonstrated in recent history. In Operation Just Cause (Panama), maritime SOF units played major operational roles. The continuing reconstruction of Panama, Operation Promote Liberty, relies heavily upon civil affairs expertise drawn from both the active and reserve components. During Operation Earnest Will (Kuwaiti tanker reflagging), sea-based forces of mine countermeasures units, small surface combatants, Naval Special Warfare forces, and Marines demonstrated the use and utility of maritime forces in support of our National Security Strategy. In Operation Desert Shield/Storm, all of these forces were employed in support of conventional as well as special operations.

Thus, in the 1990s three trends will likely accelerate in significance: (1) increasing instability within the Soviet Union and in areas contiguous to it; (2) rising global economic tensions as a result of enhanced interdependence; and (3) growing turmoil in the developing world. Based on these trends, a National Military Strategy for the 1990s is being developed and the future of maritime SOF and sea-based SOC forces must adjust to new roles.

U.S. DEFENSE STRATEGY AND MARITIME FORCES

Accordingly, dealing with broader somewhat more ambiguous threats requires a defense strategy that deters and defeats aggression at all levels of conflict in a changing global environment. Secretary Cheney has established the following major elements of U.S. defense strategy, in each of which maritime SOF and sea-based SOC forces will play a valuable role:

Strategic deterrence and defense

Given ongoing Soviet nuclear modernization, the U.S. must maintain diverse, survivable and highly capable offensive nuclear forces. But we should also pursue a defense system for global protection against limited ballistic missile strikes -- whatever their source. To underscore this last point, the Proliferation Countermeasures Working Group, an internal Pentagon body, has begun a major study into the threat posed by upgrades of Scud surface-to-surface missiles, Scud exports by the Soviet Union, and other ballistic missile proliferation in the developing world. Importantly, Maritime SOF and sea-based forces are two of just a few available instruments for destroying an adversary's surface-to-surface nuclear, biological, chemical weapons capabilities. Equally important, Maritime SOF special reconnaissance and direct action capabilities can be a force multiplier by targeting critical nodes in the logistic lines and command control capabilities for strategic response.

Forward Presence

Although the changing global environment allows us to reduce

our permanent foreign deployments, some U.S. forces must remain deployed overseas in areas of U.S. interest. The forward presence of U.S. forces makes for more credible deterrence, promotes regional stability and provides us an initial capability for crisis response and escalation control. Maritime SOF and sea-based forces can be a principal player in achieving greater regional stability through a wide range of ongoing nation-building internal defense activities, and military-to-military programs, which constitute a de facto forward presence. Not only are these forces cost-effective, but because of their low profile, they can provide an acceptable alternative in delicate situations where a larger or more obvious force presence would be politically unpalatable. For example, Maritime SOF and SOC forces currently deployed and providing a forward presence include: Amphibious Ready Groups (SEALs and Marines) in PACOM and LANTCOM; NSW (SEALs and SBUs) in the Philippines/Guam, Panama, and Europe.

Crisis Response

U.S. conventional forces must be able to respond to short notice regional crises and contingencies that threaten U.S. interests. That requirement will guide the stationing, size and capabilities of U.S. conventional forces. Maritime SOF and MEU(SOC)s have demonstrated their utility as supporting elements to conventional forces in recent crises including Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Operation Just Cause (Panama), Operation Earnest Will, the Philippines, Liberia, Peru, and El Salvador. Recognizing that their geographic advantage may mean that deployed MEU(SOC) forces may arrive at a crisis scene before designated SOF, detailed procedures have been worked out to ensure that the MEU(SOC) can effectively support the SOF on arrival and that equipment, supplies, and techniques are interoperable. These procedures are evaluated in scenario-tested exercises, the most recent Crisis Interaction Requirements Exercise (CIREX) having been conducted with the Joint Special Operations Command and the 24th MEU(SOC) in October 1991.

Force Reconstitution

A significant consideration in general war scenarios is the re-

quirement for reconstitution. Although a global war against Soviet and Soviet-backed forces has become far less likely, we must maintain the ability to reconstitute a larger force structure if a resurgent threat of massive conflict returns. Reconstitution is a time consuming process, during which maritime forces have historically bought time and raised domestic morale by conducting sabotage and waging unconventional warfare. This requires us to retain those features of force capability that are most difficult to reconstitute, such as, quality personnel and a capable U.S. industrial and technology base. To meet this challenge, the relatively modest Active Component of sea-based SOF/SOC force structure must be maintained. In fact, reconstituting maritime SOF/SOC is difficult due to long lead times for developing mature SOF operators and units and for acquiring the necessary operational expertise.

Therefore, in a volatile and turbulent world, where rapid change is the only reliable norm, well trained and equipped sea-based and maritime SOF forces are a versatile instrument of national policy. Their flexibility, size, ease of deployment, forward deployment, and experience around the globe make them ideally suited for limited contingencies, valuable adjuncts to larger conventional actions, or in support of DoD peacetime activities.

POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT SHORT OF WAR

President Bush is committed to active engagement in the world. But we must also recognize that we do not have the fiscal resources or political will to respond to every crisis or injustice. As the concept of containment becomes less relevant, the need for a replacement that emphasizes selective engagement becomes increasingly apparent.

Additionally, a policy for the environment short of war should also provide a conceptual framework for the coordinated employment of all elements of national power. Inasmuch as this policy would focus on security issues in pre-conflict activities, it is of particular interest to naval units who are so frequently called upon to respond to situations at the low end of the spectrum, such as maritime interdiction of narcotics trafficking, nation assistance,

peacekeeping operations, non-combatant evacuation operations, and other peacetime contingency operations.

In general, our policy for the environment short of war preserves some aspects of our Cold War security policy, for example, encouraging market economies and democratic regimes, as well as two important means to attain these objectives: effective alliances and coordinated interagency effort. Contrary to the past, however, when the USSR was practically the sole focus of security planning and everything else was treated as a lesser included case, the United States must now prepare itself for the distinctive characteristics of regional and lesser conflicts unconstrained by superpower geopolitical competition.

Systematic Approach Required

Our policy should emphasize the selective pursuit of opportunities to enhance regional stability, defuse nascent crises, and support the growth of representative governments and market economies. Of particular importance to naval forces, it should seek to increase leverage from the coordinated use of available political, economic, and military resources. This is significant because the economic infrastructure in many developing areas is so poorly developed that it is difficult to achieve the stability necessary for orderly change without concomitant efforts in the areas of health care, veterinary medicine, agricultural methods, etc. While deployed units routinely address some of these needs in peacetime and emergency relief is provided in response to disasters, a more systematic approach is required if we are to incorporate the skills and experience of USAID, Commerce, Justice, etc. Interagency cooperation, in Washington, in the embassies, and in the field, is essential to redressing grievances which give rise to instability. Although several initiatives have been studied, few solutions appear imminent.

Interagency Cooperation

One area where interagency cooperation has already proved fruitful has been the assistance the Marine Corps has received from

the FBI. Realizing that the population of the world's urban centers are growing exponentially, the training of the Maritime Special Purpose Force within each MAGTF(SOC) has benefitted from realistic live-fire training which has been conducted in cities across America with the assistance of the FBI. Under the Training Assistance to the Marine Corps (TAMACOR), the FBI provides Special Agents to the Commandant and each of the Fleet Marine Force commanders to assist specifically with the training of the MAGTF(SOC) in individual skills, special target training, and urban environments.

Implementation

Successful implementation of our policy for the environment short of war requires that the United States be proficient in four security mission areas:

- diplomacy and support for diplomacy;
- pre-crisis activities;
- force projection and crisis response; and,
- post-crisis activities.

Proficiency in these four areas would improve our early warning capabilities, our ability to respond to crises, our capacity to build ad hoc coalitions, and our ability to extend the impact of our military actions. Proficiency in these mission areas also reinforces the precept that force should be used only as part of a larger political-military strategy designed to follow up military success with other actions needed to secure long-term political objectives.

Low-Intensity Conflict

This expansive term encompasses virtually all political-military confrontations above routine, peaceful competition and below the threshold of conventional war. There are no clear Clausewitzian centers of gravity, at least not in terms of terrain or the enemy's forces these are usually long-term struggles for legitimacy. Threats lack clear definition and call for flexible, comprehensive solutions that have political, military, and economic dimensions. Sea-based

forces are frequently the ideal military component in these scenarios, as they possess intrinsic flexibility and self-contained, versatile logistic capabilities. Their significant military potential is normally reserved for use in support of political measures. There are, however, other scenarios in which military power features more prominently.

Military Operations Short of War

These situations, such as Operation Just Cause (Panama), typically require more conventional applications of force and are generally confined to short periods of time. The contributions of the SEALs in conducting combat swimmer operations and disabling the Panamanian Navy, destroying Gen Noriega's aircraft, and searching for Gen Noriega are only now being revealed.

General War

The traditional activities of Special Operations Forces, as embodied in Direct Action, Special Reconnaissance, Unconventional Warfare, etc., do not change. However, in general war these activities are executed in support of the theater CinC's strategic plan. The contribution of sea-based special operations personnel in supporting the maritime interdiction effort was but one of many examples of the vital contributions made by these forces in Desert Shield/Storm.

DoD supports our policy for the environment short of war through forward presence and crisis response, key pillars of the new defense strategy. DoD's contribution includes the multitude of things that U.S. military units provide -- from coalition training to peacekeeping, from security assistance to armed response -- which could enhance regional security on a daily basis. Our national security policy should be both protective and pro-active, selective and coordinated. In a time of declining force structure and more ambiguous threats, it is important to obtain increased leverage from available military assets. Our policy requires economy-of-force strategies which buttress diplomatic efforts to counter re-

gional threats through prudent, selective use of military assets before, during, and after crises.

While the missions associated with the environment short of war are not unprecedented for DoD, they have not been a major focus of defense planning during the past 45 years. The ongoing transition to a multipolar environment requires the integration of peacetime activities into the restructuring of our defense forces to meet the challenges of the 1990s.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. **Weapons of Mass Destruction.** Nations, and sub-national groups such as drug cartels and terrorist groups, will continue to attempt to acquire weapons of mass destruction. The preemptive destruction of these systems will become a strategic priority. Given the importance of this inevitable mission and the need for precision, we should continue to hone the skills and push the technological envelope for equipment necessary to prepare our maritime forces for employment in this area.

2. **Use of Discriminate Force.** Conventional weapons will continue to increase in range and lethality. To minimize casualties, especially in urban areas, U.S. forces must continue to refine techniques and the technology which allows us to use discriminate force in countering this threat. While space-based systems may offer promise. Maritime SOF and SOC forces will continue to play a key role in the near term and a complementary one in the more distant future.

3. **Develop PSYOP Capability.** PSYOP is an essential component of any operational plan, preceding, during, and after the fight. Presently, the Naval Services rely upon the Army for this capability but, if the Corps is to be fully capable of "conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign," a PSYOP capability is an appropriate and necessary complement to our civil affairs structure.

4. **Expand Officer Exchange Programs.** Despite the military

complexities they entail, multi-national military operations are a most desirable strategy in mobilizing political and financial support for regional conflicts. This complex undertaking will require the development and refinement of coalition warfare. This type of joint operation underscores the wisdom of assigning more officers to live and work with foreign military organizations in which cultural and language differences must be addressed well in advance. Diplomats can construct a coalition in a relatively short period; military interoperability requires extensive groundwork and training to reach a high degree of mutual understanding and cohesiveness.

5. **Develop Civil-Military Interface for LIC.** Many of the most likely scenarios involving the use of U.S. military forces cannot be resolved by military means alone, e.g., LIC scenarios, humanitarian assistance, etc. We need to develop an interagency organization similar to the Vietnam-era CORDS (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development) to serve in the host nation and a small interagency mechanism within the NSC.

6. **Create Interagency Rapid Response Cell.** To respond to crisis situations, an interagency fly-away team could be deployed to provide liaison between the country team and the unified commander and between the country team and the Washington headquarters of the appropriate departments and agencies.

OUTLOOK

The world has changed and continues to change. Americans traditionally have expressed a desire to influence world events and the international security environment, whether in response to natural disasters or to assist friends in a struggle toward democracy.

Beyond inevitable economic challenges, there will also be military conflicts that require the skilled and measured application of force. The bipolar world, with its unambiguous threats, is gone. A multi-polar world may eventually emerge, but for the present, we are the sole superpower. To defend our ideals, our interests, and

our friends, we must contend with instability, insurrections, and attempts to impose regional hegemonies.

Micro-force options, such as maritime SOF and SOC units, are not only effective, but are within the limits of political will and fiscal reality. These forces, when prudently employed with other general purpose forces, have proven themselves capable of providing valuable and broadly applicable capabilities for the execution of post-containment policies and strategies.

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Chapter III

The Impact of Advanced Weapons Proliferation on Combat Missions

Theodore Clark
and
Thomas Harvey

SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

The proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, and biological -- NBC) in the developing world may be the single greatest threat to peace in the 1990s. Currently, 15 to 20 developing countries have or are attempting to acquire a ballistic missile capability.¹ With a short flight time, high probability of penetration, and the potential for combination with increasingly advanced munitions, ballistic missiles have great appeal to Third World defense planners.



¹ Janne Nolan claims 16 developing countries possess ballistic missiles and 12 countries are developing or producing these systems domestically. (see Janne Nolan, *Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1991, 8.)


Seth Carus asserts 22 developing countries currently possess or are actively attempting to acquire ballistic missiles, though only 15 have operational missile forces. They include: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Kuwait, Libya, North Korea, North Yemen, Pakistan, South Korea, South Yemen, Syria, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, and Taiwan. Carus believes 13 countries are actively designing and building ballistic missiles. (see W. Seth Carus, *Ballistic Missiles in Modern Conflict*. New York: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1990, 1.)

Anthony Cordesman cites Defense Secretary Richard Cheney's remarks just before the Iraqi invasion. According to Cheney, by the year 2000, approximately 15 developing countries will be able to produce their own missiles. Six of these will have IRBM capabilities with the multiple warhead possibilities which will include weapons of mass destruction. (Anthony H. Cordesman, *Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East*. London: Brassey's, 1991, 1.)

In addition, the likelihood of progressive improvements in range, accuracy, rates of fire, and varieties available will enhance the utility of ballistic missiles in future conflicts. No longer used only as weapons of terror against civilian-city targets, ballistic missiles armed with new, more deadly warheads will play a much greater role in developing nations' overall warfighting strategy while creating greater security problems for American forces abroad. The increasing accuracy and destructiveness of these weapons systems are providing the Third World with a genuine counterforce potential which will have far-reaching consequences for U.S. power projection forces in the future.

Many of the developing countries that are procuring new surface-to-surface missile (SSM) forces are engaged in a parallel proliferation effort to obtain weapons of mass destruction. There are numerous indications that nuclear proliferation in the Third World is accelerating despite many countries' signatures on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Algeria, and Syria are pursuing nuclear weapons programs while Argentina and Brazil have the capability to produce weapons grade uranium.² Israel, India and Pakistan already have a declared nuclear weapons arsenal of growing proportions while Iraq nearly achieved this goal.³

Adding to this nuclear instability is the demise of the Soviet Union. In late December 1991, Italian officials asserted that Russian uranium and plutonium were being sold abroad to countries "like" Libya and Iraq by former KGB and GRU agents in order to



² Argentina and Brazil have initiated a series of mutual inspections of each other's facilities thus alleviating some of the tension in the area. In addition, Argentina has officially ended development of the controversial Condor missile program which it was developing with Egypt and Iraq during the late 1980s.


³ Pakistan is estimated to have five to 10 warheads. India 40 to 60 nuclear warheads. ("Missile Proliferation, Regional Contingency Planning, and Alternative TMD Architectures." Institute For Foreign Policy Analysis, Study Report, 14 June 1991, 37.) India reported that Pakistan has 10 nuclear warheads. (see FBIS-NES-91-219, 13 Nov 1991, 50.)

raise hard currency.⁴ There is a growing fear that nuclear technicians from the former USSR will seek employment in countries which actively seek nuclear weapons programs in exchange for high salaries.

As these worrisome developments gather speed in the developing world, U.S. national security strategy is in a state of evolution with the disappearance of Cold War verities. In place of the long-standing and predictable divisions of East-West conflict, a more uncertain and fluid world situation has arisen. As Professor Samuel Huntington has observed, "The emerging world is likely to lack the clarity and stability of the cold war, and to be a more jungle-like world of multiple dangers, hidden traps, unpleasant surprises and moral ambiguities."⁵ The persistent proliferation efforts of the developing world represent a major source of this projected instability.

Even in the midst of this global flux, nearly all U.S. policymakers and military leaders acknowledge the inevitability of major cutbacks in standing U.S. military forces, a large portion of which will come from units currently deployed overseas. The closing of facilities in the Philippines, the drawdown of U.S. military units in Europe, Korea, and possibly Japan, foreshadow the importance of a major reworking of the concept of forward basing. The past reliance on substantial U.S. forces at forward staging areas across the globe to respond to crises will have to give way in part to rapidly deployable forces stationed in the U.S. and to self-contained elements associated with the U.S. Navy.

The Marine Corps, which has always taken pride in its structuring



⁴ "Soviet uranium, plutonium for sale, Italian official says." *Boston Globe*, 31 Dec 1991, 8. (Romano Dolce, assistant public prosecutor said on state television that nuclear material was headed to countries like Iraq and Libya. A Milan newspaper claims former KGB and GRU agents have been smuggling nuclear material abroad to raise cash. This article did not, however, specify exactly which countries were contacted by the Soviet agents nor did it specify if the agents were operating for their own personal interests or whether they were working for the Soviet government or certain republic.

⁵ Eric Schmitt, "Arms Panel Chief Outlines Military Cuts," *The New York Times*, January 7, 1992, All.

as a "force in readiness," will fill a valuable gap in the military continuum between home-based U.S. reaction forces and permanently deployed forward troops. With its flexible task organization and its integrated combined arms structure, a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) can be drawn from one of the three active Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) to provide for most regional contingencies. Yet the continued relevance of the Marine Corps to U.S. national security policy depends in large measure on its ability to counter the most serious global threats through adjustment of operational doctrine; in the present period, the lethality of SSMs and weapons of mass destruction constitute such an overarching threat.

To gain an understanding of the Marine Corps' capacity to respond to this challenge, it is important first to examine in more detail the anatomy of the proliferation issue, as well as the regional political dynamics which have fueled this threat, and then consider adaptations in employment doctrine set forth by the Marine Corps in response.

PROLIFERATION ISSUES

While the proliferation of SSMs and weapons of mass destruction extends worldwide, nowhere is the problem more acute than in the countries located from the Maghreb to the Fertile Crescent. Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, and Syria all possess or are seeking ballistic missiles. Other countries just outside this region which also play an important role in both the worldwide and regional proliferation trends include Pakistan, India, Turkey, and perhaps the newly independent Soviet republics. Of the six developing nations which have fired ballistic missiles during hostilities, all are from this troubled region or on the immediate periphery. With Iraq's resounding defeat, three countries in the Middle East now stand out as the most prominent trend-setting proliferators -- Syria, Israel, and Iran.


SYRIA

In return for Syria's participation in the Gulf War effort, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf nations pledged over \$2 billion in support to Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad. With this new bankroll and without a defense industry of his own, President Assad rushed to place large military orders with the USSR,⁶ Czechoslovakia,⁷ and North Korea. In March 1991, North Korea agreed to deliver 150 Scud-Cs to Syria.⁸ The first shipment of 24 missiles and mobile launchers was detected in early March, with two more shipments arriving later in the year to bring the total to 100. Steven Emerson suggest that these new Scud-Cs are capable of carrying chemical weapons without any adverse effect on the missile's performance.⁹

In addition, China has come under increasing suspicion of exporting components and even entire systems of its M-9 SSM to Syria. To this effect, newspaper reports in the summer and fall of 1991 indicated that an unknown quantity of M-9 SSMs was en route to Cyprus with Syria as its final destination.¹⁰

Syrian Weapons of Mass Destruction:

Syria initiated a major chemical and biological weapons program following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon.¹¹ By the late



⁶ Barbara Opall, "Syria to Buy \$2 Billion in Soviet Weapons." *Defense News*, 8 Jul 1991, 3 and 29.

⁷ Alon Pinkas, "Syria to Get 300 Tanks from Czechoslovakia," *The Jerusalem Post*, 15 Sep 1991.

⁸ The Scud-C has a 400-mile range (double a Scud-B's range), and can carry a payload of 1,500 pounds (three times that of the Scud-B). The upgraded Scud-C is reportedly more accurate than the Scud-B.

⁹ Emerson, 12. Emerson also points out that the Syrians have developed successfully a chemical warhead for the Scud-C with the assistance of the North Koreans.

¹⁰ Bill Gertz, "China, North Korea Secretly Deliver Missiles to Mideast via Cyprus," *The Washington Times*, 2 Jul 1991. (In October, *The Wall Street Journal* claimed Syria had purchased 24 M-9s from China, see "Peace Conference Puzzle," 25 Oct 1991, A14). Pakistan has received M-11 SSMs as well from China.

¹¹ Cordesman, *Weapons of Mass Destruction*, 145.

1980s, Syria had at least two chemical weapons facilities in use, one near Damascus and another at Homs.¹² Janne Nolan contends that these two facilities may have been built with foreign assistance from western and/or eastern Europe.¹³ The Syrian military has been stockpiling nerve gas and other chemical agents for several years, making Syria's chemical weapons capability one of the greatest in the region. The Syrians have developed a wide range of systems to deliver their chemical munitions. For example, the Syrians can probably deliver chemical weapons by various means, including aircraft, artillery shells, Frog-7 rockets, Scud-Bs, Scud-Cs, and highly accurate SS-21 SSMs.

Syria's biological weapons program is not as advanced, but Syria is reported to have at least one major biological weapons facility.¹⁴ Biological weapons programs, however, are particularly difficult to detect since any pharmaceutical industry or fermentation plant can be used to mass produce biological agents.¹⁵ Equally troubling is the potential for vaccines and penicillin to be made into viruses or toxins. Because biological weapons can be married to the same delivery systems as chemical weapons, they offer developing countries a tempting weapons potential.

In conjunction with its chemical and biological weapons programs, Syria has only recently demonstrated an active interest in acquiring nuclear technology. On November 28, 1991, China revealed that it was preparing to sell a mini-neutron source reactor to the IAEA for transfer to Syria.¹⁶ According to Wu Jianmin, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, the 30 kilowatt reactor can only be used for isotope production and neutron activation analy-



¹² Cordesman, *Weapons of Mass Destruction*, 145. "Peace Conference Puzzle," *The Wall Street Journal*, 25 Oct 1991, A14. Janne Nolan, *Trappings of Power*, 76.

¹³ Nolan, *Trappings of Power*, 77.

¹⁴ Cordesman, *Weapons*, 145.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* 7.

¹⁶ "Beijing to Sell Mini-Reactor for Transfer to Syria," *The Jerusalem Post*, 29 Nov 1991, 24.

sis.¹⁷ The Israelis reacted strongly to this new development, but the Shamir government was unsuccessful in prodding Washington to help cancel the deal.

ISRAEL

Due to Israel's small size, and the concentration of both its population and industrial centers, combined with a reliance on national mobilization, a Syrian ballistic missile attack against Israel could be devastating. By using chemical and biological weapons against urban areas, the Syrians could effectively immobilize large segments of the Israeli population. For example, during the Iraqi Scud attacks on Israel, Ze'ev Schiff notes that it took only a few SSMs to shut down Tel Aviv's businesses, to scatter residents, and to slow Russian immigration dramatically.¹⁸

More precise short range missiles, such as the SS-21 could be used to delay the Israeli Air Force's ability to engage Syrian forces in the critical first stages of any war. Since Tel Aviv and Damascus are each less than 60 miles from their common border, short range missiles could have a strategic military impact. In this sense, Syria's combined efforts to improve its SSM forces while simultaneously enhancing its NBC capabilities make President Assad's goal of achieving military parity with Israel appear possible and particularly worrisome.

Israeli SSMs and ATBMs:

While Israel's SSM force is superior to any of its Arab neighbors, Israeli defense planners face a troubling fact -- Saddam Hussein



¹⁷ *The Jerusalem Post*, 29 Nov 1991, 24.


¹⁸ Ze'ev Schiff, "Israel After The War," 2 *Foreign Affairs* 1991: 26. During the Iran-Iraq War, the constant Iraqi missile attacks on Teheran, combined with the fear of chemical weapons produced massive evacuations from the Iranian capital. Some reports claim over one million Iranians fled Teheran during the War of Cities. Rumours circulated that senior Iranian officials, including Khomeini had fled Teheran. (see Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, *Lessons of Modern Warfare: Volume II, The Iran-Iraq War*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1988, 367.)

was willing to attack Israel despite the possibility of an overwhelming counter-strike. By not attacking Iraq during the war, Israel's doctrine of reprisal was left weakened. In response, many Israeli officials, headed by Defense Minister Moshe Arens, have called for increased active and passive defensive measures. Others have suggested that Israel should focus on smaller, less ambitious programs such as the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) which were used by the U.S. Marines during the war.

Israel's active defenses are comprised of several components, including satellites and defensive missile systems. Reconnaissance satellites play an integral part in early warning efforts. According to the Tel Aviv newspaper *Ma'ariv* on 8 August 1991: "Israel will soon have the capability of launching reconnaissance satellites into space for intelligence purposes."¹⁹

In terms of missile systems, the Israelis are considering modifying the I Hawk for a limited ATBM capability, continuing their use of the Patriot ATBM, and accelerating their efforts to operationalize the Arrow ATBM. Overall, the Israelis have envisioned a layered defense system which could include the Arrow, the AB-10, and a hypervelocity gun, but financial restrictions will make it difficult to put all three layers into place.²⁰

The Arrow ATBM is designed for medium to high altitude intercepts. At a speed in excess of Mach 9, the Arrow is designed to intercept targets at much higher altitudes than the current Patriot missile system, thus diminishing the threat from chemically-armed SSMs. Some military experts, such as Leonard Spector, believe that U.S.-Israeli cooperation in developing defensive missile technologies can only aid Israel in advancing its offensive missile forces.²¹ Others, such as Thomas G. Mahnken suggest that



¹⁹ Imaneu'el Rosen, "Reconnaissance Satellites Capability 'Soon'," Tel Aviv *Ma'ariv*, in Hebrew, 8 Aug 1991, 1., in FBIS-NES-91-154, 9 Aug 1991, 29.

²⁰ Layer one would consist of the Arrow for threats in the 20-40km range in altitude; layer two would incorporate the AB-10 for 20 KM altitude threats; layer three would contain a hypervelocity gun with ranges of 10-20 km.

²¹ Spector, "Nonproliferation -- After the Bomb Has Spread," 10.

ATBMs may reduce the demand for SSMs by increasing their vulnerability.

Mahnken overlooks the fact that Syria is unlikely to receive any advanced ATBM know-how from the U.S. Such exclusion could heighten Syria's sense of vulnerability to Israeli defensive missile developments. But should an arms control regime come into effect in the region, ATBMs may become more available to Arab countries and play an important stabilizing role.²²

Israel's Nuclear Deterrent and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction:

Israel's nuclear arsenal is substantial, but its exact numbers remain shrouded in secrecy.²³ Through smuggling,²⁴ actively seeking supercomputers from the West, and development of an advanced indigenous program, the Israelis continue their proliferation efforts. Some military experts even believe that Israel deployed many of its nuclear weapons on mobile launchers aboard Jericho I SSMs sometime in the early to mid-1970s. By remaining outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Arab nations point to Israel as the true aggressor in the area.

Following Iraq's use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War, Israel quietly renewed its chemical warfare facilities located south of Dimona. There also are unconfirmed reports of a biological weapons research facility at the same location.



²² Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Israel are the only countries in the region that currently possess the Patriot. Kuwait, the UAE, and Bahrain have expressed interest in acquiring these systems. Before its defeat in the war, Iraq claimed to be working on its own ATBM called the Fao Fao. (see W. Seth Carus, *Ballistic Missiles in Modern Conflict*, 81.)

²³ Although experts do not agree to exact numbers, most seem to put the figures between 60 and 200 nuclear weapons. (see Spector, 150. Cordesman, *Weapons*, 129. Seymour M. Hersh claims in his new book *The Samson Option* that the total is 300; see Joel Brinkley "Book on Israel's Arsenal Says It Exceeds Estimates by US," *The New York Times*, 20 Oct 1991, 1 and 12.

²⁴ Leonard Spector suggests that Israel may have illegally obtained 810 high speed switches (krytons) from the US from 1981-83 which could be used to improve design and yield of Israel's nuclear weapons. See Cordesman, *Weapons*, 127.


IRAN

Iranian SSMs:

By the end of March 1988, Iran announced it was near the start of production of its own rocket. The missile, known as the Oghab, is a short-range system with only a 40 to 45 kilometer range.²⁵ Relying on Chinese technology, the Iranians have been able to develop three short-range systems: the Oghab, the Shahm-2, and the Nazeat.

Though militarily insignificant during the Iran-Iraq War due to its short range and small warhead size, the Oghab signalled a growing trend towards indigenous weapons capabilities in the developing world. As Seth Carus commented in 1990, only Iran and Israel are known to have placed indigenously designed missiles into service. Later, Iran developed a 130-mile range SSM known as the IRAN-130 which was first fired against Iraq in 1988.²⁶

In addition to its indigenous efforts, Iran has turned to other developing countries for assistance in producing and obtaining new SSMs. As the former USSR under Mikhail Gorbachev became less willing to aid Iran, North Korea became a greater military trading partner. In late 1988, a secret North Korean-Iranian military commission was established to encourage military cooperation between the two countries. By early 1990, this new relationship was reflected in Iran's purchase of 20 Scud-Bs.²⁷ Following a second set of negotiations in late 1990, North Korean military technical advisers began arriving in Iran and as Steven Emerson of *The Wall*



²⁵ Cordesman and Wagner, 230. The Oghab is 230mm diameter, 4820mm long, weighs 320kg and carries a 70kg warhead. Iran also has displayed another rocket known as "Nazeat" which is 355mm in diameter, 590mm long, weighs 950kg and has a 180kg warhead. (see footnote 44 on page 524 in Cordesman and Wagner.) Also see W. Seth Carus, 20-21.

²⁶ Cordesman and Wagner, 367. The IRAN-130, however, was not produced in large numbers due to its poor accuracy and unreliability.

²⁷ Emerson, *The Wall Street Journal*, 12.


Street Journal, claims, the North Koreans began converting a missile maintenance facility into a missile production site. ²⁸

The North Korean-Iranian military cooperation extends even further. North Korea has been training Iranian technicians at North Korean missile production and launch facilities. According to Emerson's article, western intelligence agencies know Scud-C missile parts have arrived in Iran from North Korea as well. In May 1991, U.S. satellites confirmed this fact by tracking a Scud-C launch from Iran. The value of the arms deal between the two countries appears to be approximately \$3 billion, which the Iranians are paying for with oil.

Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction:

Iran still is coping with the Ayatollah Khomeini's anti-modernization campaign of 1979. ²⁹ Though a reversal of policy came in 1981 following Iraq's invasion of Iran, the Iran-Iraq War hampered Iranian attempts to restart nuclear power and weapons projects. ³⁰ The one exception was the Teheran Nuclear Research Center where most of the Iranian specialists remained.

In 1984, a new nuclear research center was established at Isfahon ³¹ and work on the Bushehr plant was restarted. In 1987, Iran concluded a \$5.5 million contract with Argentina to receive non-weapons grade enriched uranium fuel for their research reactor in Teheran. ³² In late 1989, construction began on a plant for producing uranium concentrate from uranium ore in Iran's Yazd province and new plants have been reported under development.



²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ All work on the Bushehr nuclear power plant and the Darkhouin reactor site ended and many Iranian technicians fled the country.

³⁰ There were at least seven attacks on Iranian nuclear projects during the war, see Cordesman, *Weapons*, 105.

³¹ In June 1990, the Chinese formalized a cooperative agreement to develop a small research reactor at Isfahon. (see Sciolino, *The New York Times*, 31 Oct 1991, A7).

³² Spector, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989-90: Nuclear Ambitions*, 207.

Iran has turned to numerous countries to restart construction of its 50-75 percent complete nuclear plant at Bushehr. In February 1990, a Spanish newspaper reported that a Spanish firm was involved in negotiations to complete two nuclear power plants at Bushehr.³³ The following month, the USSR and South Korea were alleged to be considering work on nuclear power plants in Iran.³⁴ Apparently none of these negotiations succeeded. In July 1991, the German Economics Minister Juergen Moellemann visited Teheran, where a joint working group to study the issue of the Bushehr nuclear plant was discussed.³⁵ Iran has also sought assistance from India, Pakistan, Brazil,³⁶ and France.

More recently, China's assistance with Iran's nuclear warhead program has caused considerable concern in the West. U.S. intelligence officials believe that China has provided Iran with the necessary equipment to produce a nuclear bomb.³⁷ Since June 1990, top Chinese scientists have been training Iranian technicians and scientists and recently, American officials learned that China had provided Iran with a calutron.³⁸



³³ Cordesman, *Weapons*, 106.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ "Paper Urges FRG to Complete Nuclear Plant," Teheran IRNA in English, 0703 GMT, 2 Jul 1991, in FBIS-NES-91-129, 2 Jul 1991, 49. It remains unclear whether the Germans will continue work or not. See "Bushehr Nuclear Plant to Be Completed," Teheran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network in Persian, 0930 GMT, 17 Sep 1991, in FBIS-NES-91-180, 17 Sep 1991, 67-68. Also see "Second Official Denies Iran Seeking Nuclear Arms," Beijing Xinhua in English, 0121 GMT, 7 Nov 1991, in FBIS-CHI-91-216, 7 Nov 1991, 20.

³⁶ Iran is seeking German nuclear technology which Brazil possesses. However, treaties between Brazil and Germany forbid transfer of nuclear technology without Germany's acceptance. (see FRG Nuclear Technology From Brazil Sought," Berlin ADN in German, 0204 GMT, 3 Dec 1991, in FBIS-NES-91-232, 3 Dec 1991, 41.)

³⁷ R Jeffrey Smith, "Teheran Nuclear Buildup is Cited," from *The Washington Post* appearing in *The Boston Globe*, 30 Oct 1991, 2. See also *The Wall Street Journal*, 31 Oct 1991, 1, and Elaine Sciolino, "Report Says Iran Seeks Atomic Arms," *The New York Times*, 31 Oct 1991, 42.

³⁸ Sciolino, A7. Louise Lief with Stephen J. Hedges, "The Growing Nuclear Fold," *US News and World Report*, 25 Nov 1991, 42.

Though the calutron may be used for peaceful purposes, Elaine Sciolino states that some U.S. officials are concerned that the Iranians will try to copy the calutron and mass produce it for weapons purposes.³⁹ The Chinese appear to be involved in another project with the Iranians to modify Silkworm missiles to carry nuclear warheads.⁴⁰

In 1987, CIA Director William Webster warned that Iran had a chemical weapons capability which included mustard gas and blood agents.⁴¹ According to Anthony Cordesman, Iran's chemical weapons material and technology have come from a variety of countries including India, North Korea, Germany, and China.⁴² Some of these same countries are aiding Iran in developing ballistic missile systems which are capable of carrying chemical weapons. Iran's leaders have made no effort to conceal their interests in chemical and biological weapons.

Since enduring widespread chemical attacks by Iraq, Iran has continued to prepare for future chemical warfare.⁴³ Though far more questionable, there is some evidence that Iran is undertaking a biological weapons program to accompany its nuclear and chemical development programs.⁴⁴

GENERAL TRENDS

The proliferation trends in Syria, Israel, and Iran indicate that



³⁹ Sciolino, A7. Calutrons are used to enrich uranium.

⁴⁰ "Iran's Reach for a Nuclear Sword," *The Boston Globe* (editorial), 13 Nov 1991, 18. "Baghdad Paper: China Supplying Enriched Uranium," In *Baghdad Al-Iraq* in Arabic, 9 Nov 1991, 1 and 7, in FBIS-NES-91-219, 13 Nov 1991, 54-55.

⁴¹ Cordesman, *Weapons*, 83. Blood agents include hydrogen cyanide, phosgene gas, and/or chlorine gas. Some of these chemical munitions were used by Iran during the last two years of the Iran-Iraq War. See Cordesman and Wagner, 513.

⁴² Cordesman, *Weapons*, 84.


⁴³ See "Exercises Simulate Chemical Attack," Teheran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network in Persian, 1630 GMT, 18 Nov 1991, in FBIS-NES-91-223, 19 Nov 1991, 52.

⁴⁴ See Cordesman, *Weapons*, 84, and Cordesman and Wagner, 513.

efforts to control the proliferation of missiles and NBC technology continue to fall short. There is a growing readiness in developing countries to cooperate among themselves in order to circumvent the developed countries' control regimes. These cooperative ventures, it is important to note, are not only regional arrangements, but truly worldwide in scope.

Further advances in science and technology, both in the developed and developing world, will create possibilities for deadlier weapons from an ever-increasing variety of sources. Missile technology and advanced weapons systems which were once the exclusive domain of the U.S. and the USSR, are now being produced in the Third World. This trend is likely to continue and expand in the future.

The current delivery of North Korean Scud-Cs to Syria, India and Israel's satellite launches, Pakistan's nuclear warhead program, Israel's ATBM efforts and significant nuclear arsenal, and Iran and Syria's open desire for a nuclear capability are all signs that a rapidly changing security environment is unfolding in the 1990s. Combined with other possible improvements, such as maneuverable ballistic missiles equipped with improved inertial guidance, preprogrammed courses, or ground controlled steering,⁴⁵ and use of advanced inertial navigation systems (INS) that make SSMs extremely accurate, the U.S. and its allies face some daunting possible conflict scenarios for the future.⁴⁶ In addition to improved SSMs, new weapons systems such as the cruise missile may become an integral part of developing countries' arsenals.⁴⁷ According to some military experts, cruise missiles are less complex, cheaper, and more accurate than SSMs.⁴⁸ With access to



⁴⁵ George Leopold, "Future Missiles Will Outpace Scuds," *Defense News*, 4 Feb 1991, 38. Also see Seth Carus interview in *Defense News*, 4 Feb 1991, 46.

⁴⁶ Mahnken and Hoyt, 256.

⁴⁷ Seth Carus believes the cruise missile will create the greatest danger in the 1990s. Carus, 65.

⁴⁸ Mahnken and Hoyt, 256. Cruise missiles do have some negative qualities: they are slower than ballistic missiles and can be intercepted by SAMs. Also Carus, 39.


new technologies, such as the Global Positioning System (GPS), Third World countries will have a means of delivering these missiles with very high accuracies. According to Seth Carus, GPS receivers cost only a few thousand dollars and refine cruise missiles accuracies to within 100 meters of the intended target.⁴⁹

The triumvirate of Syria-Israel-Iran may be the best index of how quickly and in what form proliferation efforts will manifest themselves in the 1990s. Syria and Israel remain deadlocked in a spiraling arms race which neither country can afford, and yet neither can unilaterally choose to halt without a peace agreement. In many ways, it is Syria's ally, Iran, that sits in the enviable position of rising power in the region. Just how the Islamic nation decides to position itself militarily will have significant repercussions for Israel, Syria, most of the Gulf nations and the U.S. If present trends are any indication, SSMs and weapons of mass destruction will play a major role in Iran's attempt to reassert itself in the Persian Gulf region.

THE MARINE CORPS AND THE NEW STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

In light of this global dispersion of advanced weapons technologies and the diffusion of potential threats likely to confront the U.S. in the future, the proven power projection capability of the Marine Corps faces more daunting challenges than at virtually any point in its history. While no change in doctrine or employment techniques can completely nullify the impact of the emerging weapons technologies that have come to dominate military conflict, operational and doctrinal innovations can limit setbacks and losses.

Doctrinally, the Marine Corps has turned to the concept of maneuver warfare, as set forth in *FMFM-1, Warfighting*, as the approach best-suited for conditions expected to prevail on the modern battlefield. The emphasis on maneuver has been adopted as



⁴⁹ Carus, 39.

the optimal means for depriving an opponent of massed targets for high-tech weapons and for avoiding needless battles of attrition against a numerically superior enemy. The application of this approach entails an emphasis on surprise, rapid strikes, multiple simultaneous attacks, flanking maneuvers, exploitation of vulnerabilities, and psychological operations to destroy the moral and physical balance of an enemy.⁵⁰ A primary aim of these techniques is to neutralize the effectiveness of high-threat weapons without necessarily having to destroy every delivery system or every weapons canister.

The concept involves moving so swiftly and decisively that the enemies' will to fight collapses in the face of an overwhelming display of U.S. mobility and firepower. Confronted with a fait accompli of American forces to its front, along its flanks, and in its rear area, a wavering enemy force could be expected to opt for surrender over pitched battle. *FMFM-1, Warfighting* underscores the philosophical distance between maneuver warfare and the historically-preeminent notion of attrition:

The object of maneuver is not so much to destroy physically as it is to shatter the enemy's cohesion, organization, command, and psychological balance. Successful maneuver depends on the ability to identify and exploit enemy weakness, not simply on the expenditure of superior might.⁵¹

In the Gulf War, the philosophy of maneuver warfare was operationalized with stunning efficiency by the Marine Corps. The 1st and 2d Divisions executed offensive thrusts at poorly defended points near the center of the Iraqi line in Kuwait and captured or destroyed far larger enemy forces. Commenting on this operation, one Marine general provided a capsule of maneuver warfare's essence with his statement that, "Our focus was not on destroying

⁵⁰ LtCol G. I. Wilson, "The Gulf War, Maneuver Warfare, and the Operational Art," *Marine Corps Gazette*, June 1991, 23.


⁵¹ U.S. Marine Corps, *FMFM-1, Warfighting*, Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1989, 29.

everything. Our focus was on the Iraqi mind and getting in behind them.”⁵²

Another effective aspect of Marine employment techniques in the Gulf lay in the preparation for amphibious assaults into Kuwait. While such operations were eventually ruled out because of the delays attendant on mine-clearing operations along the coast, the mere prospect of such an attack forced a major diversion of Iraqi forces to guard against a seafront landing. The success of this diversion underscored the multi-dimensional strength of the Marine Corps, with its capacity to conduct land, sea, and air operations with equal effect. British historian B.H. Liddell-Hart was struck by this diversity of function and believed the Marines merited the title of a three-in-one Service.⁵³

Yet even this capacity to keep an opponent off-balance through multiple avenues of attack does not eliminate the vulnerability of amphibious forces at sea. The unavoidable concentration of amphibious forces on naval vessels for transport and deployment purposes leaves them open to attack by high-tech guided munitions, by SSMs, and even by relatively primitive defensive systems such as mines. Increasingly, the developing world's efforts to acquire sophisticated weapons systems has permitted it to target specific military concentrations with disruptive accuracy, posing a significant obstacle to Marine amphibious forces.

To counter this threat, the Marines have developed operational techniques to minimize the exposure of amphibious task forces (ATF) to advanced weapons systems and increase the weight of uncertainty in the minds of enemy planners attempting to discern the focal point of an attack. The major innovation in this arena has been the development and refinement of an over-the-horizon capability. This technique allows ships to remain beyond the easy reach of enemy shore and air defenses while permitting rapid de-



⁵² Wilson, 24.

⁵³ B.H. Liddell-Hart, "Marines and Strategy," *Marine Corps Gazette*, May 1990, 25 (reprint of an article from July 1960).

ployment of amphibious forces ashore by helicopters and air-cushioned landing craft (LCAC).


The increased flexibility and force protection provided by an over-the-horizon orientation is suggested in the following description of capabilities by Bernard Trainor:

To put the modern landing in perspective, consider that a modern Marine amphibious force equipped with helicopters and LCACs and embarked in 20-knot amphibious shipping located 50 miles off Norfolk can overnight move and land anywhere from Myrtle Beach, SC, to Montauk Point on Long Island and never once appear on the horizon beforehand. ⁵⁴

More broadly, the U.S. military establishment in the past decade has placed greater emphasis on joint operations and phased deployments in order to highlight the strengths and offset the vulnerabilities of individual Services. The sequencing of military elements into a theater can be accomplished in a complementary manner so that differing capabilities reinforce and bolster one another, rather than compete for preeminence.

Thus, the Marines are expected to benefit in the accomplishment of their mission objectives not only from their longstanding association with the Navy but also from their operation in an environment where the Air Force has suppressed high-tech air and ground threats and the Army has provided an array of units to reinforce and augment the capabilities of Marine enabling forces.

The coordination of assets underlying this approach rests on combined arms principles which have been espoused by the Marine Corps for years. Further, the cooperation of interservice forces essential to success in combat have been clearly recognized by the



⁵⁴ LtGen Bernard Trainor, USMC(Ret), "A Force 'Employment' Capability," *Marine Corps Gazette*, May 1990, 36.

command structure of the Marine Corps and have received validation in the Gulf War. As one Marine officer observed:

For those who arrived in the Gulf in late August, the follow-on arrival of the 24th Infantry Division caused a large sigh of relief. And few Marines saw the Army VII Corps taking on the Republican Guards in southern Iraq as a threat to Marine roles and missions.⁵⁵

In a similar vein, the Marines will benefit from the deployment of anti-tactical ballistic missiles (ATBMs) and other theater/tactical missile defenses that result from research and development efforts now being conducted under the auspices of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization and the Army. These efforts are expected to culminate in an advanced theater missile defense system by 1996. Such systems will provide cover for all theater forces located under their protective umbrella.

In circumstances short of actual combat, the ability of the Marines to loiter at sea in the geographical vicinity of crisis points is another valuable characteristic. Naval deployment permits a rapid response but positions forces beyond the reach of terrorist or state-controlled weapons of mass destruction.

In addition, the positioning of amphibious forces in international waters reduces the potential for such forces to inflame a delicate regional balance or become a provocation in and of themselves, as might occur if they were deployed ashore prematurely. Given the sensitivity of many developing world leaders to the stationing of American forces within their borders, maritime basing can provide the proper balance between respect for these nationalist concerns and the need to safeguard the interests of the U.S. with rapid reaction forces.

In all, the challenges posed by the build-up of advanced delivery systems and weapons of mass destruction in unstable regions of the



⁵⁵ R. Scott Moore, "The Army Plans Its Future," *Marine Corps Gazette*, January 1992, 49.

world is a matter of serious concern but not a cause for despair. Acquisition does not imply the necessary skill to use these systems effectively nor does it supply the willingness to use such weapons in a rash or abrupt manner. This observation is especially true in a situation where regional leaders recognize that they could very likely be confronting U.S. military forces which have demonstrated an awesome mastery of the destructiveness of high-tech weapons systems.

The Marine Corps has recognized this ambivalence in potential opponents and has accordingly aligned its operational doctrines to exploit the moral factor in combat through maneuver warfare. But the Marines do not simply count on the forbearance of hostile forces; they have also instituted deployment techniques which physically safeguard their forces in the event that such high-tech weapons are used against them. Such innovations, while not fool-proof and certainly subject to refinement, will nonetheless reinforce the continuing importance of the Marine Corps to U.S. national security strategy even as the severity of the threat posed by missile technologies and weapons of mass destruction increases in the years ahead.



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Editorial Policy *Perspectives on Warfighting*

The Marine Corps University's *Perspectives on Warfighting* is a series of occasional papers, edited by The Marine Corps University, funded by the Marine Corps Command and Staff College Foundation, and published by the Marine Corps Association.

Funding and publication is available to scholars whose proposals are accepted based on their scholastic and experiential backgrounds and fulfillment of our editorial policy requirements. We require: (1) a focus on warfighting (2) relevance to the combat mission of the Marine Corps (3) a basis of combat history and (4) high standard of scholarly research and writing.

The Marine Corps University's *Perspectives on Warfighting* will be studies of the art of war. History must be the basis of all study of war because history is the record of success and failure. It is through the study of that record that we may deduce our tactics, operational art, and strategy for the future. Yet, though the basis of the series *Perspectives on Warfighting* is always history, they are not papers about history. They are papers about warfare, through which we may learn and prepare to fight.

Preface

The Marine Corps University continues its series of scholarly papers on warfighting with the publishing of this two-volume set entitled *Perspectives of Warfighting, Number Two*.

These papers are written by distinguished participants of the 1991 Conference on Naval Expeditionary Forces and Power Projection which was conducted at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Tufts University) and co-sponsored by the Marine Corps University and the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis.

Volume One discusses the nature of conflict, emerging threats, and U.S. national security interests; forward deployed strategy and forces; and naval expeditionary forces, power projection, and combat missions. Volume Two continues with papers addressing naval expeditionary forces, power projection, and stability missions, and concludes with the 21st century and naval expeditionary forces: developing issues and constraining factors.

Introduction

The observation that events in the world unfold faster than the ability to forge doctrinal adjustments would certainly seem to hold true in today's strategic environment. The edifice of the Cold War shuddered and then collapsed suddenly after two generations of virtually unremitting crisis and conflict. In its wake, the fixed reference points of U.S. national security policy have shifted dramatically. With no overarching opponent against which to focus strategic doctrine or to justify force structure and weapons procurement plans, U.S. policymakers must fashion a new national security strategy against a backdrop of ambiguous threats and diffuse challenges.

In an effort to contribute to this reshaping of U.S. national security doctrine and force structure, the international security studies program of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University has sponsored over the last three years, an annual colloquium to focus on the future status of each of the major military services. This two-volume publication of *Perspectives on Warfighting* is a product of the most recent conference in this series, which addressed the roles and missions of naval expeditionary forces into the 21st century. The conference was co-sponsored by the Marine Corps University and the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis and brought together experts and leading thinkers of the Marine Corps and naval expeditionary forces from the military, academia, the business sector and the press. Selected conference papers have been edited and published herein because of the valuable insight and contribution they make to the debate on future force structure and strategic priorities.

While limited space does not permit a detailed recounting of all conclusions reached at this conference, a brief capsule of the underlined and recurring theme of the papers warrants emphasis: the Marine Corps, which has always taken pride in its structuring as a "Force-in-Readiness," fills a valuable gap in the military continu-

um between home-based U.S. reaction forces and permanently deployed forward troops. With its flexible task organization and its integrated combined arms structure, a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) can provide a quick response to most regional contingencies. While the MAGTF can be deployed by air, sea, or a combination thereof, the critical value of this force is its close association with the U. S. Navy and its strong amphibious credentials.

The starting point of any U.S. strategic analysis must recognize that this country, regardless of the configuration of power and threats confronting it will remain a nation bounded by oceans, with considerable maritime interests, both economic and military. As an extension of the naval arm, the Marine Corps provides critical amphibious capability which can rapidly augment the U.S. presence in a region for the purposes of deterrence, compellence, defense, or simply "showing the flag." This amphibious capacity has provided, in the words of the late British historian B. H. Liddell-Hart, "the greatest strategic asset that a sea-based power possesses ... the U.S. Marine Corps is the best kind of fire extinguisher, because of its flexibility, reliability, logistic simplicity, and relative economy."


With the mission that it fulfills, the Marine Corps will accompany an important place in the array of military forces fielded by the United States well into the future. This two-volume publication provides a variety of perspectives on how the Marines can continue to discharge its vital duties in an era of limited resources and projected military cutbacks.

In organizing the conference and this publication, we gratefully acknowledge the support of General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., Commandant, USMC; General Alfred M. Gray, former Commandant, USMC; General Joseph P. Hoar, USMC, Commander of Central Command, who agreed to provide indispensable financial support for this undertaking; Brigadier General Peter Pace, USMC, currently serving as the President, Marine Corps University; and the Marine Corps Command and Staff College Foundation who agreed to publish the conference papers.

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Section I

Naval Expeditionary Forces, Power Projection, and Stability Missions

The wholesale transformation of the international setting has modified the conditions under which combat missions will be pursued, as outlined in the previous section, but the extent of change does not end there. Stability missions, which will increasingly occur in circumstances which overlap with those of low intensity conflict, will most likely grow in importance and frequency. Dr. Richard Shultz addresses three questions arising in this context: One, what are the parameters of the international security environment of the years ahead? Two, what strategic concepts should guide the international security policy of the U.S. in the post-Cold War era? Three, how can naval expeditionary forces support these new strategic concepts?

The author observes that the present era is likely to be characterized by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles in the developing world, a continued buildup of conventional capabilities, and a focus on regional security problems. In conceptual terms, future unrest will remain at the low end of the spectrum of conflict, ranging from regional limited conventional war to ethno-nationalistic strife.

While four categories encompass the functions served by the use of force (defense, deterrence, compellence, and swaggering), compellence/power projection and peacetime engagement will move to the forefront in projected U.S. security designs. Peacetime engagement missions will be growing in importance as the U.S. seeks to establish new bilateral and multilateral arrangements to

regional stability. The presence of forward deployed forces and capabilities and the conduct of joint and combined exercises will be important to solidify these arrangements.

Within this context, Marine expeditionary forces are configured and oriented to make an important contribution. A MAGTF provides a flexible combined-arms force that can be deployed rapidly and can be sustained from a sea base. The MAGTF thereby provides a compellent/power projection capability for maritime operations across a significant portion of the spectrum of conflict. Just as important, MAGTFs possess a capacity for special operations, can be resupplied by Maritime Prepositioned Forces, and exploit the combat concepts of maneuver and surprise.

LtGen Henry Stackpole, USMC, underscores the need for naval forces in a multipolar world as a critical element of U.S. national security strategy. Daily presence, political reinforcement, crisis control, intervention forces, freedom of action and a forcible entry option for the vast majority of the earth's relevant surface constitute essential elements in the implementation of U.S. strategy.

The most influential and useful application of U.S. forces in the emerging security environment is a consciously fashioned political instrument applied in sophisticated combinations with other elements of national power -- the leading edge of diplomacy in a sense. Naval forces are and have been uniquely suited to this role, but their effectiveness depends on their proximity to points of friction. There is always an undeniable cost in maintaining a global crisis response capability, even in peacetime. Yet its worth to the U.S. far exceeds its cost since our history, according to the author, is a record of late response to international crises which result in the expenditure of much national treasure for cure rather than for prevention of such crises.

The U.S. remains a maritime nation relying on sea lanes of communication for commerce and economic vitality. Economically, foreign affairs remain critically linked to the domestic welfare. Desert Storm received the majority of media attention during the early part of this year. Although this military sequence was important to

U.S. national interests, other significant events demonstrated a versatile, flexible force capable not only of "power projection," but "assistance projection." These less publicized elements of naval activity included humanitarian actions in the Philippines, northern Iraq, and Bangladesh as well as evacuations of American citizens from Liberia and Somalia.

Ambassador Thomas Pickering examines stability missions within the broader context of international coalition-building as required by his position as U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations. He observes that the new world order does not entail a surrender of U.S. sovereignty or a forfeiture of U.S. interests, but outlines new international channels through which to deter aggression as well as achieve peace and stability. In this regard, the U.S. is concerned with safeguarding two categories of interests: core security interests and values and principles that form international civil society.

The role of the U.N. Security Council in furthering these goals is not all-encompassing or exclusive; even in the U.N. Charter, regional organizations are explicitly granted authority to resolve threats to peace and security before resorting to the Security Council. As is evident in the Middle East and Yugoslavia, regional stability is shaped primarily by parochial issues which may not easily succumb to U.N. problem-solving or may unfold entirely as a matter of internal concern. There exists little consensus today on what conditions would justify intervention in the solely domestic affairs of another state. For this reason it is unlikely that international law will quickly mature to provide assured external guarantees for minority rights or democratically elected governments.

From a realistic perspective, U.S. pursuit of foreign policy objectives cannot be bound to an explicit grant of U.N. authority at all times. At best, the U.N. can deliver part of the solution through enhancement of legitimacy and flexibility of operations. But great strides need to be taken in defining individual nation responsibilities in terms of troop allocations, materiel, command authority, and Military Staff Committee participation.

David Nicholls looks at the issue of future collective security cooperation from a European standpoint. He asserts that the Western European habit of working together and with the U.S. in many fields of politico-military endeavor is deep-rooted, but problems have arisen in fashioning collective responses to challenges beyond the NATO area. European members of NATO have been much more willing to take part in peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the United Nations than in NATO-sanctioned operations. This same reluctance manifested itself in the recent Gulf War where European states coordinated their actions through the Western European Union rather than through NATO.

Yet, there is still a role for collective defense as defined in NATO's new strategy, in that this also remains the principal basis for legitimizing national defense forces. Thus, NATO will continue to serve two vital functions: defining national force levels of Western European members of the Alliance; and providing a pool from which to draw forces for duties beyond the NATO area.

In terms of European naval expeditionary forces, the author believes that Britain and France have the political will to retain such forces, even with limited capabilities for autonomous action. Neither country is willing to foreclose any options in the naval field which might compromise their residual interests, their status, or their national pride.

Compellence and Escalation Control: The Value of Visible Forward Deployed Forces

Dr. Richard Shultz

INTRODUCTION

With the end of the Cold War, the international system has entered a period of great change. It is the third such occurrence in this century, the first two following WWI and WWII. With the end of each of these global conflicts, it has been widely assumed that the world would enter an era of peace and an end to conflict. Nations could then redirect their energies and spending priorities from defense and security to an array of other issues including economic development, natural resources, energy, food and population, and environment.

Consider the following predications found in both popular and scholarly publications as the 1980s came to a close. Changes in the international system were believed to point to the decline in the utility of military power and the use of force. This was a bold prognosis based on the assumption that the destructiveness of modern weapons made their use increasingly clumsy, highly lethal and hardly cost effective. These arguments were not new and variations of them were proposed following WWI and WWII.

The disutility of military power was part of a major change in the essence and structure of international politics brought about by the disintegration of superpower hegemony and the emergence of a multipolar-pluralistic international regime. In this new structure the relations among nations, it was postulated, were changing from those marked by conflicting national interests and independence to those characterized by economic interdependence, common interests, and

transnational cooperation. With changes in the modes of conflict and the sources of friction, non-security issues -- economics, resources, energy and the environment -- were growing in importance, as security and military power recedes. A global paradigm, rather than a state-centric one, was viewed as in ascendancy.

This optimism, at least temporarily, was undermined by Iraq's seizure of Kuwait and the war that followed. Indeed, following the war, the debate over the place and utility of military power shifted. The questions now center on what kinds of military capabilities the U.S. will require in the years ahead and what overarching strategic concepts should guide their development and employment. However, with the failure of the coup in the Soviet Union and that country's rapid dissolution the pre-Gulf War arguments discussed above have also resurfaced in the debate over U.S. international security policy.

With this as prologue, the following issues are addressed: One, what are the likely parameters of the international security environment of the years ahead and to what extent will change coincide with stability? Two, what strategic concepts should guide United States' international security policy and strategy in the post-Cold War era? For over four decades containment and deterrence served this purpose. What should replace them? Three, how can naval expeditionary forces support these new strategic concepts and requirements?

THE POST-COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The international security environment that existed since the latter half of the 1940s has come to an end. The failed coup in the Soviet Union was that country's death knell. However, while a new era has begun to unfold, it is unclear to what extent it will be characterized by stability, new forms of conflict, or both concurrently. Certainly, it was ironic that in the midst of discussions over the peace dividend, the U.S. fought a major war.

What these two divergent events signal is an emerging international system that will experience stability and instability in the

years ahead, within the larger context of uncertainty that has accompanied systemic change in the past.¹ Recent trends point in these contradictory directions. For example, with the collapse of the Soviet threat to the West and the end to its domination of Eastern Europe, core issues of the Cold War have been resolved and stability should ensue. It will, in terms of the security issues that dominated East-West relations since the late 1940s. However, even in this region, new forms of instability have already emerged. Will the ethnonationalistic conflict in Yugoslavia spread elsewhere in Eastern Europe and even to the Soviet Union as it unravels?

Likewise, since the latter half of the 1980s, regional conflicts in Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and elsewhere have come to an end. There also has been an upsurge of democratically inspired movements challenging authoritarian regimes in various parts of the developing world. Additionally, incipient democracies also give rise to previously repressed ethnic hostilities. Each of these events contributes to regional stability. At the same time, a major war took place in the Gulf, the Chinese government crushed the democratic movement in China, and various forms of low intensity conflict continued to occur in the Third World.

What does this signal for the international security environment of the 1990s and beyond? On the one hand, it will hold opportunities to enhance and expand stability. The end of the Cold War provides options that should be pursued. On the other hand, it is equally important to recognize that during periods of great change, conflict and the use of military power are also realities. Furthermore, these dangers will be more ambiguous and difficult to plan for due to the uncertainty of the years ahead.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and bid for regional hegemony dem-



¹ A good example of the extent of uncertainty in periods of great international systemic change is the 1920s and early 1930s. Who could have predicted the far-reaching changes and global threats that eventually emerged. Indeed, it was believed that the world had entered a new age and no real threats to international stability were even remotely possible. This is not to suggest that anything comparable to what did transpire at the end of the 1930s is likely to occur in the future. Our point is that change and stability is only one possible alternative international future.

onstrated that the end of the Cold War did not alter for all nations certain enduring and historically based approaches to power and the use of force. While some states will eschew military means in the name of higher principles in the years ahead, it is likely that others will not. Thus, the efficacy of military power will remain an arbiter when states disagree. While the rationale for its use and the ways in which it is employed will assume new forms that are not yet clear, the resort to military force, as Clausewitz observed long ago, will remain an instrument of statecraft.

As we look to the years ahead, what developments are likely to contribute to the possibility of crisis and instability? Several emerging trends can be discerned.

PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Over the last two decades the worldwide proliferation of arms has been a major factor contributing to regional instability. Many nations in the developing world have acquired a range of advanced weapons in significant quantities. It is likely that we will continue to see the diffusion of sophisticated weaponry to various regions of the world.


Within this context, most worrisome is the proliferation of mass destruction weapons. Most of the Cold War period was marked by essential nuclear bipolarity with a limited number of other stable states possessing nuclear capabilities. The years ahead will see increasing nuclear multipolarity, with proliferation by at least three states -- Iran, Iraq, and North Korea -- that may seek regional hegemony. Although it was defeated in the Gulf War, Iraq endeavors to conceal and preserve its nuclear weapons-related facilities for the future, even as the United Nations takes steps to rid Baghdad of them.

However, what the UN has uncovered thus far in Iraq reveals several disquieting facts. First, Iraq was much closer to the production of a nuclear weapon than the U.S. government predicted,

which put it at as near as five to ten years in the future.² Second, despite its status as a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iraq covertly carried out an impressive nuclear weapons program. Finally, Baghdad took advantage of clandestine nuclear-related transfers from suppliers in the West to advance its program. Each of these developments points to the difficulty of preventing proliferation.

As we entered the 1990s, 12 nations -- Israel, Libya, Brazil, Argentina, South Korea, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Taiwan, South Africa, and India -- have either achieved *de facto* nuclear weapon status or taken important steps in that direction.³ Other states, like Algeria, strive to join their ranks. These developments are taking place in regions of the world with deeply ingrained and long term hostilities.

In addition to nuclear weapons, the last decade also saw the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons (CBW). Furthermore, during the Iran-Iraq War, chemical weapons, produced domestically, were employed in combat by Baghdad with regularity. According to an Iranian report, Iraq first used chemical weapons in 1983, and "subsequently employed them on 195 additional occasions before hostilities ceased, with the number of chemical attacks increasing during 1987 and 1988."⁴ Why Iraq did not use its chemical weapons during the Gulf War is uncertain. While they probably could not have employed aircraft due to coalition air superiority, the delivery of chemical weapons by artillery was an option.⁵ It is estimated that during the current decade between 15-20 states will acquire a CBW capability and the means to deliver them.



² See "Testimony of Reginald Bartholomew, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology," Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., May 18, 1989.

³ Leonard S. Spector, *Nuclear Ambitions* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), Part I.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 189.

⁵ For an interesting discussion of several hypotheses see The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 1990-1991* (London: Brassey's, 1991), pp. 76-78.

BALLISTIC MISSILES IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

U.N. inspection teams have reported that "Iraq had 30 Scud missiles fitted with chemical warheads ... designed to explode on impact." They did not use them, according to the report, "due to the dangers of moving warheads under heavy fire."⁶ Chemical weapons delivered by ballistic missiles provide states with terror weapons that can be used beyond the battlefield against unprotected cities.

Janne Nolan has observed that "in the late 1980s, ballistic missiles became the currency of a new international security environment, as a number of developing countries heralded their entry into the missile age." She points out that most of those who are acquiring this capability are "in regions of chronic tension."⁷ Both Iran and Iraq used missiles against one another's cities during their eight-year war. Such a precedent was not encouraging and Iraq employed ballistic missiles in the same way against Israel and Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War.

Currently, 16 nations in the Third World have ballistic missiles in their inventories and, as Spector points out, "a number of disturbing developments in the area of missile proliferation took place during 1989 and the first half of 1990."⁸ These include: One, "a number of developing countries ... fully integrating such systems into their military forces." Two, these states continue to "extend the [range] of their missiles." Three, "missile transfers -- involving complete systems, as well as components and technology -- have continued apace, despite the efforts of a number of countries to stem the flow through the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)." Finally, several Third World states, who are the



⁶ Holly Porteous, "Ridding Iraq of CW to Take Two Years," *Jane's Defense Weekly* (September 28, 1991), p. 557.

⁷ Janne Nolan, "Missile Mania: Some Rules for the Game," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (May 1990), p. 27. Also see Seth Carus, "Missiles in the Middle East: A New Threat to Stability," *Policy Focus: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy* (June 1988).

⁸ Spector, *Nuclear Ambitions*, p. 24.

object of the MTCR, are finding ways to “cooperate on the development and production of surface-to-surface missiles.”⁹

CONTINUED BUILDUP OF CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES

The international security environment of the 1990s will also continue to experience conventional arms proliferation. During the 1970s-1980s, this allowed at least 15 Third World nations to develop large and modern conventional armies based on a heavy armored division concept. For example, in the Middle East, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Syria achieved this status.¹⁰

Each of these powers also has modern combat aircraft including F-4s, F-14s, F-15s, F-16s, Mirages, Tornados, Mig-23s, Mig-25s, and Mig-29s. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, several states in the region are preparing to expand the size and quality of their air forces. *Jane's Defense Weekly* has recently reported that in the “run up to the Dubi Air Show ... Middle East air forces” have compiled extensive shopping lists “to replace aging aircraft as well as [to] expand their force structure as a shield against future aggressors ... The replacement market is led by Saudi Arabia.”¹¹

Additionally, many Third World regimes have “smart” weapons like the Exocet cruise missile in their inventories. This is but one of a class of “first generation” precision-guided munitions (PGM) which are appearing in the arsenals of Third World states. It was an Exocet that demolished the *H.M.S. Sheffield* during the Falklands War and damaged the *U.S.S. Stark* in 1987.¹² During



⁹ Ibid., p. 25.

¹⁰ See U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1989); Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures 1989* (Washington, DC: World Priorities, 1989); Rodney Jones and Steven Hildreth, *Modern Weapons and Third World Powers* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984); and Shlomo Gazit, ed., *The Middle East Military Balance 1988-1989* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989).

¹¹ “Middle East Promise,” *Jane's Defense Weekly* (October 26, 1991), p. 767.

¹² For a discussion of the transfer of “smart” weapons to Third World states see Paul Walker, “High-Tech Killing Power,” *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (May 1990), pp. 23-26.


the Soviet-Afghan War, as one specialist has observed, the "Stinger was the war's decisive weapon -- it changed the nature of combat." Stinger missiles denied the Soviets domination of the skies and "demonstrated that control of the air environment is as vital in low intensity conflict as in higher intensity warfare."¹³

Furthermore, several Third World states can now domestically design and produce one or more of the following major categories of weapons -- armored vehicles, aircraft, naval vessels, and missiles. "Eight Third World nations," as Andrew Ross has documented, "are now able to design and produce all four types." These include Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, Taiwan, South Africa, India, Israel, and Egypt. He also points out that "eight more countries are producing at least two or three of the four types of conventional arms: Chile, Columbia, Indonesia, Mexico, North Korea, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand."¹⁴ This will contribute to the diffusion of military power to various regions of the developing world and make the resort to force, even in the face of opposition from a major power, a more attractive option.

Finally, in the aftermath of the Gulf War it appears that the acquisition of the most advanced "smart" weapons will accelerate as the nations of the Middle East embark on a new phase of the arms race. Precision munitions were of strategic importance in achieving the coalition's war objectives. Command bunkers, aircraft shelters, and other protected military targets were penetrated and destroyed with surgical accuracy. The performance of these weapons was displayed worldwide by CNN and their effectiveness vividly displayed.

REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENTS

Will regional instability in the developing world increase or decrease in a post-Cold War international system? While such dis-



¹³ "Stinger in Afghanistan," *Air Defense Artillery* (January-February 1990), pp. 3-8.

¹⁴ Andrew Ross, "Do-It-Yourself Weaponry," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (May 1990), p. 22.

putes will no longer be part of the Cold War competition, the end of that contest may unleash violent regional confrontations formerly kept limited or subdued. According to Geoffrey Kemp, this may be the case for the following reasons: "First, superpower retrenchment itself will create a vacuum, and regional powers will move quickly to fill the void. Second, sources of conflict in key regions of the world have not gone away and in some areas ... the prospects of war are growing." Finally, "there is no sign that countries in regions of conflict have the political incentives ... to work together to reduce tension."¹⁵ In fact, as we noted above, several of these states are expanding and modernizing their military capabilities.

A review of trends over the last four decades will disclose that it has been in the various regions of the developing world where most violent conflict has taken place. The 1980s revealed no evidence of a sharp downturn. According to one study:

What is most striking is that, except for the guerrilla war in Greece in the late 1940s, the Soviet use of force to stifle dissidence in Eastern Europe in the 50s and 60s, and the violence in Ireland, wars since World War II have taken place in the Third World ... These regional conflicts stemmed from struggles to win independence from colonial domination; to adjust borders, influence, and power among newly independent nations; and to realign the internal political and social structure or governmental form within a nation. With few exceptions, the colonial wars were over by about 1958. The wars of adjustment continue to this day, and have almost always involved clashes of conventionally organized military forces. The internal wars, by far more numerous, also continue. These latter conflicts have usually involved chal-



¹⁵ Geoffrey Kemp, "Regional Security, Arms Control, and the End of the Cold War," *The Washington Quarterly* (Autumn 1990), pp. 33-34.

lenges to a government and its conventional forces from irregular forces. ¹⁶


Furthermore, these conflicts are extremely complex. While many became intertwined with the Cold War, because of their own dynamics, the end of the East-West struggle did not ensure their culmination. In fact, the superpower rivalry may have served as a partial constraint on several of these intractable disagreements between long term adversaries.

Are these trends a harbinger for destructive regional conflicts? According to one recent estimate, we may "see regimes that have made themselves champions of regional radicalism, states that are all too vulnerable to such pressures, governments that refuse to recognize one another, and countries that have claims on one another's territory -- some with significant military capabilities and a history of recurring war." ¹⁷

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

Low intensity conflict (LIC), over the last 25 years, has been endemic to various Third World regions, with the number of states and movements involved on the rise. This is likely to continue in the future. The Reagan Administration defined LIC in the following terms:

[L]ow intensity conflicts may be waged by a combination of means, including the use of political, economic, informational, and military instruments ... Major causes of low intensity conflict are instability, and lack of political and economic development in the Third World. These conditions provide fertile ground for unrest and for groups and nations wishing to exploit unrest for their



¹⁶ "A U.S. Strategy for Third World Conflict," A Report by the Regional Conflict Working Group prepared for the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy (1987), p. 3.


¹⁷ *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 7.

own purposes ... An effective U.S. response to this form of warfare requires ... the use of a variety of policy instruments among U.S. government agencies and internationally. Responses may draw on economic, political, and informational tools as well as military assistance. ¹⁸

This definition is instructive for the following reasons: First, low intensity conflict is characterized as a political-military confrontation short of conventional war between either contending states or a group/movement and a state. It can range from covert subversion to a paramilitary insurgent conflict. Second, the instruments utilized in these conflicts include political, psychological, economic, informational, and paramilitary means. Third, LIC involves strategies of conflict that are both indirect and unconventional in approach. Finally, among the societal factors that underlie or cause LIC are discontentment, injustice, repression, instability, and political, economic, and social change. These conditions are generally found in the Third World and it is here where most low intensity conflicts occur.

The factors identified above contribute to an environment conducive to the out-break of low intensity conflicts. In fact, LIC describes an environment or situation in which conflict or instability can take one of several forms. Currently, the most frequently mentioned kinds of LIC expected to take place in the years ahead are international and state-sponsored terrorism and international narcotics activities.

However, we should not discount the possibility of insurgent warfare. It has been among the most predominant forms of low intensity conflict to occur in the post-war period. Previously, it was adopted mainly by Marxist-Leninist movements or factions. In the years ahead, movements that adopt ethnicity as their ideology are more likely to employ the insurgency strategy. In the recent past,



¹⁸ David Silverstein, "Preparing America To Win Low-Intensity Conflict," *Backgrounder: The Heritage Foundation* (No. 786, August 1990), p. 4.


insurgency strategy has been embraced by those inspired by ethnic aspirations, including the Muslims in the Philippines, Kurds in Iraq, and Tamils in Sri Lanka. The potential for similar movements in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East to adopt this strategy is enormous. Latin America is also vulnerable to ethnic-based insurgencies which exploit Indian resentment of Spanish descendants (e.g., Peru and Guatemala).

IDEOLOGY AND INSTABILITY

Will ideological causes of instability continue in the post-Cold War era? During most of the period since 1945, destabilizing ideology has been synonymous with various forms of Marxism-Leninism. However, its attractiveness as the basis for either revolution or government has lost its appeal.

As a result, some observers assert that we have reached an end to ideology in world affairs and the instability such forces generate. This argument can be found in the essay by Frank Fukuyama, "The End of History."¹⁹ Not all agree with his assumptions and point to other forms of ideological conflict that are likely to cause instability in the future.

For example, specialists in ethnicity argue that ethnonationalism is on the rise and cannot easily be accommodated in many multinational states. "Questions of accommodating ethnonational heterogeneity within a single state," writes Walker Connor, "revolve about two loyalties -- loyalty to the nation and loyalty to the state -- and the relative strength of the two." He notes that in this contest, "the great number of bloody separatist movements that have occurred in the last two decades within the first, second, and third worlds bear ample testimony that when the two loyalties are seen as being in irreconcilable conflict, loyalty to the state loses out."²⁰



¹⁹ Frank Fukuyama, "The End of History," *The National Interest* (Summer 1989).

²⁰ Walker Connor, "Ethnonationalism," in *Understanding Political Development* edited by Myron Weiner and Samuel Huntington (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman/Little, Brown, 1987), p. 213.

Likewise, Donald Horowitz has observed in *Ethnic Groups In Conflict* the following:

Ethnic conflict is a worldwide phenomenon. The evidence is abundant. The recurrent hostilities in Northern Ireland, Chad, and Lebanon; secessionist warfare in Burma, Bangladesh, the Sudan, Nigeria, Iraq, and the Philippines; the Somalia invasion of Ethiopia, and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus; the army killings in Uganda and Syria and the mass civilian killings in India-Pakistan, Burundi, and Indonesia; Sikh terrorism, Basque terrorism, Corsican terrorism, Palestinian terrorism; the expulsion of Chinese from Vietnam, of Arakanese Muslims from Burma, of Asians from Uganda, of Beninese from the Ivory Coast and Gabon; ethnic riots in India, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Zaire, Guyana, and a score of other countries -- these comprise only the most violent evidence of ethnic hostility. ²¹

Furthermore, he goes on to note that today "ethnic conflict possesses elements of universality and uniformity that were not present at earlier times." ²²

This appears to be the case in post-Cold War Eastern Europe, where ethnic tensions reveal old and deep-seated rivalries. Events in Yugoslavia reveal the long-term nature of these differences. While Serbs and Croats have carried this to the level of warfare, lesser forms of ethnic tension are evident in other parts of Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union is rife with these differences that have a significant impact on the dissolution of the USSR. Ethnic frictions have also occurred in Poland and Czechoslovakia since the end of communist rule.

In the developing world ethnnonationalistic differences have been, and will continue to be, "the major obstacle to political de-



²¹ See Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 3.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 5.

velopment. Today, just as two decades ago, ethnic nationalism poses the most serious threat to political stability in a host of states.”²³ Ethnonationalism in the form of radicalized secessionism and irredentism will continue to be an ongoing event in the developing world.

A second source of ideological conflict lies in the area of religious fundamentalism, specifically in the Islamic context. According to one specialist, “all proponents of *jihad*, whether writers or actors, intellectuals or politicians, are ideologues. At the same time, they are religious ideologues, since, despite the history of the critique of ideology, religion and ideology merge for them, as for others, during the modern or technical age.”²⁴

In the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the call to *jihad* against the United States is well documented. Here, we refer to the Shi'i approach to holy war in Islam. This also was the basis for the war waged by Iran for over eight years against Iraq. Likewise, Shi'i factions in Lebanon have followed a similar tactic and based their activities on explicit religious ideology. Will similar states or movements be motivated by the religious elan of Shi'i Islam in the future is not easily determined. However, it is a powerful force in many parts of the developing world.

THE UNKNOWN AND THE UNCERTAIN²⁵

Earlier, we observed that in the past when the international system has undergone fundamental change, what followed was not easily forecast. The future is difficult to know with any degree of certainty. For example, in the aftermath of World War I, no one predicted



²³ Connor, “Ethnonationalism,” pp. 199-200.

²⁴ Bruce Lawrence, “Holy War (*Jihad*) in Islamic Religion and Nation-State Ideologies,” in *Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Tradition*, edited by John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson (New York: Greenwood Press), p. 141.


²⁵ This phrase is borrowed from “National Military Strategy for the 1990s,” (Department of Defense, draft 8/22/91), p. 3.

what was to transpire only two decades later. Indeed, the creation of the League of Nations, the treaties agreed to at Locarno by the European powers, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact were all to ensure stability and peace. The fact that it turned out differently reveals the extent to which what follows a period of great change in the international system is highly uncertain. In this case the predictions of global stability and peace proved to be incorrect. While it may be different in the years ahead, there is no certainty of that.

While it is formidable to plan for the uncertain and the unknown, these factors are a very real part of the post-Cold War world. Estimating whether, and if so to what extent, conflict and instability will take place is very problematic. The issues discussed previously are possible indicators of the direction it might take. However, they are neither conclusive or definitive.

STRATEGIC CONCEPTS AND U.S. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

While it did not start out this way, the bipolar system of the Cold War, once established, was marked by an unwritten set of arrangements between the superpowers that placed limits on the promotion of instability and the use of force. Gordon Craig and Alexander George have noted that "while certainly not an ideal international system," the Cold War "did indeed constitute a primitive one in which certain restraints and norms were present and adhered to."²⁶ For example, they point out that nuclear weapons exerted a "powerful [restraining] effect" on "the many differences and rivalry between the two sides." Additionally, "cooperation in crisis management [after the Cuban Missile Crisis] became one of the most important means," among others, "for regulating rivalry and promoting some cooperation."²⁷



²⁶ Gordon Craig and Alexander George, *Force and Statecraft* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 117.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 117-118. Similarly, James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., in reviewing the literature on system structure and stability note that "some contend that a multipolar world is likely to be less stable than a bipolar system. With fewer important actors and greater certainty in military and political relationships, the prospects for misunderstandings and conflict are said to be less under conditions of bipolarity than in a multipolar world." *Contending Theories of International Relations* (3rd ed.; New York: Harper & Row, 1990), p. 119.

These constraining forces, to a degree, likewise curbed the use of force by allies and clients, thus preventing regional conflicts from turning into superpower ones. In other words, the power balance and modalities worked out over the years between the two superpowers had a spillover effect into those critical areas of the world troubled by long standing disputes and emerging new ones. While regional conflicts occurred, there were instances in which the superpowers were able, through influence over their allies, to limit the extent of hostilities.

In this bipolar system, the U.S. designed its international security policy around the strategic concepts of containment of the USSR and deterrence of its nuclear forces. Beginning in the early 1960s, deterrence moved to the forefront and remained the basis for U.S. strategic thinking and policy formation throughout the period.

The 1990s will be different, as was noted earlier, and will reflect concurrent but contradictory trends. On the one hand, the changes that have occurred will bring stability to parts of the world that were "battlefields" during the Cold War. This stability has to be managed to ensure its continuation and furtherance. There is no guarantee that because it currently exists, stability will endure if unattended.

On the other hand, the new international system will be fluid, and marked by diverse, diffuse, and incalculable conflicts that may, with more frequency take place. This will be due both to the increasing diversity of interests, disagreements, and demands of states in these subsystems, as well as to the absence of the constraining influence of the superpowers.

One way to conceptualize the difference between the international security environment of the Cold War and its aftermath is through the spectrum of conflict, a framework frequently utilized in the U.S. national security community. The objective of it is to identify the different types and frequency of conflict/war via a

three-level classification. ²⁸ The diagram on the next page, in our estimation, reflects the international security environment of the 1990s.

As can be seen, in the years ahead, the more probable forms of conflict begin at the level of regional limited conventional war and move left on the spectrum to low intensity conflicts, ²⁹ show of force, and presence, peacekeeping, and related stability actions. ³⁰ Thus, as the intensity of conflict shifts from the conventional to lower levels, the probability of occurrence increases.

In light of the above, what strategic concepts ought to guide U.S. policy and strategy in a post-Cold War international security system? Over the last 25 years, the American security studies community has generated a literature that contains concepts we can draw on to answer this question. In terms of the uses of military power, Robert Art has observed: "Although the goals that states pursue range widely and vary considerably from case to case, there are four categories that analytically exhaust the functions force can serve: defense, deterrence, compellence, and swaggering." ³¹ The latter category includes various non-combat/peacetime missions, such as presence, peacekeeping, and related stability actions. The current umbrella term for these missions is peacetime engagement.




²⁸ For a discussion and application of this concept see U.S. Marine Corps, *FMFM 1, Warfighting* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1989).

²⁹ As was noted earlier in the text, low intensity conflict entails a political-military confrontation short of conventional war between either contending states or a group/movement and a state. It can range from covert subversion to a paramilitary insurgent conflict. The instruments utilized in these conflicts include political, psychological, economic, informational, and paramilitary means. LIC involves strategies of conflict that are both indirect and unconventional in approach. The most frequently mentioned kinds of LIC most likely to occur in the 1990s include international narcotics and international and state-sponsored terrorism. However, we should not discount the possibility of insurgent warfare.

³⁰ These are part of the general category of non-combat operations that the Department of Defense refers to as peacetime missions. These include presence through bilateral or multilateral arrangements, humanitarian assistance, Military Training Teams, peacekeeping, and related security operations.

³¹ Robert Art, "The Role of Military Power in International Relations," in *National Security Affairs*, ed. by B. Thomas Trout and James Harf (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1982), p. 27.

CONTINUUM OF WARFARE




During the Cold War, deterrence emerged as the central strategic concept for the United States. This can be seen both in the works of U.S. strategic thinkers and in the national security policy and strategy of post-WWII administrations.³² While deterrence will remain important, based on the previous assessment of the contours of the post-Cold War international security environment, Art's latter two categories of compellence/power projection and presence/peacekeeping/stability or peacetime engagement will move to the forefront in terms of priority. Below, the parameters of these two strategic concepts will be outlined, and in the next section the role and suitability of naval expeditionary forces in support of these missions will be discussed.

COMPELLENCE AND POWER PROJECTION

The purpose of compellence is to employ military power to affect an adversary's behavior in the following ways: one, to halt an activity that is underway; two, to undo a deed already accomplished; or three, to initiate an action that is undesirable. The concept was given its initial and most detailed consideration in the study by Thomas Schelling, "Arms and Influence." He asserted that "compellence ... usually involves initiating an action that can cease, or become harmless, only if the opponent responds. The overt act, the first step, is up to the side that makes the compellent threat."³³ Thus, to be credible, "the compellent threat has to be put in motion ... and then the victim must yield."³⁴

In effect, for Schelling, compellence almost always involves the use of force. Furthermore, it involves attention to where, what kind, and how much military power is to be used in order to convince the adversary to comply. Compellence is offensive, action oriented, and particularly suited for crisis situations.



³² For a thorough review of these developments see Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983).

³³ Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 72.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

The distinction between deterrence and compellence is apparent. The former uses force passively to prevent an action from taking place, while the latter employs force actively and involves a sequence of actions and reactions. Unlike deterrence, compellence is easier to verify because it requires something to take place. However, it is precisely because of this that it is more difficult to achieve. In the case of deterrence, the adversary has the veil of plausible denial. This is not true for compellence, which requires a actor to alter its behavior.

Directly related to the concept of compellence is that of power projection. W. Scott Thompson has defined it as "the capacity to inject appropriate instruments of influence and force over distances into rapidly changing violent (or potentially violent) situations." ³⁵ The ability to project power is enhanced if one has available an "infrastructure" that includes "the prepositioning of forces and equipment, the deployment of a worldwide naval support system, the development of reconnaissance capabilities, and the expansion of command and control communications networks." ³⁶

Russell E. Dougherty, former Commander of the Strategic Air Command, in defining the requirements for effective power projection noted that: one, it "must be believable ... to our adversaries"; two, "the power to be projected ... must be built on actual forces"; and three, "the force [must] be ... fit to fight." ³⁷ In an international security system characterized by regional conflicts that are increasingly diverse, diffuse, and difficult to forecast, the ability to project power to compel an adversary to halt an activity that is under way or undo a deed already accomplished will be more germane than deterrence in the years ahead.



³⁵ W. Scott Thompson, *Power Projection: A Net Assessment of U.S. and Soviet Capabilities* (New York: The National Strategy Information Center, 1978), p. 8.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ Russell E. Dougherty, "Power Projection: Historic and Contemporary Perspectives," in *Projection of Power: Perspectives, Perceptions, and Problems*, ed. by Uri Ra'anan, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Geoffrey Kemp (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1982), p. 11.

When a crisis erupts with little or no forewarning, a compellence/power projection capability enhances the role of military power as a political instrument. According to George, Hall, and Simons, when employed in this manner, "force is used in an exemplary, demonstrative manner ... to induce the opponent to revise his calculation." It allows you "to demonstrate resolution to protect well defined interests and also to demonstrate the credibility of one's determination to use more if necessary."³⁸ For these authors, compellence/power projection or coercive diplomacy "focuses upon affecting the enemy's will rather than negating his capabilities."³⁹ We believe that to exclude the latter as an option is to limit the flexibility of compellence/power projection.

PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT

Presence, peacekeeping, and stability, Art's fourth strategic concept, relates directly to a number of peacetime engagement military missions. These will be of growing importance as the U.S. seeks, in conjunction with various regional allies and friends, to establish new bilateral and multilateral agreements and frameworks to bring about and/or maintain regional stability. The presence of forward deployed forces and capabilities and the conduct of joint combined exercises will be an important element of these post-Cold War regional security arrangements. They provide credibility for such arrangements, demonstrate commitment on the part of the United States, and give pause to states who might be intent on altering the status quo.

Various peacetime engagement missions also strengthen the ties between the United States and its regional allies. This is accomplished through mobile training teams (MTT), security assistance, and civic action programs. These build strong military to military relations and also improve the standing of the host military with its own population. MTTs are designed to provide the military

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³⁸ Alexander George, David Hall, and William Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1971), p. 18.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

forces of friendly countries with the training to operate, maintain, and employ weapons systems and support equipment or teach other basic skills. In conjunction with other security assistance measures, MTTs are an important part of the process of creating and maintaining new regional security arrangements and regimes.

Other important aspects of peacetime engagements are peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance missions. They likewise contribute to regional stability in consequential ways. Peacekeeping operations include missions in both hostile and potentially hostile situations. The goal is to either prevent or contain conflict and to forestall its spillover into other parts of a region. Humanitarian assistance provides disaster relief on short notice. It likewise seeks to confine a situation that could degenerate into internal conflict from doing so. These and related peacetime engagement missions are important instruments for achieving and maintaining regional stability.

MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE: COMPELLENCE/POWER PROJECTION AND PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT MISSIONS

The concepts of compellence/power projection and presence/peacekeeping/stability or peacetime engagement will take on growing significance in the post-Cold War international security policy of the United States. To utilize them effectively, the U.S. will require a flexible and multi-purpose force structure. Within this context, Marine expeditionary forces are configured and oriented to make an important contribution.

First of all, they reflect the naval and expeditionary traditions of such important strategists as Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian S. Corbett, both of whom understood that advances in transportation, communications, technology, and forward-basing provide a state with the capacity to project power globally.⁴⁰ While Corbett, in

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⁴⁰ Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Seapower on History* (New York: Dover Publications, 1987); Julian S. Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1911).

many respects, complements the work of Mahan, his emphasis on amphibious forces and joint operations are particularly relevant to the future international security environment. Wellington's campaign against Napoleon was, for Corbett, indicative of the power projection adroitness of expeditionary forces.

The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is structured for compellence/power projection missions. It will be particularly applicable if, as suggested earlier, conflicts in the future are diverse, diffuse, and incalculable; take place in far-reaching parts of the developing world; and the more probable forms begin at the level of regional limited conventional war and move down the spectrum in terms of intensity.

Consider the MAGTF capabilities, as depicted in the diagram on the next page. It provides a flexible combined-arms force that can be structured to respond to a broad range of conventional and unconventional conflict situations. Each of the four MAGTF configurations -- MEF, MEB, MEU, SPF -- contains a command, ground combat, aviation combat, and combat support element. Because they can be deployed rapidly and sustained from a sea base, the MAGTF provides a compellent/power projection capability for maritime operations across a significant portion of the spectrum of conflict.

The largest MAGTF formation, the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), contains up to 60,000 Marines and Sailors and deploys with supplies for 60 days. It includes infantry, artillery, armor, reconnaissance, aviation, and logistics components. A MEF of roughly 20,000 can be on the ground and ready to conduct operations in less than two weeks. It can fight alone or as part of a larger joint and/or combined operation. In the case of the latter, a MEF becomes the forward element that establishes a secure base for the follow-on buildup.

The rapid deployment of a MEF in a crisis presents an opponent with a serious challenge and provides the President with an instrument of coercion and crisis control. Because it establishes a meaningful presence on the ground in a short period of time, a

MAGTF CAPABILITIES

MEF

MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

MEB

MARINE EXPEDITIONARY BRIGADE

MEU

MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT

SPF

SPECIAL PURPOSE FORCE

- RAPID DEPLOYMENT
- SPECIFIC MISSION
- MOST FOCUSED FORCE

MANNING AND SUSTAINABILITY AS REQUIRED BY MISSION

1,000-4,000 PERSONNEL

15 DAYS SUSTAINABILITY

- MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS
- AMPHIBIOUS RAIDS
- NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION
- SPECIAL OPERATIONS
- SECURITY OPERATIONS
- HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

4,000-18,000 PERSONNEL

30 DAYS SUSTAINABILITY

- FORCIBLE ENTRY
- COMBAT OPS ASHORE
- FORWARD ELEMENT OF A MEF OR JOINT FORCE
- COMBINED ARMS TEAM

30,000-60,000 PERSONNEL

60 DAYS SUSTAINABILITY

- STRIKE, SEIZE, SECURE
- SUSTAINED COMBAT ASHORE, ALONE OR AS PART OF A MAJOR JOINT FORCE
- JOINT C4I2 CAPABLE

CINC's FORCE IN READINESS

MEF can give an adversary pause. As a result of its combat capabilities, a MEF is able to carry out an array of conventional warfare missions.

During Desert Shield, the Marine Corps deployed a Marine Expeditionary Force to Saudi Arabia by September 1, 1991. This buildup demonstrated the MAGTF capacity for the rapid introduction of a significant and credible force. If Iraq harbored any intention of carrying its invasion of Kuwait into Saudi Arabia, the presence of a fully deployed Marine Expeditionary Force made an unambiguously clear statement of American intent and resolve. During Desert Storm the MEF was part of a major joint and combined force that compelled Iraq to undo what it had achieved on August 2, 1991.

As the diagram depicts, the second MAGTF component is a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). It has the same composition as a MEF, but on a smaller scale. A MEB can range from 4,000 to 18,000 and can sustain itself for 30 days. It can be fully deployed in eight days for solo operations or as the forward element of a MEF or joint force. According to "FMFRP 2-12, Marine Air-Ground Task Force: A Global Capability," "The MEB can be configured for deployment as an air contingency force, a maritime or geographical repositioning force, or an amphibious force."⁴¹ In conjunction with its multiple mission profile, this adds to the mobility and flexibility of the MEB.

The final two elements of the MAGTF are the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and the Special Purpose Force (SPF). The former can be in place within a few days because it is a forward deployed, sea-based force. This allows MEUs, which are located in the Mediterranean Sea and Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, to be on the scene and respond immediately to a crisis. It is a rapid reaction force that can carry out various operations, most importantly long-range amphibious raids during night and adverse conditions. The MEU also serves as the forward element of a MEB.



⁴¹ FMFRP 2-12, *Marine Air-Ground Task Force: A Global Capability* (Washington, DC: Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 1991), p. 22.


The SPF, as the name suggests, is organized for an array of special missions. With respect to compellence and power projection these would include raids, strike operations, surveillance and reconnaissance, and related actions.

Beyond the above attributes the MAGTF has other features that make it suitable for compellence/power projection missions. These include: one, a capacity to conduct special operations; two, maritime prepositioned equipment; and three, an emphasis on maneuver and surprise.

MAGTFs are special operations capable (SOC) and this enhances the mission flexibility of each of its four elements. This includes special operations in support of conventional missions and in low intensity conflicts. The latter is particularly important if, as is now estimated, low intensity conflict (LIC) challenges continue to increase in the future. The Marine Corps divides LIC into two categories: stability and limited objective operations. The latter directly relates to compellence/power projection situations, while the former, as will be detailed below, pertains to peacetime engagement missions.

Limited objective missions include raids, limited objective attacks, NEO, hostage rescue, deep strike and interdiction, airborne assault, clandestine insertion and extraction, and so on. As is apparent, each can be initiated from the sea or air. Beyond direct action, SOC includes various intelligence missions.

The suitability of MAGTF elements for compellence/power projection is also enhanced by Maritime Prepositioning Forces (MPF). MPF consists of a command element, a MEB, maritime prepositioned ships, and a Navy support element. The prepositioning of equipment afloat reduces the response time in a crisis and, in effect, serves as a mobile POMCUS.⁴² As Bernard Trainor has




⁴² POMCUS or European Positioning of Materiel Configured to Unit Sets is generally associated with European contingencies. For a discussion see Robert Harkavy, *Bases Abroad* (London: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 310-311. In the years ahead, POMCUS is likely to become a part of emerging regional security arrangements.

pointed out, the MPF program "is one of the significant actions taken that makes sense and recognizes that the problem we face is one of employment rather than deployment."⁴³

Each of the three MPF squadrons, located at Atlantic Command, Diego Garcia, and Guam-Tinian, carries enough equipment and supplies to support a 16,000-man MEB for 30 days. Thus, the MPF allows for the rapid deployment, assembly, and employment of a MEB in a secure area using a combination of airlift for personnel and prepositioned ships for capabilities.

The rapid buildup of the MEF during Desert Shield certified the value of MPF during a crisis. According to one recent account, "From the receipt of mission on 7 August until the final offload on 7 September the MPS program provided enough supplies and equipment to SWA to enable 33,600 Marines and Sailors to operate for 30 days of sustained combat."⁴⁴ The entire deployment for Desert Shield and Desert Storm went through two phases. In phase one, which ran from August 7 to November 8, 1990, MPS-2 and MPS-3, in conjunction with combat aircraft, aviation support ships, and airlifted personnel, deployed and sustained a composited I MEF in Saudi Arabia. The phase two deployment, which began on November 8, 1990, achieved the same status for II MEF by December 22, 1990.

A key lesson from the Gulf War is that in a crisis situation, where you must put forces on the ground in a short response time, MPS is a prerequisite. A critically important component of the expeditionary concept, MPS supports two key elements -- crisis response and forward presence -- of the new "National Military Strategy for the 1990s."⁴⁵ In Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Marine



⁴³ Bernard E. Trainor, "A Force Employment Capability," *Marine Corps Gazette* (May 1990), p. 29.

⁴⁴ Ernest S. Jones, "MPS and Desert Storm," *Marine Corps Gazette* (August 1991), p. 48.


⁴⁵ The August 1991 draft of "The National Military Strategy for the 1990s" identifies foundations for future military strategy: deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution.

Expeditionary Forces served as the forward element of a major joint and combined operation. MPS proved to be of strategic significance. It does not, however, solve the problem of how the capabilities for heavy divisions are to be forward deployed. Indeed, land based prepositioning, a SWA POMCUS, has to be part of any future multilateral regional security agreement the U.S. enters into with the Persian Gulf states.

Finally, MAGTF accentuates the combat concepts of maneuver and surprise. Rapidly deployable maritime forces can make effective use of the principles of maneuver warfare, most importantly the shattering of an adversary's cohesion through rapid and unexpected strikes at points where it is unprepared. Trainor accurately observes that "The ability to make a forcible entry cannot be overemphasized and is perhaps the most important point to be made." ⁴⁶ Of course, to be able to do so at a time and place of one's choice is the essence of military surprise. A modern amphibious force that can do so will create uncertainty and confusion for the enemy.

The relationship between maneuver, surprise, and expeditionary forces is further enhanced through the Marine combat concept of Over-the-Horizon (OTH) entry. A MAGTF that can deploy from the sea a regimental-size assault force 50 miles deep in the enemy's rear area has real significance, for the defenders cannot determine where you intend to land. OTH and rapid surface landing effectively combine the principles of maneuver and surprise. They extend the battlefield.

In the international security environment of the 1990s, MAGTF capabilities are ideal for crisis response in limited conventional and low intensity conflicts. This is precisely why the necessary improvements should be procured to make the Over-the-Horizon concept a fully viable military option. ⁴⁷



⁴⁶ Trainor, "A Force Employment Capability," pp. 29-30.

⁴⁷ For the specifics on OTH see the Marine Corps Combat Development Command's concept paper, *Over-the-Horizon Amphibious Operations* (Quantico, VA; Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 1991).

With respect to peacetime engagement, the MAGTF, likewise, can make an important contribution. Conceptually, the Marine Corps includes this array of missions within the parameters of low intensity conflict. As noted above, LIC is divided into limited objective combat operations and stability operations. The latter is, in several respects, synonymous with peacetime engagement. During the 1980s, the Commandant directed the Marine Corps Combat Development Command to focus part of its attention on both categories of LIC.

With respect to peacetime engagement, this resulted in tailoring various elements of the MAGTF to carry out the following missions. One, joint and combined exercises within the context of regional security arrangements. Two, assist friendly governments maintain internal stability. Three, peacekeeping operations as a part of a larger joint or international force. Four, MTTs and related security assistance programs. Five, the provision of humanitarian assistance as part of a response to natural disasters. And finally, protecting and/or evacuating noncombatants from violent regional conflicts.

The MAGTF can provide several essential elements for various peacetime engagement missions. However, there are some areas that require upgrading. This is particularly true of area expertise, including a well developed foreign language capability, as well as knowledge of the culture, customs, mores, and current setting. As our focus shifts to regional security, a sophisticated knowledge of the political, social, economic, cultural, and religious influences at play in these parts of the world becomes essential.

Over the last decade Marine forces have been involved in each of these missions. The MAGTF has been structured to respond to peacetime engagement situations. While it has its shortcomings, as noted above, nevertheless, this positions the Marine Corps to support forward presence missions or peacetime engagement, one of the four foundations, along with deterrence, crisis response and reconstitution, of the new "National Military Strategy for the 1990s."



Security Assistance, Humanitarian Assistance, and Related Operations

LtGen H. C. Stackpole III, USMC

INTRODUCTION

A Marine will stand before you with a "road map" of ribbons on his chest, showing that his teeth were cut in combat. He is primarily a war-fighter because, in order to provide the Nation with a credible deterrent capability and defend it if deterrence fails, you must have individuals such as he who have that kind of background. However, no Marine is a war-lover.

Naval expeditionary forces -- Sailors and Marines -- have been, **and are**, an integral component of the Nation's efforts to attain its national security interests and objectives. Military forces capable of humanitarian assistance must be in a U.S. "quiver of arrows" which includes flexibility, sustainability, and other capabilities. Naval expeditionary forces are olive branches which also can be placed in a bow and fired. This is "assistance projection" rather than force projection, and it is an important part of what naval forces do each and every day of the year.

There is an increasingly important correlation between domestic and international requirements. The Nation must maintain a strategic balance for its economic, political, and military elements of power. Military capabilities must be in line with the Nation's enduring values and the armed forces must be relevant to maintaining these values in this day and age. Central to this is the idea of readiness and the capability to meet threats -- the indefinable threats -- which are out there.

Stability is a cardinal goal of U.S. National Policy: Instability is the threat. This was articulated clearly by Admiral Charles Larson to all his forces in the Pacific. He was the primary architect in setting up forces for disaster relief to Bangladesh in the aftermath of a killer typhoon which hit that nation in late April 1991. But, that was not the only operation done in the name of stability as part of forward presence operations during the period of Desert Storm/Desert Shield. Outlining a few "assistance projection" examples will help illustrate the utility of naval expeditionary forces to furthering the Nation's ideals and achieving its goals.

OPERATION "FIERY VIGIL"

Fiery Vigil was a joint operation commanded by an Air Force General at Clark Air Base, Republic of the Philippines. It was carried out primarily by Marine Corps and Navy forces which were able to respond rapidly to this disaster and evacuate 17,000 U.S. personnel and their dependents to a safe area hundreds of miles to the south. There, with the cooperation of the Philippine government, they set up an "airhead" to care for and evacuate these individuals from danger. Air Force C-141s and the Airlift Control Elements (ALCE) to support them then moved these American citizens on to Anderson Air Force Base in Guam and eventually to the United States.

Simultaneously, Marines, principally engineers from Okinawa, joined as part of Marine Air-Ground Task Force 4-90 to dig Cubi Point Naval Air Station and Subic Bay Naval Base out from under the tons of volcanic ash. In addition, naval forces provided the motor vessel *Lummis*, one of our Maritime Prepositioning Ships, loaded with Reverse-Osmosis Water Purification Units and engineer equipment -- two critically-needed commodities for the relief effort.

The magnitude of this effort can be accentuated by the fact that one square-foot of ash weighs 26 pounds wet, and the rains did come to aggravate the situation in the Philippines. This wet ash devastated the buildings at Clark and Subic Bay. It devastated buildings which were accustomed only to monsoon rains. The suc-

cess of this mission was not due to the exertions of Sailors and Marines, it was an operation conducted jointly -- a united effort by all services to accomplish a humanitarian action and bring relief to American citizens and Filipino nationals in need.

OPERATION "PROVIDE COMFORT"

There is a certain sterility to what is usually reported in newspapers. To best illustrate this, the words of Lieutenant General John Shalikashvili (Commander of the Joint Task Force for "Provide Comfort" on the border between Turkey and Iraq) to a group of people at the State Department on Refugee Day are appropriate. His words (paraphrased below) set the scene and help listeners understand the magnitude of the problem he encountered and the capabilities which U.S. military forces can apply to alleviate human suffering.

"Television pictures of those early days in the Kurdish refugee camps did not convey the reality. They did not convey the sounds, the smells, and the horror there in the camps. During those early days of April, it was truly a nightmare -- a place that Dante might have known. The Kurdish refugees 'hovered' just below the snow line without shelter, without adequate clothing, without food, without any kind of sanitation, and without any kind of medical attention. Before the world could realize the enormity of the tragedy unfolding, hundreds of the very young and the very old were dying every day.

The sheer magnitude of the refugee situation was exacerbated by the speed with which it developed, the rapidly deteriorating conditions in those camps, and the unimaginable isolation created by impassable mountains. The precarious security situation (the Iraqi Army on one side and terrorist organizations such as the Dev Sol and the PKK on the other) made this one of the most difficult and complex refugee situations ever encountered by U.S. Armed Forces. It would have overwhelmed any single humanitarian organization.

Accomplishing this mission was a monumental effort which required hard work, dedication, and professionalism from many men and women. Hundreds of soldiers worked 24 hours a day to rig thousands of tons of air-droppable equipment. Air Force C-130 pilots threaded their way through narrow, cloud-covered valleys to drop their supplies onto fog-shrouded drop zones. Special Forces soldiers and civil affairs specialists went into the mountains to first find, then organize and attempt to assist refugees. Military doctors and medics cared for the sick, inoculated against diseases, and helped with sanitation. Airborne soldiers and Marines pushed a very reluctant and resistant Iraqi Army out of the way to establish a secure zone in which to build these camps.

Helicopter pilots, some to fly protection over northern Iraq and others to carry supplies to the most isolated mountain camps, were indispensable. Engineers built roads where God never intended roads to be built. They repaired runways, erected camps, dug wells, and, yes, built countless latrines. Specialists established vast communications networks and cleared mines which literally covered the countryside. Air Force and Navy fighter aircraft, with tankers to refuel and AWACS to control them, provided overhead protection. There were mountains of supplies and thousands of pieces of equipment in Kirkuk, all needed yesterday. The sense of urgency in all who participated was readily evident, for everyone knew that each minute wasted and every day gone by meant the deaths of hundreds more.

When all was said and done, it required the efforts of about 13,000 U.S. servicemen and women, from all services, and some 11,000 soldiers from 12 coalition countries. Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines brought with them those special resources the military possesses:

- * An ability to respond to a crisis at a moment's notice.
- * The capability to reach, almost overnight, the most isolated corners of the world.
- * The organization to tie together something as complex as this, and;
- * Young men and women, fully trained in a hundred dif-

ferent skills needed for winning wars, but just as germane for saving lives.

Most important to the success of "Provide Comfort" were these young men and women. They are a national treasure and, more than ever, confident to tackle any challenge. As "Provide Comfort" demonstrated again, they are full of the sort of the infectious enthusiasm of Americans which seeks to help those in need.

A KILLER STORM

The typhoon which battered the littoral regions of Bangladesh the night of 29 April 1991 packed 150-knot winds at its center. Making the situation worse was that it hit during a full moon -- tides were at their peak. The highest point of the outlying islands and along the coast of Bangladesh is about 30 feet: The tidal wave which accompanied the storm that dismal night was 30 feet! The winds came, the waters came, and 140,000 people perished in a matter of hours, most of them women and children.

The area of devastation was extensive. The north point, Chittagong, was under 15 feet of water. The destruction stretched 110 miles southward to another point, near the border with Burma, called Cox's Bazar. Damage extended inland an average of about five kilometers and included six major islands and a number of smaller ones with exotic names like Sandwip, Kutubdia, Moheshkali, and Matabari.

Bangladesh, a nation of 120 million Muslims, is the second largest Muslim nation in the world and the second largest democracy in terms of population. These people live in an area about the size of the state of Wisconsin. The region is hit every year by a cyclone season, then a monsoon season, followed by yet another cyclone season -- the only country in the world which suffers "Nor-easters" and "Sou-westers." It is a deltaic region, second only to the Amazon in size. Forty-five million tons of silt come from the confluence of the Magma, the Brahmaputra, and the Ganges Rivers along with the Himalaya Mountain Range runoff. It has been said

that you can stick a walking staff in the ground and it will probably sprout leaves.

It is one of the most inhospitable areas of the world in which to conduct relief efforts. The tidal rise is 21 feet. The currents average from six to 12 knots. Add to this that the thunderstorms and winds which occurred each day of the operation had 50 knot vortexes which preceded them. Conditions such as these call for superior airmanship and seamanship, especially when operating in and out of unmarked zones.

OPERATION "SEA ANGEL"

Operation "Sea Angel" did not present the problems faced during "Provide Comfort" in terms of a military threat, or in terms of having to use force. But, the U.S. Joint Task Force (JTF) commanded by this author which responded to that tragedy-had to deal with 139,000 dead people -- all killed in one single night. There were also an estimated one million cattle carcasses littering the countryside. The newly-elected government of Bangladesh was faced with an infrastructure in its southern bay region which had been totally destroyed. A concerned U.S. President responded to the anguish of Bangladesh. What was accomplished?

First and foremost, the operation saved countless lives. Estimates are that 1.7 million people were impacted by that disaster and lost their homes and their livelihood. Although the death toll was enormous, the quick response by the U.S. probably saved, somewhat conservatively, in the neighborhood of 30,000 lives. Death tolls can be estimated, but the "toll" of lives saved through the comprehensive relief efforts of the U.S. and other nations is immeasurable. That was the number one goal -- the preservation of life.

Second, it shored up a government which was 39-days old at the time of the disaster -- the newest democracy in that hemisphere. Bangladesh had been living under nine years of autocracy. It would have been a very easy matter for that country to return to an

autocratic form of government. Some were hoping that new government would fail.

Third, U.S. assistance helped focus international attention on that backwater of the world. The people of Bangladesh are now recovering, surviving, and on their way to a better life than they had before the disaster. This is the direct result of literally billions which poured in from other agencies and donor nations because of the U.S. commitment to humanitarianism.

Last, Marines proved -- one more time -- that people who are known as "Sea Devils" by one Muslim nation, were regarded as "Sea Angels" by another Muslim nation. Proof that Marines, as part of naval expeditionary forces, can carry the instruments of war to bring about both compellence and the olive branch of peace to relieve human suffering.

This type of humanitarian assistance, or forward presence missions, are a preventative measure rather than a cure. In the long run, this prevention saves the U.S. a substantial amount of potential investment to find cures. However, in the short run, it may appear to cost more because it means forces must be forward deployed, credible, engaged in helping to shape world events, and providing a positive leadership example to those nations in search of a paradigm for success. Therefore, while compellence may be a commodity which requires occasional renewal for credibility, prevention should be the concept which guides our daily military efforts.

ANATOMY OF A SUCCESS

What made Operation "Sea Angel" a success? There are innumerable particulars which contributed to the success of this massive samaritan effort. For the purpose of brevity, the three most important, yet apparently simple, factors are outlined here.

First, there was the mission. The call to action came at 5:30 a.m. local time in the Philippines. Admiral Larson, the Commander in Chief of all U.S. forces in the Pacific, queried from Honolulu after the President's decision to aid Bangladesh. The question was,

“How soon can you have a JFT team in Bangladesh?” The answer -- 24 hours! He said, “Go! Your orders: Report to the United States Ambassador as a member of the country team and carry out humanitarian operations in support of the Government of Bangladesh.” There was no direction on how it should be done.

This type of broad guidance allows the commander on scene to exercise his or her judgment of the best way to accomplish the mission. Information does not have to be filtered through several levels to reach the decision-maker. As is true for many situations, it is that individual who has an “up close and personal” knowledge of the situation and who can make the wisest and quickest decisions.

The second factor was the “team.” When most people envision joint operations, they think of something the size of Desert Storm -- a massive endeavor. The total force for operation “Sea Angel” was about 8,000 -- most of them at sea. It was a heavy Navy/Marine “side-of-the-house” operation because infrastructure was so severely devastated that any attempt to put a large presence on shore would have been a liability rather than an asset. There were no more than 500 individuals ashore overnight at any one time: 250 in Dhaka with Headquarters of the JTF, and 250 at the Operations Center and primary distribution point at Chittagong.

This magnificent force composed of young Americans once again proved their ability to surmount any challenge. As an example, the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade and the Navy’s Amphibious Group Three were on their way back to the United States from Desert Storm. The Muslims of Bangladesh initially were afraid that these individuals might be angry about having to stop on their way home from the war, a fact which would delay their return home. How wrong they were! Those Marines and Sailors proved their compassion when they saw the devastation and substandard existence that existed in Bangladesh. They left feeling they had accomplished something decent and right. This quintessential example of a Joint Task Force humanitarian assistance/disaster relief mission also included:

* An Air Force component, without whose C-141 Airlifters and C-130s, the JTF would not have been able to move supplies from Dhaka down to Chittagong and then on to Cox's Bazar. The 603 Airlift Control Squadron operated from the Dhaka Airport. They helped "deconflict" air operations from the control towers for two operating ramps to forward supplies from there to Chittagong and onto the interior.

* An Army component which provided the first elements in theater in the form of Blackhawk helicopters. They began the initial lift of supplies and equipment. They were superb flyers and worked very closely with the Marines.

* A Joint Special Operations Task Force, a disaster relief package of three-man teams which is incomparable -- don't leave home without them.

The command element for this operation was drawn from this author's III Marine Expeditionary Force staff in Okinawa, Japan. A small contingent of 24 individuals conducted the initial survey and liaison in country. A deployable Joint Task Force Element from Honolulu with a deputy, an Air Force Colonel, augmented this staff. An Operations Center, with a Navy captain and a Marine colonel working with the Bangladeshi, was quickly established to coordinate all efforts. No one believed that it was a joint operation because someone in Washington, D.C. said it had to be. They believed it had to be joint because that was the way to get the job done. The complementary capabilities of each service provided a synergism which ensured mission success.

The last of the three factors of success was that agencies, such as the United Nations Disaster Relief organizations, and other countries were able to help start rebuilding the infrastructure.

It was not an all-United States show. There was an "ad hoc" coalition of other nations who came to render assistance. This emphasis on "coalition" is the only way for the future. The United States

can no longer be the world policeman: It is a partner, and that must be remembered. In many instances, U.S. technology and ideology will place it in a leadership role. There are indications which show that other nations will follow the lead. Our quick action and strong response to the disaster probably encouraged other nations to participate. India, Japan, the United Kingdom, France, People's Republic of China, and Pakistan all provided support in the way of helicopters and other significant assistance.

There was a disinformation program with which to contend. Certain nations of the region charged that the U.S. was going to establish a permanent base in Bangladesh. To counter this, weekly briefings were conducted for all foreign ambassadors in Bangladesh. After the first briefing, these foreign ambassadors turned to the JTF Commander and -- in an unheard of statement -- said, "We wish to put our operations under your operational control." Thus, "Sea Angel" was a joint **and** a combined operation in the classic sense of those terms. But, it was even more than this.

Perhaps the most important intangible to success was the relationship established with the Bangladeshi Government. Ambassador William Milam advised appropriate government officials that they would "run the show" and that U.S. forces would back them up. Their sovereignty and national pride were respected, and this was a vital element. This method also helped provide the catalytic agent to bring together U.S. and international non-governmental organizations with the government of Bangladesh. There had to be caution here, since there can be a natural enmity between some agencies who think they know what the country needs and Third World governments who think the agencies are undermining them. This operation did not experience this.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS "PITFALLS"

There are many "pitfalls" which are inherent to any operation, be it during peace or war. Some are generic to all, while others are operation specific. The most basic of "pitfalls" is to assume that each one listed below will apply to every situation every time. Some "pitfalls" are:

* International resolve and aid will always be there when needed -- not so! Other disasters, lack of funds, and political constraints will all have an impact on specific operations.

* Aid is on the way: Relax, we're okay -- wrong! The magnitude of worthy causes is much increased and resources appear to be a diminishing commodity.

* They're coming, cancel other requirements -- no one country or group of two countries can do the entire job alone! Coalitions are the way to operate.

* The military can do it alone -- no, they can't! Cooperation and coordination with all governmental, non-governmental, and international agencies are absolutely essential.

* If the military can conduct combat operations, it easily can accomplish humanitarian operations -- a sure path to failure! Some capabilities may be directly applicable while others are antithetical. Undoubtedly, the vast majority of military capabilities do have some pertinence. Plans and training must address both.

* A campaign plan is only an unaffordable luxury -- inadvisable! A clear mission statement, composition of the force, and an "end state" desired are all important elements to help focus the effort.

AVOIDING THE "PITFALLS"

How are these "pitfalls" avoided? There must be a plan. The plan may have to be developed very quickly, but rapid planning is a military forte. The plan should be rehearsed if time permits. Even if it is simply a matter of "talking through the plan," that is better than "shooting from the hip." This plan must be explained to *everyone* involved, and it must be explained clearly until each individual knows what the mission is. Political esoteric rationale is

not beyond the scope of understanding for the young men and women who serve in today's armed forces.

External needs must be anticipated. This is the forte of ambassadors and the business of non-governmental organizations. They must be involved very early in humanitarian efforts. The Agency for International Development (AID) was a magnificent catalyst for helping accomplish this anticipation during "Sea Angel." In a related vein, aid-giving agencies must be alerted early and updated in order to help them anticipate future possible requests. A single all-agency, all-nationality headquarters should be established to control the relief effort.

Military forces must be sensitive to the feelings of other government, non-governmental, and international organizations. Those groups must be recognized as important since they are peacekeepers in the truest sense. A mutual understanding of each other's capabilities is absolutely required.

There is a lack of knowledge in many countries, as with non-governmental agencies, about what capabilities a U.S. JTF can provide to a relief effort and vice-versa. Since this is mutual, all must be better educated. In Bangladesh, when they saw that one LCAC could lift 60-tons in a single lift, when they saw what helicopters could carry in a single lift, they recognized the capabilities the JTF had with it, and the next morning, on the runway to Chittagong, were a hundred tons of supplies for distribution.

If local and/or international military or paramilitary organizations are deployed, the need for liaison officers cannot be stressed enough -- all forces have to be on the same "sheet of music." This is true regardless of whether the mission is power or assistance projection.

Disaster preparedness contingency plans should be formulated if they do not already exist. These must include procedures for requesting, receiving, and processing massive support from international sources. The nations receiving assistance are the ones who

should request support, but they may require help in distribution and other matters in which the military can assist.

Finally, there must be a constant effort to communicate, coordinate, cooperate, and -- something the military does not do well -- compromise. On someone else's turf, more is done by compromise than by showing up with an attitude of being the "biggest kid on the block."

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

Some advice is contained in the previous section, but it is not all inclusive, nor is it omniscient. There are, however, a few broad areas which require immediate attention if military forces are to play a more effective role in humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations.

Encyclopedic cultural and societal information on various nations and regions of the world must be more readily available to all who participate in these operations. It was fascinating to watch two cultures interact. On one hand, there was amazement on the part of the Bangladeshi as they watched a burly Marine swing two 100-pound sacks of rice -- one on each shoulder -- and walk off with it to load it on a vehicle. By the same token, these Marines stood and watched in amazement as a graceful Bangladeshi woman, with a 60-pound weight on the top of her head and with a straight spine, negotiated rocky paths. Two different cultures: Two different ways of lifting things! Information must be available, but, more importantly, it must be used.

A basic difficulty that the Bangladeshi faced was that they were unable to reach out to remote areas, or into areas which had been rendered remote by destroyed communications. They were unable to identify what the greatest needs were -- shelter in one area, food in another, medical supplies in still another. This sort of information is required so that aid can be applied efficiently. There is no easy answer to this problem. Local officials will have to be relied upon for this information. The military can assist most efficaciously in transporting these experts to the areas in question. LCACs,

helicopters, other vehicles give a capability to get out to the countryside to determine the needs, and then to distribute essential specialists, supplies, and equipment.

Also in the area of information gathering and intelligence processing, there is a desperate need to have a space dimension not only in time of war, but in time of peace. If multi-spectral imagery had been available for "Sea Angel," with a terminal aboard the ships, relief would have been applied more quickly and thousands more lives might have been saved. Reconnaissance had to be done by low-level helicopters, with disaster relief teams from the Army aboard, to identify what the shoreline looked like, what the infrastructure looked like, and where things had to go. Multi-spectral imagery -- with a before and after look -- would have solved the problem.

It has been mentioned before, but bears repeating here since it is critical to the success of humanitarian/disaster relief operations -- **it must be a team effort.** During "Sea Angel," the JTF worked together in a very compatible way with CARE, UNICEF, Save the Children, OXFAM, a whole crew of international organizations. Those organizations brought it together while the military did the heavy lift -- each effectively using its strength in a complementary manner. The JTF had "carte blanche" from the National Command Authorities to fly anybody assisting in the disaster relief in U.S. military helicopters. This is not standard procedure, but it should be.

The relationship with the host government must be one which allows that government to establish the priorities and needs. There was no corruption in Bangladesh -- the good reached those who needed them. A big advantage was a British system of civil servants and a British system of military professionals -- gallant and out-manned, but willing to work with us. The JTF provided coordination cells next to the President's office and an Operations Cell at Chittagong. All the "players" were brought together in an effort to determine where the needs lay. That planning cell focused 72-hours to a week out into the future in order to accomplish what

had to be done. Most importantly, Bangladeshi sovereignty was respected.

Stated simply, the intent of humanitarian assistance must be to save lives, not to reconstruct a nation. If the latter is attempted, it could be a "tar pit." That's not affordable! The international community must be the one to attempt the long-range improvement through reconstruction. The U.S. military can assist with short-term help.

In Bangladesh, their local infrastructure was repaired, light engineer work was done, and a system was set back into motion. This allowed self-sustainment and brought their own sense of dignity and esteem back into play. They had people that could continue the work after we assisted them through the immediate crisis.

One of the greatest successes which can be used as a model was that medical elements were brought together in a way which was incredible. Public health in Bangladesh was advanced by two years as a result of this disaster relief, simply in the necessary preventive medicine which was applied. They were left with a federal emergency management agency-style operation so that they could educate their own people on how to handle disasters. U.S.-led efforts helped them to help themselves -- now and in the future.

EPILOGUE

Those responsible for planning and allocating funds must recognize that, with a smaller armed force, decision-makers will have to select those crises which the U.S. attempts a response. There exists within the military today, capabilities which can be harnessed to accomplish great good in this changing world without hazarding its primary role of defending the nation, its citizens, and its ideals. Naval expeditionary forces, since they can operate from sea-bases, are ideal to respond to crises along the littoral regions of nations requiring assistance. They can remain at sea within easy response time and do not depend on an already strained infrastructure ashore. They are truly a part of the solution and not the problem.

Although the tone of this has been positive for the most part, this section must end on a cautionary note. While many individuals talk about potential Armageddon with weapons proliferation, or about conventional deterrence in Europe, or about a nuclear North Korea -- the ticking "time bomb" is Africa, Southeast Asia, Southern Asia, and Latin America. It is sobering to consider that international health organizations estimate that, sometime between the years 2000 and 2010, much of the African population will be infected by the HIV virus. That's a bomb every bit as big as anything nuclear.

It is in those regions where our forward presence operations must be directed. Modest efforts with Mobile Training Teams, security assistance, humanitarian assistance, and other efforts can attain benefits well beyond the costs. Forward presence operations are here, they are now. Decision-makers, planners, and operators must learn to perform these missions as well -- if not better than -- they plan and conduct combat operations. The emerging global strategic environment will demand this and no less if we are indeed to make *caring* our credo rather than conflict.

The U.N. Contribution to Future International Security

Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering

I.

Perhaps the most important fact with which planners and policymakers have had to contend with over the last two years is that the end of the Cold War removed from the international political system, its central dominating principle - the East-West dispute. In a speech last April, President Bush outlined his vision of a new framework. He has described it in the following words:

The New World order does not mean surrendering our sovereignty or forfeiting our interests. It really describes a responsibility imposed by our successes. It refers to new ways of working with other nations to deter aggression and to achieve stability. To achieve prosperity and, above all, to achieve peace. It springs from hopes for a world based on a shared commitment to a set of principles that undergird our relations - peaceful settlement of disputes. Solidarity against aggression. Reduced and controlled arsenals, and just treatment of peoples.

What are the security implications of a transition from the Cold War to the kind of new order the President has described? If one looks at U.S. post Cold War security interests through a U.N. window, one way to describe the view is to talk about two adjacent circles separated by a rather permeable border. In the first circle are core U.S. security interests:

- Protection against direct attack;
- Protection of US citizens abroad;
- Aid and support of allies;

- Maintenance of unmolested international communications and commerce;
- Assurance of access to vital resources;
- Insulation of essential interests from the effects of foreign wars - such as the tanker escorts late in the Iran-Iraq war; and so on.

In the second circle are the general and broad goals, values and principles which are the essence of that civil international society whose vision President Bush invokes by speaking of a new world order or a "Pax Universalis." It embraces:

- The rule of law;
- Non-aggression and the pacific settlement of disputes;
- Respect for sovereignty;
- Defense of human rights and respect for humanitarian principles;
- Control of arsenals;
- Curbs on proliferation;
- And, in general, a disciplined, cooperative approach to common security.

It is necessary to explore the U.N. authorized use of force as necessary to protect such principles.

II.

The centrality of the U.N. Security Council to the shaping and legitimizing of the response to Iraqi aggression has raised expectations, hence political pressure, for a comparable council role in other crises. Expectations that the U.N. will swiftly act on the Haitian coup, the civil wars in Yugoslavia, and in Liberia last year, illustrate the point.

However, it is worth remembering that the charter never intended the Security Council to be its only or full-time court of first resort. Indeed, Article 52 explicitly mandates regional efforts to resolve or redress threats to peace and security before resort to the

U.N. And that is a good thing. In the first instance, these are often what might be termed "neighborhood" issues, and common regional interests may permit a wider scope of action.

Nevertheless the future will surely bring crises that are not regionally containable despite the best efforts of regional actors. At that point, the Security Council can be turned to as a necessary and legitimate step. The Council can also expand on regional efforts when required, internationalizing a trade embargo for example.

One of the things that drive this global/regional question is the character of conflict itself. Readers of the daily summaries prepared by the intelligence community know that most entries describe conflicts within states not between them. In the post Desert Storm period that is an instructive fact, it reminds us that threats to regional stability will not result primarily from the miscalculations of expansionist powers. As the Middle East and Yugoslavia daily demonstrate, regional stability after the Cold War - at it was before it - is largely shaped by essentially parochial concerns of an ethnic, religious, political, economic and social character. This may cause some nostalgia about the neatness and clarity of the Iraqi threat, which from both a political and a strategic perspective was more a caricature of the Cold War with a legal overlay and an ostentatious villain than a useful metaphor for the untidy challenges and conflicts ahead.

A daily dilemma facing the Security Council in this context is that while the rule of law and the role of order are more comfortably complementary after the Cold War, they are not equivalent. Our humanitarian and political interest in seeing an orderly resolution in Yugoslavia may not conflict with, but it certainly exceeds any responsibilities conferred by relevant international law. Similarly, international law has little positive to say about the responsibilities of other states in the event of coups and anarchy or bloodshed within a neighbor's borders. In fact the rule of law would permit - though it is unpleasant to ponder - a world convulsed by extraordinarily destructive but utterly legal internal conflict. (The OAS Santiago Declaration about the non-acceptability of govern-

mental change by coup represents an important step forward now under test in Haiti.)

This dilemma is not helped by the fact that the common law of states as well as the covenants and treaties agreed between them permit competing and conflicting claims. Nowhere is this more evident than when the international community is forced to choose between the rights of states and the rights of peoples.

Our continuing experience with Iraq illustrates the tension. When in November of 1990 the Security Council adopted Resolution 678 authorizing action to expel Iraq from Kuwait, its legal basis was the U.N. Charter prohibition, in Article 2, paragraph 4, on the threat or use of force against another state. When persecuted Iraqi Kurds fled into Turkey and Iran five months later, the Security Council made a very different finding. It reasoned, in Resolution 688, that the massive flight of the Kurds presented a threat to peace and security sufficient to override the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of another state, a principle protected by another provision (paragraph 7) of the same article.

Yet it is important to bear in mind that this groundbreaking resolution was very difficult to negotiate, notwithstanding the humanitarian issue and the threat to regional security. And more recently there has been very stiff resistance to forceful resolutions of Yugoslavia and Haiti. This leads to two conclusions. First, there is work to do before the Security Council is ready to serve regularly as global crisis manager. That would require a clear and predictable consensus on how and to what extent it should address threats to international security arising from internal situations within states. No such consensus yet exists. Second, as a consequence, we must remain open - as the U.N. Charter provides - to alternative regional and even unilateral tools to serve the "order" as well as the "law and justice" agendas expressed by the President.

In a sense, this approach to security leads us back to first principles. Part of the "work" to be done is the same that our membership in the U.N. and other international institutions has always required. It is the toilsome task of nurturing an international society

of common values to inform and vitalize the orderly world the President calls for and which we all wish to live in. Civil order in the U.S. benefits from the absorptive power of shared values and a common culture which can dull differences, lessen rivalries and make most of us stake-holders in the status quo.

The absence of a parallel culture internationally, however tolerable during the Cold War, is now a source of frustration. While the collapse of communism has eliminated the major global clash of values, it has had an opposite effect on other nationalist, tribal, religious, economic and ethnic conflicts that have been there for some time and may even reenergize North-South economic discord.

For this reason, we are unlikely to see the rapid elaboration of international law to provide assured external guarantees for minority rights, democratically elected governments, or hungry people caught in a civil war. A significant number of U.N. members do not see such principles as leading to order but subversive of it, at least subversive of an order based on firm doctrines of state sovereignty and non-intervention. Such views will sometimes prevent resort to the formal organs of the United Nations on occasions when their use would be desirable. But it is important to emphasize that neither the exercise of our rights under Article 51, nor careful engagement in support of our foreign policy principles requires us to act under an explicit grant of U.N. authority at all times. The former may well be preferable, but it is not difficult to imagine circumstances where either the fast-breaking nature of the threat or the inability of the Security Council to reach a decision argue for rapid unilateral or regional action.

On the other hand, it is reasonable to expect future occasions when the U.N. authorized resort to force may be both feasible politically as well as desirable from a U.S. perspective. Yet with the exception of the Korean War, the subject of U.N. authorized enforcement actions and their legal and practical features is an unwritten text. Nor is the job of writing that text aided by the fact that the threats we must deal with fit awkwardly into any imaginable U.N.-based structure. And neither will the U.N. - however strengthened - easily embrace the potentially wide security missions of the

future. So we should look to the U.N. to deliver a part of the solution at best. How large a part may depend upon its ability to develop two key elements of any new approach to security: legitimacy and flexibility.

As a starting point, we need to understand what constitutes "legitimacy" for intervention by force. For ourselves and our allies, Resolution 678 authorizing "all necessary means" to secure Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal was close to an ideal formulation. It gave a U.N. license for the use of force without restriction as to its manner or extent, or explicit terms for its cessation, important military and political considerations in the successful conduct of operations.

Not surprisingly, these open-ended attributes gave discomfort to many other U.N. members. The Secretary General himself has commented that while the war against Iraq was "made legitimate by the Security Council" it "was not a U.N. victory" since that could have resulted only from "hostilities controlled and directed by the U.N." One need not share Perez de Cuellar's view to appreciate his point: The most iron-clad legal justification may not buy us that more evanescent political commodity called legitimacy. For example, the ambiguity of the phrase "all necessary means" meant that actions necessary for Desert Storm's success might in the view of the Council majority have exceeded the intent of 678. While that did not occur, it created an uncovered risk. Another consideration is that broadly licensing a few countries to use force in the Council's name enables detractors to argue that the action is the project of a few governments unrepresentative of the world community.

For military actions comparable in scale to Desert Storm, there does not seem an obvious answer to this problem since a greater degree of U.N. direction and control could have imposed disabling constraints. On the other hand, we hope and believe that the scale of Iraq-Kuwait is unlikely to be repeated in the foreseeable future. Moreover, Council cohesion nurtured by the Iraq experience could carry over to other issues. If this proves true, there may be pressure for enhancing the Security Council's role in future peace enforcement and this should be considered.

One way the Charter offers to do that is by negotiation of Article 43 agreements between the Security Council and countries it selects. Paragraph 1 of Article 43 requests member states to:

“Undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call, and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining peace and security.”

My own reading of Article 43 suggests several relevant points:

First, the conclusion of such an agreement need not confer an automatic, mandatory obligation to provide troops to the Security Council, but could instead simply state their availability subject to certain terms or procedures.

Second, Article 43 is silent on command arrangements: The phrase “on its call” does not necessarily mean “at its direction.”

Third, by specifying “assistance and facilities” the language permits members to satisfy their obligations by means other than provision of combat troops - a useful flexibility.

Fourth, paragraph 3 specifies that agreements shall be at the initiative of the Security Council. A helpful limiting factor that ensures selectivity.

Finally, paragraph 3 also states that agreements may be between the Council and individual members of groups of members. Offering a potential basis for associations between the Security Council and regionally based alliances. Since alliances offer a more functional basis for concerted military action than a chance grouping of U.N. member states, this too could be a useful feature.

A vital question about ‘43’ is whether, and what kind, of command arrangements it implies. In my view ‘43’ agreements are not incompatible with signatories’ exercise of wide military latitude when those agreements are invoked. In this sense, the agreement

might be less a format for direct Council control than an expression of its general capacity to enforce decisions and hence, a means of deterrence. In fact, agreements with powerful members or groups of members might have a psychological impact similar to a classic mutual assistance pact, strengthening respect for decisions under Articles 39 (power of recommendation), 40 (provisional measures) and 41 (embargoes: diplomatic and other sanctions) and by extension, for statements of the Secretary General or the Council President. On the other hand, of course, the reality of the Permanent Member veto would remain a factor in this as in any other effort to extend the Council's scope.

Delegated enforcement is explicitly anticipated in the U.N. Charter, most relevantly in Articles 48 and 53. Article 48 empowers the Council to determine which members shall conduct the action required to carry out its decisions "for the maintenance of international peace and security." Article 53 permits the Council to utilize "regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority."

Notwithstanding the legality of delegated enforcement, we should allow for the possibility that the Council will not absent itself so completely from command and control as it did in Resolution 678. As you know, Chapter VII provides vehicles for Council involvement:

Article 42 permits it to act by air, sea or land forces to give effect to its decisions when Article 41 measures are deemed inadequate:

Article 46 calls for the Council to develop plans for the application of armed force with the assistance of a Military Staff Committee (MSC):

Article 47 details the MSC's terms of reference, which include advice to the Council on arms control, readiness planning, general matters of command as well as strategic direction of forces.

Any move in this direction will raise concerns among troop contributors. The chapter's emphasis on the MSC is especially problematic: no state whose troops are engaged in hostilities is likely to allow their direction by a group to which it does not belong or whose members have necessarily also contributed troops. There is also the need to ensure that committed troops are not subject to life-threatening surprises by changes in the political parameters governing their use, or by a breach in security or by other factors arising from activities which might be implied by the words "strategic direction." Thirdly, unless the reference to strategic command (47.3) is interpreted in some static sense, the technology of modern warfare probably makes it obsolete: it requires flexible, decentralized decision making and instantaneous communication - neither is well suited to decision by U.N. committee.

Yet there may be ways of partially employing Articles 42 and 47 while inoculating them against their most intrusive potential and these may be worth exploring particularly in the context of small scale or low intensity conflict. For example, a more explicit articulation of war aims may sometimes be desirable. More specific goals do not mean more modest ones, but they do make the Security Council more accountable for actions to secure them. A war aims statement might also specify minimum terms for cessation of hostilities - as distinct from terms for an overall settlement. A general statement of permissible means would add legitimacy by further distinguishing peace enforcement from other uses of force, though such pronouncements would only be advisable to the extent they did not expose troops to additional risk. We may also wish to explore arrangements whereby peace enforcers could report regularly and in person to the Council itself or a sub-group of the Council. While not altering command relationships, such a consultative link could be a helpful tool for preserving consensus.

THE U.N. AND COALITION FORCES

One of the questions our security community will need to consider is the issue of command and operational integration of the forces which might be employed to give effect to a Security Council decision. This requires a trade-off between the need to avoid over-

identification with a few countries, and the exigencies of the unity of command, rapid deployment, coordinated movements, and so on. Before going beyond the level of joint action employed in Desert Storm, in many substantive respects a NATO operation, are we persuaded that there are militarily and politically satisfactory answers to many unanalyzed questions about non-NATO coalition warfare? It was this sort of appreciation for the unexpected that prompted this comment from General George C. Marshall in 1938:

With us, geographical location and the international situation make it literally impossible to find definite answers for such questions as: Who will be our enemy in the next war; in what theatre of operations will it be fought; and what will be our national objective at the time?

But today's planners have a tougher task: not only do we not know the identity of our future adversaries, neither do we necessarily know who our friends - in the sense of coalition partners - will be. Yet joint arrangements for defeating a capable foe will require substantial unity of command and control, and the standard peacekeeping command format - decentralized command across national sectors - may not suffice under the fluidity of combat conditions. A technologically advanced but weakly united U.N. force might even be at a disadvantage against a low-tech but well-directed opponent.

Such considerations suggest that a significant level of interoperability may be needed for U.N.-authorized military operations. Between forces of vastly differing capabilities with no history of cooperation, this would seem to require achieving a sort of "U.N. standard" paralleling that of peacekeeping. It could involve such things as doctrine, rules of engagement, training and joint exercises, command and control, IFF systems, intel-sharing, language, logistic support and so on. Achieving all of this would mean unheard-of levels of military openness and may be difficult for governments to accept outside an alliance context. A further detailed look at most of these issues would be a useful beginning step to help flesh out the contours of the new order we seek.

In that regard, it is interesting to note that such a review was initiated twice during the early years of the U.N. The first time, from 1946 through 1948 the Permanent Members of the Security Council, meeting as the Military Staff Committee, held lengthy negotiations to produce a model Article 43 agreement, by which a member state would supply forces to the U.N. The second time was in connection with the Korean War. Reviews of both of these have been conducted by independent researchers.

The discussions of the early Military Staff Committee covered the following issues:

FORCE STRENGTH

The overall strength of the U.N. force would be small. Its moral weight and potential would be its strength. It would be limited in size so as to take prompt action. The Security Council could change the overall strength of the force by entering into additional special agreements with member-states.

FORCE CONTRIBUTIONS

The Permanent Five initially would contribute the major portion of the troops. The United States, France, Britain, and China (the Nationalist government) agreed that contributions would be comparable to each nation's capabilities. The Soviet Union insisted on equality of contributions.

CONTRIBUTIONS OTHER THAN FORCES

Contributions by members need not necessarily be represented by armed forces. Members could fulfill their obligations by furnishing "assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage" (Article 43(1)).

DECISION TO DEPLOY

Armed forces would be deployed only on the decision of the Security Council and only for the period necessary to fulfill tasks envisaged by Article 42. Due to the military advantage of it, the U.N.

force should be deployed in time to forestall or to suppress promptly a breach of the peace or act of aggression.

DECISION TO WITHDRAWAL

The United States, France, Britain, and China agreed that the U.N. force would be withdrawn as quickly as possible and that a deadline would be established by the Security Council. The Soviet Union, however, believed that the U.N. force must be withdrawn within 30-90 days after the Article 42 measures have been fulfilled, unless the Security Council decides otherwise. The Soviets also argued that the forces must be withdrawn from "rights of passage" territories within 30 days.

READINESS

The degree of readiness of the national contingents would be established in the respective special agreements. The contingents must be able to start action "in good time." They must be ready for combat.

FORCES LOCATION

With the exception of the Soviet Union, the permanent members agreed upon a wide distribution of forces throughout the world so that the Security Council could take prompt action in any part of the world. They also agreed that any displacement of these forces likely to modify their availability should be brought to the Security Council's notice.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The Permanent Five agreed that the designated national contingents would remain under the control of the member governments until the Security Council activated them for U.N. service. But they were insistent that the "control" be exercised by the Security Council, not the Military Staff Committee. The latter would be responsible for the "strategic direction" of the U.N. force. Yet the actual command of the national contingents would be exercised by com-

manders appointed by the respective member governments. The units would retain their national character and would be subject at all times to the discipline and regulations in force in their national armed forces.

OVERALL COMMAND

China, the Soviet Union, and the United States agreed that there should be an overall commander(s) appointed by the Security Council on the advice of the Military Staff Committee to coordinate decision making. France and Britain argued instead for a supreme commander who would have the power to direct action by all U.N. forces under his command.

By March 1947, the negotiations broke down, with the USSR the sole dissenter on the critical question of whether the forces supplied should be equal (the Soviet preference) or comparable (the position of the other four). The Soviets believed equality would require a ceiling corresponding to the contribution of the weakest Permanent Member and thus precluding predominance by any single country. The Military Staff Committee reported to the Security Council on its failure to resolve this and other differences, and never resumed the discussion.

The onset of the Korean War in 1950 led to another set of efforts to develop the U.N.'s procedures for collective enforcement action. One of these was a consultative mechanism by which representatives of troop-contributing countries consulted once weekly at the political level. The Committee of 16, so named because there were 16 troop contributors, enabled contributor governments to voice their opinions on the military situation and express views on future actions directly to the U.S. According to accounts of the period, Committee of 16 meetings often influenced U.S. policy choices.¹



¹ Leland Goodrich in W. Frye, ed. *A United Nations Peace Force*, page 193.

Other planning by a U.N. committee under the Uniting for Peace Resolution of the U.N. General Assembly contains clear parallels to some of today's issues:

- To produce a **deterrent effect**, it suggested an affirmation of readiness by states willing to take collective action in support of Security Council decisions;
- To permit **rapid response** to a breach of peace, it suggested appointment of a state or states to initiate military action and coordinate the efforts of other states until such time as the Military Staff Committee could act;
- To achieve **force compatibility**, it proposed creation of a panel of military experts, serving in their personal capacity, who would advise individual members on the organization, training and equipping of forces for U.N. use;

ENHANCING PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

These remarks have focused on the use-of-force aspects of the UN's security roles. Let me conclude by returning to more familiar ground: the UN and conflict avoidance. In the communique of the London Summit, the G7 leaders committed themselves to shoring up the basis for UN preventive diplomacy - a theme the President revisited when he addressed the General Assembly last month. To fulfill this goal the institution will need to shift to a higher gear. Useful steps could include:

1. Informal information sharing, by ourselves and other member states, to keep the Secretary General fully informed of existing or potential situations which could lead to international friction (this is now occurring within the context of Resolution 687's Iraqi WMD inspection program).
2. Requiring disputants or potential disputants to keep the Secretary General and through him, the Security Council, fully informed of all pertinent facts;

3. Supporting the enhanced use of special representatives in good offices and quiet diplomacy missions to help resolve issues which may lead to conflict:

4. And finally, inviting the Secretary General and the Council to give early consideration to the use of U.N. forces as a means of forestalling conflict before hostilities occur, such as by deployment to the borders of a threatened state. This may well involve elements of traditional peacekeeping and of peace enforcement as well.

The United States has traditionally opposed participation of our military in actual peacekeeping operations, while, on a case-by-case basis, U.S. personnel have served in a civilian capacity and occasionally as military observers. However, the possible deployment of peacekeepers as a preemptive measure or as a tripwire raises the issue of participation by Permanent Members in a different context. Unlike traditional peacekeeping where at least a stated commitment to a ceasefire is a given, a tripwire mission is necessitated by the active possibility of belligerence and is deployed to discourage it. Such a force would need the military capacity to slow an aggressor's advance and it would need an over-the-horizon capacity sufficient to deter the advance from taking place. In simplified terms, this is the principle which effectively served U.S. and coalition military efforts during Operation Provide Comfort. While of course it deserves careful study, the tripwire idea is a classic tool which if applied by the U.N. may justify a new U.S. approach to participation in U.N. peacekeeping forces.

It is time to put peacekeeping financing on a more stable long-term footing commensurate with its importance to global security - and our own. A step in the right direction within the U.S. would be to take a hard look now at creating a substantial peacekeeping account possibly within, or in relationship to, the Department of Defense budget, in recognition of the clear security purposes of peacekeeping expenditure.

CONCLUSION

From time to time, as history turns remarkable corners, writers use the term “annus mirabilis,” or “miraculous year” to express their amazement. These are indeed amazing times. They are not, however, from a security point of view, miraculous. There is no shortage of causes which human beings will kill or die for. Nor will we now retire all of the classic tools for pursuing and defending our interests. Nor will others. But I would submit that the U.N.’s capacity to serve common security concerns has never been greater nor more susceptible to constructive thinking or influence.

Naval Power Projection and Expeditionary Forces - A Western European Perspective

Mr. David Nicholls

"No man is an island, entire to itself."

(John Donne, Meditations)

This paper, while giving special emphasis to potential European contributions to future naval power projection, looks at the likely political and practical defense environments in which these might be made.

In a recent article in the British Press, Field Marshal Lord Carver, a former British Chief of Defense Staff and distinguished writer, stated:

"Britain's realm cannot be defended from Britain itself, from its land, from the seas immediately surrounding it and the airspace above both."

As Lord Carver goes on to say, this has evidently been true for centuries, though it has been reinforced by the range and nature of modern weapons. And while he was writing about Britain's future defence needs, the statement applies equally to other European nations. And why he should need to restate the obvious is because there do exist trends and tendencies towards renationalisation of defence and less than enthusiasm - indeed at worst indifference - towards the logical extension of Lord Carver's dictum, so that it applies not just to the UK, not just to Europe, but to the world community at large.

Nonetheless, the European approach to military power projection in the future must inevitably be coloured by the inheritance of

the past. It will reflect a mixture of three experiences: colonial, or of Empire, including withdrawal from it; of NATO and the transatlantic relationship; and of the United Nations.

As to the first, the issue for many European countries is no longer one of front page significance, even though history has an uncomfortable way of resurfacing, as with recent events in the former Belgian colonies. Most European nations have, at one stage or other, gone through an often emotional and painful period of withdrawal from Empire, in which both political and economic pressures have played a part: either specifically in relation to individual colonies or dependencies, or generally in terms of a reduction or withdrawal of the level of regional military presence. Some countries, notably Germany, came to terms with the problem many years ago - indeed were obliged to do so - and have found other ways of exerting influence and of enhancing their economic well-being; some, especially Britain and France, may perceive that national economic prosperity does not depend any more on projecting national military power, but retain obligations to dependencies which are not yet ready, or show no signs of being ready, to become independent or - and the notable case is Hong Kong - will be transferred to another's authority.

It has to be added that these two countries may also find it convenient that they are obliged to retain such overseas responsibilities in order to justify to themselves a capability for power projection which helps to maintain their status as players on the world stage, a status to which they instinctively cling.

There are other and different influences at work, but some common threads can be identified:

- Western European countries in general do not view the projection of national military power as indispensable for the political and economic well-being of their realm;
- Just as national security can only be achieved in-theatre through collective defence, so Western Europeans see security in its broadest sense depending on collective economic approaches;

- There is no sign of a return to major national projections of force; the irreversible trend towards shedding Empire and national power projection through military forces has been matched by reductions in the means to maintain military forces specifically for that purpose: in some cases the latter has been a natural consequence of the former, in other cases the need for budgetary reductions has accelerated the inevitable process of withdrawal;

- In any event, defence reviews (usually euphemisms for defence cuts) have left little scope for maintaining forces even for contingencies outside the European theatre.

In fact, as the years passed, concentration on in-theatre defence ceased to be a matter of financial expediency and developed into becoming a matter of policy; while the retreats from Empire often occasioned bloody battles fought overseas with national troops, each European member of NATO saw the vital need to prevent such battles being fought in Europe; and the principle that effective deterrence has meant devoting a high level of national spending to collective defence within an international framework became well recognized and accepted.

This experience of partnership in collective defence - which, centred on NATO, has embraced within it North America as well as Western Europe, and has seen the United States both as a leader of the Alliance as well as an equal partner within it - has lasted over 40 years, and during that time the habits of working together have been developed in every field of politico-military endeavour from consultation in the North Atlantic Council on the political side, for example, to joint exercises, training, command and control and support in the military field. These habits have been positive, productive and taken together have, in the context in which they were developed, translated into a determination and steadfastness to stand together which has led to the ending of the Cold War; the overall experience now provides the basis for and points the way towards future endeavours of a collective nature, if they should be needed.

The NATO experience has, however, also witnessed less successful attempts at collective approaches: For example, successes in the field of collective procurement have been fewer than might have been hoped. On the political side, and very relevant to this paper, attempts to encourage European allies to work together under the NATO flag in confronting threats and challenges beyond the NATO area have met with scepticism and obstruction; and have on occasions soured transatlantic relations. Notable examples were the American-led initiatives of the late 1970s and early 1980s, responding to the perceived Soviet threat to the oil fields of the Gulf and highlighted by the invasion of Afghanistan. The American appeal to respond to this invasion with a show of solidarity produced only a modest contribution from the United States' European partners; the so-called "post Afghanistan" measures barely survived a year.

The more insistent appeal for the creation of forces specially to deal with "out of area" emergencies (which was later coupled with the threat of withdrawal of American forces from Europe to deal with such emergencies if there was no Allied response) was also gradually allowed to be left aside; but the concept of allies working together under NATO auspices to deal with any emergency outside the NATO area - a concept which embraced drawing up measures to enable Allied forces so to operate, through pre-planned staging, transit and overflying rights - was pursued as policy issue and engendered a heated debate.


The reasons for this are worth examining, as they are relevant to likely European attitudes in the future. Objections included the economic price that might have to be paid, coupled with feelings that resources could be better spent on economic aid, and a general reluctance of ex-Imperial powers to become involved in the disputes of their former territories. An important objection was the risk of prejudicing relations with other friendly countries; thus, for example, the case of the Turks, who were unwilling to enter into open-ended staging arrangements for fear of damaging relations with their Islamic neighbours.

But the predominant concern manifested itself in the fear of being sucked in to super power disputes, with a risk of an escalation of any conflict; the fear of such scenarios transcended the fear of Soviet power projection - not least of all the evidence of Soviet naval power projection, which was seen and recognized as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy - even though this, too, could have proved damaging to the interests of member states.

Nonetheless, even though there could be no agreement that emergencies outside the NATO area should be formally discussed in NATO with coordinated responses being made under a NATO flag, Heads of State and Government were able to approve,¹ at the NATO Summit in Bonn in 1982, that those nations who saw a threat to their own interests and who wished to do so, could consult together within the NATO forum and, as appropriate, coordinate action.

However, when, for the first time following this agreement, the Iran/Iraq war with its threats to freedom of navigation in the Gulf exploded into a major "out of area" crisis affecting more than one member of NATO, the Western European allies who were both members of NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) chose the latter body as the principal forum² for consultation and coordination of action, even though the forces they decided to deploy were (the French excepted) assigned to NATO.

Moreover, the WEU nations cooperated in order to implement United Nations resolutions: It is noteworthy that individual European nations' reservations about becoming involved in dispute beyond the NATO area under NATO auspices have not extended to the operations of the United Nations. Thus, over the period of the Cold War, the United Nations have been engaged in peace-keeping or peace-inducing activities and individual European nations have played a part in these; the post-war period began with a mul-



¹ Though the French reserved their position.

² There were consultations with other NATO allies, notably the Americans, but not formal NATO discussions when the first decisions were taken on how to handle the crisis.

ti-national force in the name of the U.N. repelling the North Korean invasion of South Korea; and the Cold War has ended simultaneously with a Coalition operating on Security Council mandates to liberate Kuwait.

At this point it is right to remember that much of the peacekeeping since the Second World War has not been carried out by the United Nations Organization or under their auspices, and that there may well still be circumstances in which power projection in support of keeping the peace or for giving humanitarian aid will be more appropriately carried out by states operating outside the ambit of that Organization; and that what happened in the conflict with Iraq may never repeat itself. But it is nonetheless possible to draw the conclusion that, in the future, any out of area operations involving Western European forces are most likely to attract consensus if they take place as collective endeavours under the auspices or authority of the United Nations. This conclusion is the more likely given that NATO and the United Nations are now linked in the Alliance's new Strategic Concept, agreed and issued at the NATO Summit in November 1991: This includes specific reference to the potential use of forces planned and assembled in the name of NATO being used for service under United Nation's auspices. The increasing relevance of the United Nations may also prove vital to the future role of Germany in operations outside the NATO area: Germany's current stance, built on the standard interpretation of her Basic Law, leaves her unable or unwilling to send troops overseas and diminishes her influence on world events; yet it is difficult to believe that, in the future, a nation of her standing will not have an important contribution to make in this direction. Finally, recent remarks of Professor Adam Roberts are also relevant: Talking earlier this year to the Royal Institute of International Affairs on the subject of *A New Age in International Relations?* (and note the question mark), he commented that in what he sadly concluded to be an otherwise insufficiently changed world, the U.N. has been remarkably successful in establishing itself as a universal authority.

While the United Nations - NATO linkage is a positive development in itself, it is a long way from saying that European nations

will now switch their attention - and resources - from collective defence in NATO to global collective defence. Over and above their experience of the last 40 years or so which have already been mentioned, there are a number of reasons for this. First, and notwithstanding the Iraq experience, the general concept of world policing or world peacekeeping is still too abstract, too diffuse, to attach specific requirements to; and secondly, this is the moment to be looking for economies in defense, not creating new tasks. A good illustration of this is given by the European approach on how to use components of NATO's rapid reaction troops. The emphasis is on using the same, and not separate, forces for in-theatre (NATO-led) and out of area (WEU-led) roles. This approach in effect legitimizes temporary withdrawals from NATO of the kind practised by Britain during the Falklands Conflict and by all NATO nations during the conflict with Iraq.

It is just as well that increased talk of the United Nations will not of itself lead to Western Europeans switching their attention in that direction. Not only is there still a role for collective defence as defined in NATO's new strategy, but this also remains the principal basis for legitimizing national defence forces. Thus the NATO case operates in two directions: to help define - indeed, for many, essentially to define - national force levels of Western European members of the Alliance; and to provide the pool from within which to draw forces for duties beyond the NATO area if the need were to arise. It is likely that this situation will persist so long as NATO remains accepted as having a significant contribution to make to the defence of Europe.

It follows that to look at what kind of European naval forces there may be around for naval force and expeditionary force projection in the next 20 years or so:

- one must look at what kind of European nations who already have such a capability, with particular emphasis on deep water or blue water navies;
- one must not expect or assume that other nations will move in their direction, since limitations on resources are

likely to converge with political reluctance to turn back the tide of history.

We are thus speaking predominantly about Britain, the Netherlands and Italy from amongst the members of the intergrated force structure of NATO, and France from outside this structure, even though her naval force levels are not directly related to NATO contingency or force plans.

In the case of the first two, the formal and NATO basis for a naval force projection capability rests on the defence of the Northern Flank: and the uncertainties created by the break up of the Soviet Union are seen to enhance the case for retaining the European contribution to the defence of Norway - a perception shared by the Norwegians. Though the debate on the relative values of sea and air power in this theatre will no doubt continue, there has been no change in the belief that seapower still remains the best³ military means of achieving NATO and national objectives in or off North Norway, and on that basis (speaking now of the United Kingdom) replacement amphibious naval shipping has survived the scrutiny of the United Kingdom's post Cold War studies ("Options for Change") and has been publicly declared to be in the long term defence programme; the British Secretary of State for Defence recently reconfirmed the Government's intention to seek tenders for new ships. In the parallel British manpower review the Royal Marines have been retained; once it is recognized that special skills such as they possess have a place in the British Forces, the case for keeping them as a specialist force rather than train army personnel to take their place is difficult to rebut.

While the French have no specialist shipping, their interest in naval power projection remains; and to complete the group, the Italians have been expressing an interest in developing similar capabilities, though probably primarily aimed at disaster relief.



³ If not in some cases the only means - foggy conditions in North Norway can render the use of aircraft impossible.

The formal NATO case for retaining specialist naval shipping and personnel is strong, but probably the planned retention depends as much on national perceptions of the advantages of retaining this kind of naval capability in an uncertain world, in which, at least for the British, after the experience of the Falklands as well as of the invasion of Kuwait, the unforeseen must have its place. And in any event, there remain formal commitments to dependencies and the end of British rule in Hong Kong starts to loom.

The costs of replacing specialist shipping must leave the observer with doubts about when it can be afforded; and a sense of proportion is needed: At 7,000 strong, the Royal Marines are a small force and there are few places where they could fully measure up to a reasonable definition of a self-contained expeditionary force.

Though there is a place for a self-contained expeditionary force, and while specialist ships, craft and personnel may be key elements of such a force, there will be other important elements of European forces which can be brought to bear in a complementary way. The emphasis in NATO's strategy reviews has been on mobility and flexibility, as characterized by the redesignation of existing NATO mobile forces and the creation of specific rapid reaction forces; ship lift, for example, as shown during the Gulf conflict, will be needed as well as air lift to move land forces based in Europe to any theatre of operations beyond it. Mobility and flexibility, and collective action, are characteristics which will also be needed in peaceful as well as peacekeeping missions: disaster relief is an obvious example of this.

In the short to medium term, and so long as the NATO requirement is the essential determinant of national procurement and force management, the wider range of challenges in prospect is unlikely to replace the basic focus on meeting essential NATO force goals as economically as possible and in any case on a declining defence budget; in other words, what will be available will be based on NATO-led requirements, and there will be few funds left to finance anything else. However, the emphasis in NATO Strategy on flexibility and mobility is totally in harmony with the

application of these qualities to operations outside the NATO area; and the training and exercising which will be carried out to fulfill NATO missions will enhance the quality and preparedness of any NATO forces sent outside the NATO area.

It remains to be seen whether the in-theatre training of the rapid reaction forces of NATO can include practice in the sort of emergencies they might face if required to project their capabilities as Europeans collectively or in cooperation with others, especially the United States. For some, this would be a novelty, or a reversion to colonial experiences; for others, it would complement the sort of exercises which have seen the United Kingdom, for example, practising power projection with opposed landings thousands of miles from Europe, using naval forces. For some, it would raise the question of what kind of emergencies should be trained for, and would need the legitimacy of an operation planned with the United Nations in mind; for others, it would seem a natural continuation of the national tasks performed almost without break since the end of the Second World War. It is here that the colonial or imperial inheritance, which for many Western European nations is still a deterrent to large scale endeavours beyond Europe, may prove to be an asset; the local knowledge and experience gained over many years of operating across the world, the ties and links which have not been severed despite withdrawal back to Europe, could prove of immense value.

Britain's experience, for example, of helping to police the world and of protecting her own interests in the former pink parts of the globe, together with her attachment to retaining influence on events beyond Europe and concern at the uncertain state of the world, explain why such exercising and training within the NATO context for operations beyond it would come naturally; this would only be an extension of a policy which has been practiced, though in an increasingly modest way, ever since the Second World War. This background also explains why the case for keeping open the option of retention and replacement of forces capable of power projection has a powerful attraction. Britain has the political will to retain naval expeditionary forces; and though they might have

limited capabilities for autonomous action, they could make an effective contribution to joint operations.

It is nonetheless difficult to assess the likely collective reactions of these nations - and of other Western European nations who might form part of any expeditionary force - to future circumstances calling for action: It is probable that the reduction of tension between erstwhile Super Powers and the experience of the Iraq conflict will incline them favourably towards initiatives of the United Nations (over and above the less manpower - and equipment - demanding U.N. tasks which many nations have undertaken fairly regularly since the Second World War) and make them more inclined to join in coalitions in which the U.S. could well be in the lead; and humanitarian operations will always find willing participants, to the extent that their resources and existing forces permit.

At the same time, France and Britain will almost certainly continue to keep all options open for as long as possible - partly to protect their own residual interests, partly for reasons of status (both are members of the Security Council), partly out of national pride and tradition. But there must be serious doubts about the realism of retaining national forces capable of dealing with all sorts of contingencies unless, as for the Dutch and the British in the NATO context, there is some sharing of roles. The value of this should not be underestimated; even small forces, acting together, could both make a worthwhile military contribution and send an important political signal.

From a practical defence point of view, the evolution of the European Community, NATO and the WEU will be crucial: much now depends on the way the relationships develop between the three. The outcome of Maastricht leaves NATO inviolate but has nonetheless strengthened the position of the WEU as an instrument for the implementation of the Community's foreign and security policy. Even before Maastricht, the WEU was charged with "out-of-area" contingency planning; it remains to be seen whether this can be done effectively - is there, in practice, any point in planning for emergencies which habitually are unforeseen and are largely unforeseeable? Despite this doubt, the WEU's enhanced

status, together with the two precedents of the Iran/Iraq war and the invasion of Kuwait, when it was the WEU and not NATO which was used as the principal focus for European consultation and for coordination of the European military actions, only add to the near inevitability of the WEU's becoming the regular forum for European discussion on, and if needs be military reaction to - as Europeans or in coalition with others - events outside the NATO area which are perceived to be threatening to Western European interests. Equally important will be the continuing evolution of the European Community's foreign and security policy itself, to which Maastricht has clearly given added impetus: it remains to be seen whether, or how soon, member nations will feel bound to act in unison, or for how long they will feel able to take independent lines, or to establish bilateral arrangements in the defence field.

Britain has been at pains to stress the importance of there being no wasteful duplication of forces between the WEU and NATO - a point of view which has not been lost on economy-conscious allies, even if it is not entirely consistent with Franco-German aspirations for a separately identifiable European Army. But the questions still remain whether, or perhaps for how long, NATO can continue with its traditional coherent, collective, force planning and command systems at an adequate level of resources in the face of only a generalized threat to the security and stability of its member nations. But if NATO cannot, then probably neither can the WEU; and it is difficult to visualize the generation of the kind of political and budgetary momentum which would be needed to reproduce the structures and capabilities which have been built up in the NATO Alliance during the more than 40 years of its existence.

A similar question arises in considering the merits of giving the United Nations a military role, though there is the important associated question whether this would in any case be a proper function for that organization. The roles the United Nations may appropriately fill in a new world order have still to be defined: but, as has been commented earlier, there are arguments in favour of its primacy as monitor and moderator of world peace and stability, perhaps in step with the United States, probably willingly and ex-

pressly, giving up its role as unofficial "world policeman." It does, however, seem less likely that the United Nations will develop its own military enforcement capability, though it may well have a part in establishing guidelines for what it would be useful for the world community collectively to possess; certain criteria for disaster relief forces might, for example, be established. In any case, it can be expected to need to enlist the help of agencies which can ensure effective military action; and countries which do not have the potential of the United States for unilateral military operations will continue to need to be able to have a means of coordinating their actions, just as the United States will continue to need the political support and acceptability conferred by joint operations. For the foreseeable future only NATO - and, for European consultation and coordination, the WEU - meet these political and military requirements.

Where could this take us? The Western Europeans, like the Americans, are now looking at a new world of cooperation between East and West, joining with other countries to meet the challenges of the globe as a whole, and, as implied by Lord Carver, protecting their own security in the process. That globe still needs assisting and on occasions policing, and military power, including the special flexibility and mobility conferred by sea power, still has a part to play in this. The likely future position of Western European countries in regard to power projection is nonetheless built on uncertain foundations, much depending on the way the European Community, NATO, the WEU and the United Nations develop, and how the security dimensions of new relationships with the East - such as the recently agreed Community Associate status for Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia - evolve.

Fortunately the two principal European maritime powers, France and Britain, are made of robust stuff when it comes to political will: much depends on them, as members of the Security Council, with deep water navies, and with experience of policing the world, if the flags of Western European nations, or a European Union flag, are to fly outside the European theatre on peacekeeping or humanitarian operations. It is perhaps as well

that neither country is willing lightly to discard the ability to contribute to the projection of power by sea.

Section II

The 21st Century and Naval Expeditionary Forces: Developing Issues and Constraining Factors

In this final section attention is turned from the immediate implications of recent conflicts to longer horizon developments that will affect naval expeditionary forces well into the coming century. Dr. James Brooke examines the issues of survivability and vulnerability of forces in a naval expeditionary setting, which he views as functions of the time necessary to move people and equipment from ship to shore. While modern transport vehicles reduce exposure time, the threat of advanced weapons systems falling into the hands of Third World opponents heightens the level of risk to men and material. In particular, enhanced air power capabilities allow so-called rogue nations to challenge the forcible entry capabilities of U.S. naval expeditionary forces.

With air power as the major risk to NEF operations, air supremacy constitutes the primary means of undercutting this threat. To achieve air supremacy, an adversary's air power must be thwarted through denial of air bases from which to launch attacks, as demonstrated during Desert Storm. Conducting an airbase attack campaign is not easy to execute in this era of weapon and technology proliferation, but the trend toward "smart" attributes in current weapons systems is increasing lethality, precision, weapon reach, and versatility. These enhanced capabilities provide for more precise and effective targeting and thus help eliminate a major challenge to amphibious operations in a hostile environment.

MajGen Robert Tiebout provides an overview of the Systems Acquisition environment in which the Marine Corps operates. He

asserts that any successful acquisition program must harness three independent yet interdependent processes: 1) the Requirements Generation System (validated requirement); 2) the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (adequate funding); and 3) the Acquisition Management System (adherence to prescribed management practices).

When an acquisition program is formally initiated, there are a wide variety of methods or acquisition strategies that can be employed to satisfy an operational requirement as defined by the Commandant and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC). The ultimate goal in these efforts is to achieve the greatest "bang for the buck." To this end, the Marines exploit Navy-managed programs, other service programs, joint service programs, and Marine Corps unilateral program.

Aside from developing its own systems, a number of alternative strategies are available to the Marine Corps in the acquisition process, including the Service Life Extension Program, the Product Improvement Program, the Non-Developmental Item Program, and the Evolutionary Acquisition Program. During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the Marine Corps employed a number of innovative procedures for obtaining critically needed equipment, including additional procurement of night vision goggles, accelerated fielding of the M1A1 Main Battle Tank, equipment loans from the Army of M9 Armored Combat Earthmovers, and quick reaction procurement of such items as desert boots.

In the future, Marine acquisition priorities will focus on such equipment as night vision goggles and countermine devices that proved their worth during the Gulf War. In addition, the value of tactical intelligence systems and the Army's Multiple Launch Rocket System earmark them as high priority acquisition items for the coming years. With the ongoing and proposed military budget cuts, a strong relationship must be maintained between the equipment users in the Fleet Marine Force and the material developers to achieve the most efficient return on dwindling procurement funds.

Emerging Technologies And Expeditionary Force Operations

Dr. James R. Brooke

INTRODUCTION

The issue which this paper attempts to address is one of survivability . . . survivability for expeditionary naval forces conducting amphibious operations. The world security environment may be changing but at least one fact of expeditionary warfare is not: It still takes *time* to move people and equipment from ship to shore. *Time* is vulnerability and vulnerability for troops and equipment during an amphibious landing is obviously an element of combat that any on-scene commander would try to minimize.


This paper, therefore, takes a top-level look at a few emerging technologies that will assist in minimizing the inherent vulnerability of expeditionary amphibious operations and help ensure a more uninterrupted flow of movement to an inland objective.

WHAT IS THE PROBLEM?

The basic problem (referring to Figure 1) is that one can calculate the time required to move two Marine Expeditionary Brigades (with two helicopter lift cycles) from the bottom of the page ("departure point") to the ("objective") to be about 70-90 minutes. Even that figure is a conservative estimate and does not take into account adverse weather or enemy resistance on shore. The challenge thus becomes how to help ensure an uninterrupted flow of men and equipment, close to shore, in a hostile environment.

Indeed, technology is emerging today which is cutting the time of movement for landing operations. Vehicles are in design that

**PROBLEM: THIS EVOLUTION TAKES TIME AND IS VULNERABLE
— Must Ensure Uninterrupted Flow**



9-JUL-86

FIGURE 1

Basic diagram extract from Landing Force Amphibious Operations Planning MCDEC, 1985

speed the flow to lessen troop and equipment exposure time. But it is still an extremely vulnerable operation, made even more risky by the threat of combat technology proliferation throughout the world, especially to areas where U.S. expeditionary forces might find themselves involved in the future.

Figure 2 is a listing compiled from several open sources of just some of the technological capability that is proliferating throughout the Third World. Each one of these combat systems makes potential warfare in those regions that much more lethal. Each one presents challenging consequences to any expeditionary force activity, but especially to amphibious landing operations.

With the demise of the Soviet Union and a resultant arms bazaar filled with even more combat technology, one could make the judgment that so-called regional rogue nations could acquire this equipment at a much faster rate than has heretofore been reported. This emerging, chaotic arms market is listed as one cause of more likely smaller regional conflicts while at the same time creating a greater risk to U.S. troops deployed to quell any crisis. A recent *Jane's Defense Weekly* (11 Jan 92, pg. 53) lists no less than 74 global hot spots . . . a ready-made demand side economy for acquisition of advanced weaponry.

Referring again to Figure 2, noteworthy is the increase in sophisticated air power capability within the Third World. A nation's air power—and combat aircraft in particular—represent international prestige and provide domestic political status. Stealth technology, extended range, supersonic speeds and enhanced payload capacity are all elements of air power that would allow some so-called rogue nations to ultimately put forces at risk. Air power in the Third World is a significant cause for concern to U.S. contingency planners for more than any other warfighting capability, this would present a formidable obstacle to the successful completion of any U.S. expeditionary force operation.

Figure 3 illustrates the extent of Third World investment in combat aircraft. Probably the most telling statistic of all is that 23 nations with a gross domestic product per individual of less than

THE THREAT VS. EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS IS FORMIDABLE AND GLOBAL

- Third World Military Capabilities, Current - 2010 -

<i>Capability</i>	<i>Main Countries Having</i>	<i>Main Countries Providing</i>
Modern tactical aircraft in significant numbers (stealth technology in demand and appearing to some extent in designs)	All in Middle East and Southwest Asia; India; Pakistan; China, Latin America; Japan; North and South Korea	U.S.; USSR; France; U.K.; some indigenous
Anti-ship guided missiles; potentially stealthy; fast maneuvering	70 countries	France; U.S.; USSR; China; others
Modern, quiet non-nuclear submarines (44 now; 84 near term)	India; Pakistan; Egypt; Israel; South Africa; Taiwan; China; 7 Latin America; South Korea; Middle East; Southwest Asia; Southeast Asia; others considering	Germany; U.K.; France; Sweden; the Netherlands
Mines & advanced torpedoes	All that have submarines; 21 countries with naval mining capabilities, some modern	Sames as above, plus USSR, U.S., others
Chemical weapons	14 countries have capability; 10 more developing it	Germany; Brazil; basic chemicals easily available
Modern air defense weapons/systems (especially shoulder-fired)	All Middle East and Southwest Asia; India; Pakistan; Japan; China; North and South Korea; many others	U.S.; USSR; France; U.K.

Air Power in 3rd World is Cause for Concern

Source: ACDA, Jane's, IJSS

FIGURE 2

11/5/91

A ROUGH MEASURE OF NATIONAL DETERMINATION TO POSSESS AIRPOWER

— A Key National Military Value —

Nation	Gross Domestic Product/Capita (\$) *	Number Combatant Aircraft**	By Contrast (\$)
Mozambique	110	43	2,500
Cambodia	130	17	2,200
Ethiopia	130	120	3,400
Laos	150	34	3,200
Madagascar	160	12	4,600
Bangladesh	180	82	1,240
Chad	190	4	6,000
Zaire	190	28	10,300
Afghanistia	200	188	
Somalia	210	44	
Vietnam	220	250	
Mali	220	26	
Tanzania	240	24	
Nigeria	270	95	
Burma	280	16	
Guinea	350	12	
Kenya	360	28	
Sri Lanka	370	9	
Ghana	400	18	
India	400	833	
Pakistan	410	470	
Indonesia	430	81	
Zimbabwe	470	81	

- World Average: 3,870
- US: 21,000

23 Nations With GDP/capita \$500/year possess 2515 combat aircraft

* World Defense Almanac, 1990-91, "Military Technology" Monech Publishing Group, Bonn, Germany;
 ** The Military Balance, 1990-91, IISS

• Probably either exceeding requirements or of limited utility for external defense in most cases

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FIGURE 3

\$500 per year possess over 2,515 combat aircraft and 127 major air bases. These are nations whose domestic needs would seem to far outweigh requirements for air power. And the bad news is that their major air bases (referring to Figure 4) happen to be located in just those regions where naval expeditionary forces have fought before and where many of the 74 potential hot spots identified by *Jane's* (as mentioned earlier in this paper) exist today.

SOLUTIONS

If air power is the risk to expeditionary operations, then air supremacy must be the answer. As was demonstrated in Desert Storm by coalition air forces, air supremacy (or enemy sortie reduction) was the primary means of achieving early dominance. Air supremacy was the paramount element of the campaign that created a suitable environment to carry out the President's objective ... and air base denial was the key.

Destruction of an adversary's air power through air base attack would reduce sortie generation and help ensure a more uninterrupted flow on men and equipment from ship to shore. This element of air supremacy would provide that freedom of action requisite for successful amphibious operations.

Conducting an air base attack campaign to establish air supremacy is not easy to execute in this era of weapon and technology proliferation. Aircraft on the ground are becoming harder and harder to kill. They are now located in extremely hardened shelters or, as in the case of North Korea, buried deep inside mountains. Ammo bunkers, aviation fuel stations, C³ nodes are all becoming more difficult to target due to their concealment or hardened characteristics.

Trends in current weapon system technology towards "smart" attributes are responding to these emerging targeting requirements. *Lethality* (or accuracy), placing ordnance on the right spot, not just any spot, can provide significant operational payoffs in terms of weapons, sorties and lives (both military and civilian) saved. *Target discrimination*—the capability to discern between de-

THIRD WORLD MAJOR AIR BASES




FIGURE 4

coys and actual targets—pays significant dividends in terms of ordnance, sorties and time saved. Weapon *reach* provides important flexibility . . . being able to launch from a safe stand off distance outside of an enemy's threat envelope. *Mission planning* must become more user friendly and responsive. As is, it takes too long to plan a strike mission, be it one with air-launched systems or those from naval cruise missile-configured ships at sea. *Multi-mission capability* is becoming a necessity in the new combat environment. Nonlethal missions such as reconnaissance, surveillance, bomb damage assessment and locating and identifying critical mobile targets are now as important as the more traditional lethal missions. These five emerging technologies employed properly can enhance the probability of success for future naval expeditionary force operations.

Subsequent sections of this paper will be devoted to discussing each of these five technologies and highlighting their "value added" in denying an enemy's air power to place expeditionary forces at risk.


LETHALITY

Lethality means accuracy. The goal seems simple . . . to deliver an explosive warhead on a critical spot within the target area. We all watched CNN in fascination as highly accurate precision munitions being guided by pilots using video displays hit a spot in the crosshairs of their target indicator. Dropping large numbers of "dumb" bombs with the potential for massive collateral damage is giving way to smaller payloads, smaller warheads, more precise guidance systems, and minimal collateral damage. The critical factor is CEP—circular error probable—the radius within which 50% of one's ordnance can be expected to land. Obviously, the lower the CEP factor, the more precision is involved, and as Figure 5 illustrates this greater precision saves weapons, sorties and puts fewer lives (on *both* sides) at risk.

One important lesson from Desert Storm was that we must have weapons in our inventory with the precision to penetrate and collapse hardened aircraft shelters and bunkers. We must also have

SIGNIFICANCE OF HIGH ACCURACY


Hitting a vulnerable element will destroy the structure



Small, hardened targets require higher accuracy



Collateral damage reduced



506-15

• Fewer weapons, sorties or POWs/MIAs/KIAs

FIGURE 5

the weapon precision to attack—without unnecessary collateral damage—air base targets such as C³ facilities or command structures which are increasingly being discovered in populated areas. If air supremacy is the goal and air base attack is the strategy for achieving this goal, then precision weapons allowing high accuracy ordnance on critical hardened aircraft shelters and sortie generating facilities are paramount. For example, just by improving CEP from 60' to low single digits through smart guidance technology one can cut by one-half the number of weapons required to destroy a set of 51 generic air base targets. The technology trend in smart guidance systems is towards very low CEP (single digits) translating into smaller warheads, longer reach (due to additional weapon system fuel capacity available) and fewer sorties.

REACH

Weapon system reach is becoming increasingly critical in this era of a reduced force structure. Weapons that can “stretch” the combat utility of a declining number of assets can yield extremely useful operational payoffs. Cruise missiles that have ranges up to and over 1000 nm allow an expeditionary force battle group to stand-off launch and hit key air bases located deep inside an adversary's territory. Additionally it would allow these forces to respond to two or more crisis within the same theater simultaneously . . . a key attribute when a force structure of fewer ships are required to maintain the peace within a wider geographical area.

Promising technology such as integrated high-performance turbines offers increasing thrust per unit air flow while at the same time lowers specific fuel consumption and cost. It is not too far-fetched to think of a 3000 nm autonomous, low-CEP, unmanned strike system in our weapons inventory by the year 2005. Implications of this technology for the successful conduct of expeditionary force operations are clear . . . with the flexibility of increased range, refuge for adversary aircraft and other critical assets that could potentially impede the flow of an amphibious landing would now be targetable by the strike warfare component.

MISSION PLANNING

The capability to plan a strike mission quickly or in response to an emergent requirement is also going through significant technological advancements at present. Elements of mission planning include time-of-arrival control, search planning, situation assessment, mission management and fault diagnostic/mitigation, all of which currently are decentralized elements of process. The goal for technology is to compress the time and data required for accurate mission planning so as to allow the actual planning computations to be done either on-board the platform firing the weapon or, in the case of advance technology, on-board the weapon itself. Time compression, movement of more mission planning effort toward the weapon, and platform control of the strike execution process are three significant improvements to mission planning that will be employed early in the 21st century.

True "launch and leave" capability, obtaining target and intelligence updates while en route, communicating reconnaissance or strike data back to the launching platform, conducting "smart" search tactics as well as dynamic inflight replanning are all facets of the mission planning problem that are being addressed by industry today. These technological advances would increase the probability of kill (P_k) during an air base attack strike by allowing immediate weapon system response to the changing tactical situation.

TARGET DISCRIMINATION

The battlefield today is a very confusing environment. Decoys, concealment, weather, obscurants, flares and chaff, high energy lasers, and target mobility are just some of the elements existing on battlefields today that degrade weapon performance. Certainly the Scud problem in Desert Storm brought this dilemma to light . . . first finding a potential target, then deciding that it is an actual missile site (not a decoy) and finally putting ordnance on it before it moves somewhere else or becomes concealed. Aircraft and runway damage decoys were also utilized by the Iraqis in their effort to cause the coalition force to waste ordnance or bypass actual

targets . . . this complicated somewhat the air base attack campaign in their efforts to gain air supremacy. If expeditionary forces conducting a landing operation are to minimize casualties from a possible enemy air attack, the campaign to deny sortie generation from major air bases must include weapon systems that incorporate sophisticated sensors and radars that can discriminate between decoys and targets and penetrate adverse weather.

Different sensors provide significant capability against different elements of the confusing battlefield environment described above. No one sensor can do it all. For example, as illustrated in Figure 6, Laser Radar (or LADAR) has good capability to identify targets (high resolution display) and pick through decoys and jamming but extremely poor capability in penetrating adverse weather. On the other hand, synthetic aperture radar (SAR) has excellent capability in adverse weather but only fair results in an environment of countermeasures and target identification. The key for technology is to maximize sensor comparative advantage and combine them so as to be able to offer combat capability against the entire spectrum—target identification, countermeasures and weather—of distracting battlefield elements.

Technological advances in data fusion allow engineers today to begin combining different sets of sensors and mount them in the front ends of weapon systems. The operational payoffs of this engineering enhancement are significant: if only priority targets are struck while decoys are bypassed and mobile targets are now more vulnerable, these advantages will translate into increased target kills per weapons, allowing the warfare commander to conserve ordnance and sorties.

MULTI-MISSION CAPABILITY

The lack of timely battlefield intelligence was another lesson learned from Desert Storm. The capability to accurately and expeditiously update the very dynamic situation within the warfare area, to conduct bomb damage assessment and then to transmit this information to oncoming strike leaders or cruise missile launch platforms was deficient. A consequence of this deficiency

MULTIPLE SENSORS PROVIDE ACCURACY & TARGET IDENTIFICATION WHILE DEFEATING COUNTERMEASURES & ADVERSE WEATHER

Sensor	Characteristic			Capability				Countermeasures				Environment					
	High guidance accuracy (high resolution)	Target set flexibility	Target identification	Airpoint selection	Target signature stability	Target signature predictability	Low detectability	Smoke	Camouflage	Decoys	Jamming	Rain	Fog	Blowing Sand	Clouds (steep dive)	Wet surfaces	
Laser Radar	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
I2R	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
MMW Radar	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
SAR	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
IRST	●	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
MMW Radiometer	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○

Sensor Capability
 ○ None/min.
 ● Fair/Some
 ● Good/full

CS21-46C

FIGURE 6

was that ordnance was possibly assigned to targets already destroyed or non-existent, sorties were expended where not needed and lives may have been placed unnecessarily at risk.


These types of missions -- reconnaissance, intelligence and bomb damage assessment—are now commonly referred to as non-lethal missions. They include intelligence gathering and processing as well as locating and identifying critical mobile targets. New, non-lethal system architectures, employment concepts and payloads are being examined by industry today to respond to this requirement. Autonomous weapon systems, designed to be launched at long range to loiter, search at low altitude and data link back battlefield intelligence and target information without placing any lives at risk, will become a necessary military asset. This multi-mission capability emerging from cruise missile and precision weapon technology advancements will most assuredly assist in conducting an air base denial campaign more efficiently and cost effectively. Being able to adjust strategy during real-time operations will save weapons, sorties, time and, ultimately, lives.

SUMMARY

The assumption in this paper has been that expeditionary force operations—those operations involving the movement of men and equipment from ships at sea to objectives inland—are becoming more vulnerable during this era of weapons proliferation to Third World nations. The key proliferation problem identified has been the ability to accumulate unprecedented numbers of sophisticated combat aircraft, aircraft that could very easily put U.S. expeditionary forces at risk.

The challenge for the defense industry thus becomes how to develop technology that would respond to the requirement of ensuring expeditionary force survival. The question is: Given that air combat aircraft pose a threat to amphibious operations, what are the trends in ongoing weapon system lethal and non-lethal technology that could assist in an air supremacy, or air base denial campaign to ensure uninterrupted flow of expeditionary force movement? Five technologies have been discussed—current ad-

vancements in accuracy, weapon reach, target discrimination, mission planning and multi-mission capability will all lend assistance in ensuring a viable and successful amphibious landing evolution. These technologies are not in the distant future, but are being engineered now in response to an uncertain threat environment that will require naval expeditionary force presence around the world.



Acquisition Priorities And R&D Strategies

MajGen Robert Tiebout, USMC

INTRODUCTION

In the world of System Acquisition, many factors contribute to the formulation of program priorities and the acquisition strategies used. This article provides an overview of the Systems Acquisition environment in which the Marine Corps operates, and outlines some of the acquisition strategies used to obtain equipment end items for the Fleet Marine Forces. Selected insight is also provided to the unique circumstances associated with equipment acquired during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and the Marine Corps input to the 1994 Presidential Budget.

ACQUISITION ENVIRONMENT

The Systems Acquisition Environment can appear confusing and hostile, especially to those who are not intimately familiar with the details of the process. Virtually all aspects of public life have some effect on how we go about providing equipment and material to our fighting forces.

The effects that some of these forces have are readily visible. Special interest groups, such as environmentalists and anti-nuclear organizations, maintain constant vigils at selected ammunition depots and weapons stations to voice their opposition to military practices. Veterans groups and many industrial societies, on the other hand, provide strong support to the systems acquisition community. The media, the courts, the Congress, international diplomatic policies, and public opinion all make significant contributions to the environment that surrounds systems acquisition.

Any successful acquisition program must harness three independent yet interdependent processes: (1) the Requirements Generation System; (2) the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System; and (3) the Acquisition Management System. Stated more directly, all acquisition programs must:

- (1) Have an approved/validated requirement
- (2) Have adequate funding throughout the program life cycle
- (3) Follow prescribed management practices.

The Marine Corps implements these processes in a manner that is similar to those methods used by other services. The most visible differences in the process arise from accommodating two military services within the Department of the Navy (i.e., the Navy and the Marine Corps).

Requirements Generation System. The generation of the Marine Corps' requirements is accomplished through the Concept Based Requirements System, managed by the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC). The Warfighting Center within MCCDC serves as the field Marine's proponent in the development of tactics, doctrine, and techniques, as well as in the development of requirements for manning, training, and equipment.

The implementation of the Concept Based Requirements System begins with the Marine Corps Campaign Plan. This document is prepared every four years as a new Commandant assumes office. The Campaign Plan captures the vision of the Commandant and provides strategic direction for the next four years. Within the context of the Marine Corps Campaign Plan, MCCDC conducts analyses of the warfare areas in which the Marine Corps has responsibility. These Mission Area Analyses provide the analytical baseline for the Marine Corps Long Range Plan; a document that encompasses the social, economic, political, and military posture for 20 years into the future.

From the direction provided in the Marine Corps Campaign Plan and the Marine Corps Long Range Plan, the Warfighting Center initiates efforts to prioritize the deficiencies identified.

Deficiencies within each mission area are consolidated and documented in the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Master Plan. Top ranked categories from the MAGTF Master Plan receive the greatest attention in the preparation of Mission Needs Statements. In this sense, the MAGTF Master Plan serves as the bridge for the Marine Corps between the Requirements Generation System and the Acquisition Management System.

The MAGTF Master Plan priorities are also used in establishing priorities in the budget development process. In this aspect, the MAGTF Master Plan also forms the bridge from the Requirements Generation System to the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System.

Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). While the PPBS addresses all aspects of how the Department of Defense expects to achieve its strategic objectives, the principal focus centers around the development of the President's Budget. The PPBS within the Marine Corps is managed from Headquarters, Marine Corps by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Requirements and Programs. While the process addresses the allocation of the total funds authorized to the Marine Corps; the systems acquisition community is most directly affected by the resources allocated to the following appropriations: Research and Development, Procurement, and Operations and Maintenance. Unless the proper type of funding is allocated to a program in the fiscal year in which it is required, an acquisition program may become "unexecutable." As a result, the program baseline agreement (which establishes cost, schedule, and performance parameters) would need to be adjusted to reflect the funding provided. In this manner, the Programs Objectives Memorandum (POM) in the budget developmental process provides the bridge between the PPBS and the Acquisition Management System.

Acquisition Management System. When a requirement has been identified that entails acquiring new equipment and funding has been allocated to acquire this capability, the program comes under the Acquisition Management System. The principal thrust of the Acquisition Management System is to ensure that the most cost ef-

fective solution to the stated requirement is obtained in a timely manner. The process is divided into several phases, with major reviews or decision milestones that must be achieved before a program can leave one phase and enter the subsequent phase.

Each system is complex in its own right, but managing the interactions between the system is essential for program success. The decision to continue a program into the next acquisition phase is strongly dependent on how well the program has progressed in satisfying the operational requirements, its technical maturity, and the affordability of the solutions being pursued. The flexibility within each of the systems diminishes as the program matures and enters the production phase.

ACQUISITION STRATEGIES

When an acquisition program is formally initiated, there are a wide variety of methods or acquisition strategies that can be employed to satisfy the operational requirement. The Marine Corps strives to obtain the most "bang for the buck" in all acquisition efforts. The National Security Act of 1947 permits the Marine Corps to enter material acquisition in areas that are unique to our assigned mission. To that end, we rely heavily on the systems acquisition efforts of our sister Services to satisfy our material requirements. Before we enter into a unilateral Marine Corps development program, we first attempt to identify acquisition strategies in which the cost of systems acquisition (and follow-on support) can be shared with another military Service. Some examples are provided below.

Navy-Managed Programs. In the areas of aircraft, communications security, and fixed, shore-based communications facilities, the Chief of Naval Operations has the responsibility of satisfying the operational requirements of the Marine Corps. Once a material need has been identified in one of these areas, the requirement document is passed to the Navy for development/acquisition. All activities of the PPBS and Acquisition Management System are conducted by the Navy in support of the Marine Corps. While there is never a large quantity of Navy managed programs ongoing

at any one time, the financial contributions by the Navy to satisfy such needs is highly significant. The AV-8B Harrier aircraft is an example of a Navy-managed program for Marine Corps only use.

Other Service Programs. Another acquisition strategy often pursued by the Marine Corps is to procure equipment items that have been developed by other Services. In the implementation of this strategy, the Marine Corps does not actively participate in the development phases of the program. The efforts of other Services are monitored to ensure Marine Corps requirements are being satisfied. At the conclusion of development and subsequent testing, the Marine Corps decides whether or not to join in the procurement of the item.

While this acquisition strategy significantly reduces the development risks and the requirement for R&D funding, it deprives the Marine Corps of the opportunity to participate in design decisions. Examples of programs that have been pursued as Other Service Programs include the M1A1 Main Battle Tank and the Single Channel Ground/Air Radio System.

Joint Service Programs. When some Marine Corps requirements for a piece of equipment significantly differ from those of other Services, it becomes more advantageous to pursue development as a Joint Service Program. Normally, a Memorandum of Agreement will be executed that defines the responsibilities of each participating Service. The lead Service provides the Program Manager and the majority of funding necessary to satisfy all common requirements. Other participating Services usually provide a Deputy Program Manager as well as funding to satisfy any requirements that are Service-unique. Use of this acquisition strategy drastically reduces development costs to the Marine Corps. Significant savings also result from economies of scale experienced in a larger production base.

Marine Corps Unilateral Program. For acquisition efforts in which no other Service has similar requirements, the Marine Corps assumes management and financial responsibility for all aspects of the program. Needless to say, a unilateral program is the

least preferred of the acquisition strategies discussed to this point. Significant financial and management resources must be expended in the implementation of unilateral programs. An additional impediment to pursuit of Marine Corps unilateral programs is the continuous justification of the program requirement that inevitably takes place. It is often difficult to communicate to members of the congressional staff the subtle difference in mission, tactics, doctrine, techniques, or environments that make equipment used by other services unacceptable to the Marine Corps.

Having accepted the burden of managing a unilateral program, there remain a number of methods that can be used to increase the effectiveness of our systems acquisition investment. Alternate acquisition strategies are selected during the Concept exploration/Definition Phase as a result of a Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis. The following alternative strategies are routinely addressed:

- Service Life Extension Program
- Product Improvement Program
- Non-Developmental Item Program
- Evolutionary Acquisition Program
- New Development Program

Service Life Extension Program. Often a currently fielded piece of equipment can continue to satisfy an operational requirement, but it may become uneconomical to maintain, or operationally ineffective, without modification. In such instances, a Service Life Extension Program can provide for the modification or upgrade of selective components to keep the equipment serviceable. A Service Life Extension Program, by its nature, does not significantly enhance the capability of the weapon system, but focuses on maintaining the existing capability for a longer period of time. An example of a Service Life Extension Program is the replacement of engines or suspensions of an entire fleet of vehicles to permit extended use of the vehicles beyond their initially intended Service Life.

Product Improvement Program. It is sometimes more efficient to respond to a changing operational requirement by enhancing the

capability of equipment already fielded. In response to a changing threat, for example, the Marine Assault Amphibian Vehicle was modified to include an upgraded weapon system, an enhanced fire suppression system, and upgraded applique armor. The incorporation of these improvements was significantly more cost effective than developing and building an entirely new assault vehicle.

Non-Developmental Item. When commercial industry has developed equipment that can satisfy an operational requirement, the item is obtained as a Non-Developmental Item through "off-the-shelf" acquisition. When a program manager believes that commercial solutions exist, a formal market survey is conducted, followed by solicitation, selection, and purchase. When a commercial item is identified that can satisfy most, but not all, of the operational requirements, a maturation phase is conducted to permit the development of the additional characteristics required. The use of Non-Developmental Items in recent years has paid tremendous dividends to the Services. It permits rapid fielding of equipment, the incorporation of the latest technology, and makes maximum utilization of the existing production base. The Non-Developmental Item approach was employed in the acquisition of the Riverine Assault Craft, which was fielded in less than one year from the identification of the requirement.

Evolutionary Acquisition. Many areas of technology are changing so rapidly that items are technologically obsolete before they can be completely produced and fielded. The communication and electronics industries provide prime examples. Evolutionary Acquisition recognizes this rapidly changing environment and provides flexibility in the approach to systems acquisition. Evolutionary Acquisition is most easily thought of as a continuous cycle of "build-a-little, test-a-little, field-a-little." While the overall system requirement remains in focus, no attempt is made to obtain the entire capability in one large step. Evolutionary Acquisition is a series of integrated events directed at providing a specified capability. The Marine Tactical Command and Control System is being pursued as an Evolutionary Acquisition.

New Development Program. There are occasions when the most efficient method of satisfying an operational requirement is the initiation of a new acquisition program. This approach implies the systematic evolution of alternative concepts, the integration of new technology, the development and evaluation of competing system design alternatives, and entry into production of a completely new piece of equipment. The road to successful fielding of a "new start" is filled with potential pitfalls and represents the most challenging of acquisition strategies. The Marine Corps is currently pursuing this strategy in the Advanced Amphibious Assault (AAA) Program.

Foreign Military Sales. Even after a piece of equipment enters production, the industrial base can be expanded by the use of Foreign Military Sales. In some instances, the quantity of items produced for off-shore customers far exceeds the quantity produced for the United States Military Services. Recent sales of the Light Armored Vehicle to international customers is a prime example of a Foreign Military Sales program.

SYSTEMS ACQUISITION DURING DESERT STORM

Nothing tests the viability of the Acquisition Management System like the urgency imposed during times of conflict. We recently experienced such conditions in support of our Marine forces engaged in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Strong communication was maintained between the Marines in the combat environment, their proponent at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), and the Marine Corps Research, Development, and Acquisition Command (MCRDAC). Procurement and acquisition decisions were greatly accelerated to respond to the time constraints of a combat situation. As always, requirements were initiated by Marines in the field and communicated to their proponent at the MCCDC Warfighting Center. At MCCDC, the requirements were quickly evaluated and, if deemed valid, forwarded to MCRDAC for implementation. If requirements could not be satisfied by equipment currently on hand, a Statement of Urgency was prepared authorizing the use of contracting methods

reserved for extraordinary situations. The needed equipment was acquired and shipped directly to Marines in Southwest Asia.

ACQUISITION METHODOLOGIES IN SUPPORT OF DESERT STORM

Depending on the nature of the material requirement, several methods were used to procure equipment to support Operation Desert Storm. The principal methods are listed below and discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

- Additional Procurement of Fielded Equipment
- Accelerated Fielding
- Equipment Loans
- Quick Reaction Procurement

Additional Procurement of Fielded Equipment. In some cases, equipment items already fielded were required in greater quantity than had been supplied to the operational forces. Night vision goggles were in high demand because of the increased emphasis on night time operations during Desert Shield/Storm. To satisfy the urgent requirement, 350 additional goggles were obtained through an existing Army contract and provided to combat units. A similar situation existed in obtaining position/location equipment. Due to the desert environment and lack of natural geographic landmarks for accurate location information, the Global Positioning System was also in high demand. Seven hundred standard commercial Global Positioning System Receivers were obtained by amending an existing contract, and provided to Southwest Asia.

Accelerated Fielding. Urgent requirements were also satisfied through early fielding of equipment that was already being acquired, but had yet to be provided to the field. The M1A1 Main Battle Tank is an excellent example of such early fielding.

Operational use of the M1A1 in the Marine Corps was not scheduled until six months after Desert Storm began. In order to provide the new tank to Desert Storm, 108 tanks were obtained through a loan agreement with the Army. Crew and maintenance

training, as well as all required logistic support, were greatly accelerated to accomplish the early fielding.

The success of the efforts by the acquisition community is best reflected by the performance of one Marine Reserve Unit in combat. Using the newly acquired M1s, one tank company destroyed 34 of 35 enemy tanks encountered in a 15-minute period, without sustaining a single hit on their own vehicles.

The air defense community also fielded an early warning device to cue STINGER missile gunners, The Lightweight Early Warning Detector Device fielding was accelerated by nine months through early acceptance of pre-production models.

Equipment Loans. Equipment loans among the Services were also commonplace. The Marine Corps was loaned 30 M9 Armored Combat Earthmovers from the Army. We also borrowed one Senior Warrior System from the Air Force. The Senior Warrior is a tactical intelligence system that provides signal intelligence and direction finding from a non-dedicated KC-130 aircraft. Marines using the Senior Warrior obtained the signal intelligence information "first heard" during Iraq's invasion of Kafji.

Equipment loans were not a one-way street. The Marine Corps provided the Army 150 Shoulder-Launch Multipurpose Assault Weapons, associated ammunition, and a qualified instructor. The unique feature of the weapon allows the munitions to penetrate earthen targets prior to detonation, causing significantly greater destruction than if the rounds exploded on the outer surface.

Quick Reaction Procurement. In some instances, new equipment items were obtained to satisfy the unique combat environment encountered in Southwest Asia. In each case, procurement action was initiated in response to an approved Statement of Urgency in full coordination with the Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Examples of systems obtained in this manner include:

- Anti-magnetic Mine Activating Device
- Light Strike Vehicle

- Special Applications Scoped Rifle
- Desert Boots

Follow-on Actions. It should be recognized that the combat environment surrounding Operation Desert Storm and the acquisition support provided, contained many unique circumstances. Considerable effort has been expended to make maximum practical use of the lessons learned from this campaign, within the context of the Marine Corps' world-wide mission.

At the conclusion of hostilities, MCRDAC reviewed each Desert Storm initiative to ensure that adequate logistic support was being provided for items that would remain in the field. Action was also taken to recover some special use items and to prepare them for storage and potential future use. The Marine Corps Combat Development Command assembled Battlefield Assessment Teams that explored all aspects of the combat operations for incorporation into the Marine Corps Lessons Learned System. When consolidated into the computer-based Lessons Learned System, the data and information are readily available to warfighters, material developers, and logisticians in planning future development of tactics, doctrine, techniques, and equipment.

ACQUISITION PRIORITIES

As discussed earlier, acquisition priorities are affected by a wide variety of internal and external forces. Clearly, there are some trends that came out of Southwest Asia that warrant further attention. The importance of night vision equipment, for example, was highlighted during Desert Storm since many of the combat activities occurred at night. Maintaining and developing the ability to counter/neutralize mines was also readily apparent as U.S. Forces encountered the most extensive mine fields in the history of military combat. Additionally, the value of tactical intelligence systems and the importance of their contribution was clearly emphasized during Desert Storm. Using techniques now available, the Marine in the field can be given the most recent photo intelligence data—electronically. And certainly, the awesome effect that the

Army's Multiple Launch Rocket System imparted on the enemy's equipment and morale was fully demonstrated.

Material acquisition priorities are not established by the material developer. They are, appropriately, determined by the equipment users in the Fleet Marine Force. This process is currently ongoing in support of developing the 1994 Presidential Budget submission. In response to the users' requirements, MCRDAC submitted program initiatives during September 1991. At the time of this writing, Fleet Marine Force representatives are prioritizing these initiatives by their relative merit or benefit to the operational community. By January 1992, the initiatives will be prioritized in terms of cost-effectiveness to the Marine Corps.

Although these future acquisition priorities have yet to emerge, the environment in which the programming is proceeding is not favorable. With recent changes in the world political environment, there is a general perception that the potential threat to national security has diminished. This diminished threat perception has caused political leaders to question continuing the level of investment in all aspects of military spending. To a certain extent, the overwhelming military success of Operation Desert Storm has also caused others to advocate protraction of our technology and acquisition efforts.

Funding reductions are a reality in all appropriations that directly affect combat capability. Although the FY 92 Defense appropriation bill has yet to become law, current projections indicate there will be significant reductions in both Research and Development, and Procurement appropriations. Unofficial projections for FY 93 indicate that reductions in that year may approach another 5%.


Total military end strength will decline sharply in the years ahead. The total acquisition work force will decrease by approximately 18% between the beginning of FY 90 and the end of FY 94.


This projected acquisition environment makes it even more important for us to continually focus our acquisition efforts. Through

rigorous application of Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analyses, we can emphasize military programs that provide the most effective use of limited funding. We can only afford to proceed with programs that are affordable within the context of the total Marine Corps investment budget.

CONCLUSION

The Marine Corps will continue into the 21st century as the nation's premier force in readiness. Through proper prioritization and selection of the most appropriate acquisition strategy, we can continue to provide our operational forces with the best combat equipment to accomplish the mission.







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